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Abstract
In Chapter One I motivate the search for an account o f approximate truth as being the 
way to make sense o f how our best scientific theories are simultaneously false but useful, 
and o f how the same theory (even a true one) varies in its usefulness depending on 
context. I evaluate existing approaches and find that they fail -  among other reasons -  
because they are unable to accommodate how two errors o f  similar logical seriousness 
nevertheless may have greatly different implications for approximate truth. The only 
way round this is some form o f weighting scheme across logical statements that is 
motivated by extra-logical criteria. The little existing work along these lines suffers from 
insufficient generality, and I suggest instead a weighting scheme based on the notion of 
causal strength.
In Chapter Two I develop the details o f following such a prescription. It turns out to be 
crucial to highlight a hitherto underappreciated dichotomy between what I label the 
‘ontological’ and ‘empirical’ senses o f approximate truth. After outlining the practical 
advantages o f  my approach I discuss a number o f technicalities, including several that 
confound all previous approaches. (I also outline an exact formal definition in an 
appendix.) Finally, I tackle the vexed issue o f comparing two models with 
incommensurable ontologies. One o f the results o f the complicated discussion is that no 
sense can be made o f science in general getting nearer the truth, only sense made o f 
particular models getting nearer the truth o f particular explananda.
In Chapter Three I flesh out the notion -  key for my scheme -  o f causal strength, giving a 
formal definition and sorting through the numerous necessary technicalities. I also 
explain how straightforward sense can be made o f causal strengths even in cases o f 




Chapter One -  How best to approach approximate truth?
1-1) Introduction -  the view from economics
1-2) The logical-similarity approach
1-3) Weaknesses o f the logical-similarity approach
1-4) Miller's objection revisited
1-5) Some other possible approaches
1-6) First ontological approaches
1-7) Idealisation, laws o f nature
Chapter Two -  Our own account
2-1) The basic idea
2-2) Two different intuitions
2-3) More on ontological approximate truth
2-4) More on empirical approximate truth
2-5) Our own scheme
2-6) Methodological utility
2-7) Relative versus absolute approximate truth
2-8) Approximate truth or approximate explanation?
2-9) Interest-relativity
2-10) Subjective and objective
2-11) Other discussions
2-12) When ontologies differ
2-13) More on translation I: when is it acceptable?
2-14) More on translation II: further discussions
Appendix -  An exact definition
Chapter Three -  Defining causal strength
3-1) Desiderata











To my parents, 
for their exceptional love and encouragement
4
Chapter One -  How best to approach approximate truth?
1-1) Introduction -  the view from economics
Initial motivation. Introductory example. A first notion o f  approximate truth: we 
want a context-specific account. Different motivations.
1-2) The logical-similarity approach
General agenda. First attempts. Oddie's approach for the propositional case. 
Niiniluoto's approach for the propositional case. Beyond the propositional case. 
Recent extensions.
1-3) Weaknesses of the logical-similarity approach
Language-dependence: Miller’s objection. Pure logic alone is not enough. 
Language and reality. Stubbornly false theories. Two measures in one. 
Summary.
1-4) Miller*s objection revisited
Relevance to our own eventual scheme. Mormann and conventionalism. Where 
does this leave us?
1-5) Some other possible approaches
Possible worlds. Structurelikeness. Partial truth.
1-6) First ontological approaches
Introduction. Giere as a precursor. Type-hierarchies and verisimilitude. Smith's 
geometric ontology. Barnes's approximate causal explanation.
1-7) Idealisation, laws of nature
Idealisation and approximate truth. The problem of legisimilitude. Our solution.
5
1-1) Introduction -  the view from economics
Initial motivation
I started with a basic intuition brought with me from economics. When tackling a real- 
world problem in that subject, in practice the most important thing is not to try to devise 
an exactly true model. Rather, the key is to be more modest and to settle merely for a 
true enough one. The success o f a piece o f economic analysis depends on a careful 
selection o f the right model for the right problem, often borrowing piecemeal from 
several different models. It is a matter o f getting sufficiently good -  not necessarily 
perfect -  matches. (The design o f the 1994 US spectrum auction is a good example of 
how successful applied economics works in this way [McMillan 1994] [McAfee and 
McMillan 1994] [Guala 2001].)
The aim o f  this thesis is to develop a coherent metaphysics to support this intuition, 
because at the moment none exists. This will enable us to make philosophical sense of 
economic practice. Moreover, it will also prove to be a usefully original route into the 
assessment o f approximate truth for science generally. In particular, we shall argue that 
the conception o f approximate truth appropriate to economics also turns out to be much 
the best one for the rest o f  science too.
Introductory example
Imagine being Gareth Southgate at the Euro 96 football championships, about to take a 
penalty for England in the semi-final shoot-out against Germany. The problem facing 
Southgate is how to shoot his penalty. Let us simplify and give him just two options -  
either he can shoot at the left side o f the goal or at the right. (In reality o f  course he 
would also be considering perhaps shooting at the centre o f the goal, whether to shoot the 
ball low or high, whether to shoot it with pace or with accuracy, and so on.) The other 
person in this confrontation is the German goalkeeper, Koepke. He too has a choice, of 
diving to the left or to the right. Koepke hopes that Southgate shoots the ball to the same 
side that he dives, since this increases his chance o f making a save. O f course for the
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same reason Southgate hopes that Koepke dives the opposite side to the one he shoots. 
The question is: taking all factors into account, which side should Southgate shoot in 
order to maximise his chances o f scoring the penalty, and which side should Koepke dive 
in order to maximise the chances o f  saving it? This is our real-life problem.
Thinking about this problem intuitively, it is hard to reach a definite answer. Suppose 
that Southgate prefers to shoot to the left rather than to the right. Then he might reason: I 
can shoot better to the left so therefore I should do that; but then again Koepke, knowing 
this, may therefore deliberately dive to that side and so I should in fact shoot to the right 
(the bluff); but then again Koepke might in turn anticipate this way o f  thinking and so 
dive to the right, and so I could in fact outwit him by shooting to the left after all (the 
double-bluff); but then again Koepke might also anticipate that, so... (triple-bluff); and so 
on and on ad infinitum. For his part, Koepke might also follow similar reasoning and so 
end up without any clear recommendation as to what to do either. Thus at the moment 
our analysis does not seem to have got us very far.
Suppose now we employ a new tool -  game theory. A game theoretical analysis o f this 
situation (or game) might proceed in the following way. We define two players in the 
penalty game, Southgate and Koepke. We define the strategies available to each o f them, 
in this case respectively either shooting or diving to the left or right. We define the 
payoffs to each o f them for each possible combination o f strategies, in this case the 
probability o f a goal being scored if  Southgate shoots left and Koepke dives left, if 
Southgate shoots left and Koepke dives right, if... etc. Technically we also need to make 
other assumptions, such as that each player knows the parameters o f the game (e.g. that 
Koepke knows that Southgate prefers shooting to the left, and knows by how much 
Southgate prefers it); that each knows that the other knows (and that the other knows that 
he knows, and that the other knows that he knows that the other knows, and that... etc); 
and that each player is rational in that he does his best to score (Southgate) or save 
(Koepke) the penalty, and is able to perform any necessary calculations for this.
Once all this 'structuring' o f the original penalty problem has been done, and precise
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values assigned to the various parameters, then game theory can, as it were, get to work.
It is able to calculate precise optimal strategies for both Southgate and Koepke, cutting 
through the seemingly infinite chain o f bluff and double-bluff described above. O f 
course this is the raison d'etre o f game theory: to provide a rigorous treatment o f just 
such seemingly intractable situations o f strategic interaction. The particular optimal 
strategies in the penalty game would likely be probabilistic for each player. For example, 
Southgate's optimal strategy might be to shoot left two-thirds o f the time and right one- 
third o f  the time, while Koepke's should perhaps be to dive left and right equally often. 
The exact probabilities would depend on, for example, just how much Southgate prefers 
shooting to the left, and just how much the goalkeeper can reduce the chance o f the 
penalty being scored by diving to the correct side.
What precisely do we mean by an 'optimal strategy'? Here it means that given what 
Koepke is doing, Southgate can do no better than his optimal strategy; and the same in 
reverse, i.e. that given Southgate's strategy, Koepke can do no better than his optimal 
strategy. In plainer words, each is doing the best given what the other is doing. This is 
therefore the only kind o f outcome in which neither player could be doing better by 
deviating to some alternative. For this reason, that outcome (known as a Nash 
equilibrium) would usually be reckoned a sensible solution for the penalty game. (There 
is much technical debate as to what in different contexts should be considered 'sensible'.)
Summing up so far, there are two sides to this whole exercise. On the one side is the 
real-life problem o f the penalty, waiting to be analysed. On the other is our model 
(derived from game theory) o f this penalty situation. The pattern o f this example -  trying 
to apply an internally rigorous but rather abstract theory to some real-life problem -  is 
fairly typical o f applied economics.
So what is the pertinence o f the example to this thesis? Suppose we wanted to criticise 
this application o f game theory to football. Criticism would be unlikely to focus on the 
rigour o f the calculations. Rather, it would likely focus instead on issues external to the 
actual nuts and bolts o f the analysis. Perhaps it might be argued that each player's choice
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of strategies had been unrealistically simplified to just two options each. Although game 
theory analysis with, say, nine strategies each is possible in principle, in practice an 
analytical solution would likely be too complex actually to calculate. Or what about 
psychological games, such as Koepke putting off Southgate by delaying the taking o f  the 
kick? Again, in principle this too might be analysable with game theory. But in practice 
the problem would be so difficult to parameterise that only many arbitrary assumptions 
would enable an analysis at all, thereby reducing the relative significance o f  the analysis 
itself. Suppose next that neither player knows precisely or for certain what all the 
parameters are. For example, Koepke might think: 'I know Southgate prefers shooting to 
his left, but by how much? And how is that affected by the pressure he is under? And 
did he injure his right leg in that tackle five minutes before the end? And has his 
confidence been shaken by the mistake he made five minutes before that?' etc. A game 
theorist might retort that in fact uncertainty can been incorporated into game theory, 
enabling a formal analysis even o f these considerations. But again it might be argued in 
return that to do this we need to postulate subjective prior belief distributions, requiring 
arbitrary assumptions. The analysis's conclusions would in turn be critically sensitive to 
this arbitrariness. Hence the real driver o f the conclusions would again not be the game 
theory so much as the arbitrary judgments that preceded it. Perhaps game theorists might 
riposte that although all these objections could be important, in fact in this example they 
are not. And so on.
We do not opine here whether game theory actually is useful in this particular case. 
Rather, the important point is what determines whether it is or not. The crucial 
consideration is not whether this or that internal game theoretical procedure is rigorous or 
clever. The attributes o f game theory in isolation are not the issue. Instead what matters 
is whether those attributes are applicable to this particular problem. Thus game theory is 
good at studying rational strategic interaction. But our hypothetical critics above were 
arguing that perhaps players’ emotions, rather than their rational strategic interactions, 
were an important element in the penalty problem, and that the game theory model was 
poor at incorporating these emotional factors. In other words, the criticisms amounted to 
pointing out a poor match between the attributes o f the model and the attributes important
9
to the actual real-world problem. In the terms we shall use later, the model was not 
picking out the most important causes actually at work.
Meanwhile, our hypothetical defenders o f  game theory were accepting this same agenda 
for dispute. Thus they argued that game theory was in fact able after all to incorporate 
emotional factors, rather than disputing why it should even be required to do so. No one 
was arguing about what the model ought to be able to do. Rather, the disputes concerned 
the substantive point o f whether or not it actually could do those things. There is thus a 
certain methodological agreement between all sides in this hypothetical case -  namely, 
that when assessing a model’s usefulness, we should be concentrating above all on 
whether or not it is well-suited to capturing the particular attributes actually important in 
the real-life problem. What matters is not a model or problem in isolation, but rather the 
degree o f match between the two.
A first notion of approximate truth: we want a context-specific account
This example suggests that the key to the success o f a piece o f (applied) social science is 
the appropriateness o f the chosen theory for the problem being studied. What matters is 
not the theory or problem in itself. Rather what really counts is the connection or 
otherwise between the two. This implies that we cannot directly judge a theory’s 
usefulness in the abstract, but instead only individual applications o f  that theory to 
specific problems. It follows that the usefulness or otherwise o f a theory must be 
application-specific, or problem-specific. Put another way, usefulness must be assessed 
at the level o f  a context-specific model, not general theory.
The point becomes obvious if  we consider trying to apply game theory to other problems. 
It is arguable whether it is or is not a useful tool for analysing the penalty case above.
But suppose we take instead a different issue, such as identifying the winner o f the next 
general election. Some might argue that even here game theory in practice can make a 
useful contribution, but it seems clear that this new election problem is considerably more 
complicated than the penalty one. Accordingly it seems considerably more difficult to
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'get a grip on' on it using game theory. Or consider how to mend a faulty disk drive on a 
computer. It is surely uncontroversial that an appropriate model here would be one o f the 
relevant computer hardware, and that knowledge o f game theory would be no direct help. 
The point o f  course is that the usefulness o f game theory cannot be judged in isolation, 
but rather is problem-dependent. And the same applies to the usefulness o f models o f 
computer hardware, which presumably would not be so helpful when analysing our 
penalty problem.
O f course, ultimately any model can capture only some aspects o f the world, leaving 
other aspects out. I f  these left-out aspects are important to a particular problem, then it 
follows that that particular problem may not be much elucidated by that particular model. 
So no tool (at least in social science) is applicable universally. But if  a theory is not a 
theory o f  everything, then it can only be a theory o f some things. And then it must follow 
that its usefulness is not universal, but is in fact problem-dependent.
Trying to apply economic theory often leads to a situation similar to our penalty example. 
There is a contrast between abstract mathematical theory on one side and a perhaps 
‘messy’ real-world problem on the other. We typically derive, from background theory 
and other considerations, a formal model o f the particular real-world situation. No one 
believes this model to be a literally or wholly true representation o f the reality, yet at the 
same time it is hoped that it might somehow capture what is important or interesting 
about it. So there is an apparent tension. On the one hand, an economic model seems to 
be aiming at something less than the whole truth o f a situation. So already an economic 
modeller seems to be aiming low. Yet on the other hand, there is still the hope that these 
imperfect models nevertheless might somehow tell us something about the world, despite 
not being wholly true. It seems that (full) truth has been dropped as a necessary 
requirement for success in economics. Something weaker is considered sufficient.
Let us illustrate this vital argument schematically:-
Point 1: Economics is sometimes useful.
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For example, at the height o f the BSE beef scare the price o f British beef decreased. The 
economic explanation is that a drop in demand led to a drop in equilibrium price. It 
seems intuitively clear that this theoretical economic account captures well a certain part 
o f what was actually going on in this case. Health worries did indeed lead many 
consumers to avoid buying beef, at least until big price reductions came on stream.
Point 2: Yet all economic models are empirically false.
All (if taken literally) are easily falsified -  this point is not controversial. For instance, 
almost any model in the mainstream modem neoclassical tradition postulates human 
agents to be rational maximisers o f particular utility functions. Yet it is well established 
that real humans do not always behave in such a way. Hence experiments could easily be 
set up (if desired) which would contradict this basic assumption.
Conclusion: Full truth is not the key issue.
Points 1 and 2 together imply that while abstract mathematical economic theory 
empirically is never literally true, it still (sometimes) seems interesting and insightful 
nevertheless. In other words, it can be simultaneously false but useful. Consequently, a 
focus just on truth/falsity seems largely to miss the point.
It is evident that economic theory is sometimes useful, sometimes not. I f  a theory is 
typically more useful in some contexts than in others, then it seems there is a sense in 
which it is capturing more o f the truth o f some contexts than o f  others. So there must be 
some entity, connected to truth, which is varying between different applications o f a 
theory. Yet this entity cannot be simple truth/falsity itself since we saw that, strictly 
speaking, economic theory is always false and that does not vary. It cannot be some kind 
o f ‘local truth’ either, since even in contexts o f successful application a theory is still, 
strictly speaking, false. So it is natural at this stage to follow intuitive usage and to label 
our concept approx im ate tru th . (No substantive philosophical definition is yet being 
offered here, we are merely establishing the motivation for this thesis.) Then in applying 
economic theory we are in fact seeking to maximise its approximate truth with respect to 
some particular problem. This degree o f  approximate truth will o f course vary from
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application to application.
Some notes: first, we are still interested in truth as the goal o f science, albeit more as an 
ideal target to aim for than as something actually achieved. But a model can still be 
useful even if  only approximately true. Second, approximate truth is a goal o f models 
rather than general theories. And third, nowhere in this thesis shall we offer any 
particular analysis o f truth itself. It turns out that none o f the main debates turn on our 
position with regard to that issue -  which is probably why, with minor exceptions 
(sections 1-5 and 1-6), no one else in the literature has addressed it either.
Summing up: the usefulness o f an economic theory is context-specific since the same 
theory is often successful in one area but unsuccessful in another, depending on how 
approximately true o f any particular context it is. Since (in social science at least) 
theories are never wholly true, a narrow concentration on truth/falsity fails to capture the 
factors that actually determine the extent o f scientific success. Therefore what we want is 
a context-specific account o f approximate truth.
Different motivations
It is important to realise that there are other possible motivations for studying 
approximate truth, which indeed have been the actual ones o f previous work in the field. 
In particular, a lot o f that work has had its source in the general debate between realism 
and anti-realism. Many realists would like a way o f expressing the intuition that our best 
theories do actually refer to genuinely existing entities in the world. Since it is also 
accepted that most if  not all o f our theories are not literally true, the only way to salvage a 
realist interpretation o f them is then to claim instead that they are approximately true. In 
other words, a satisfactory account o f approximate truth is seen as important, perhaps 
even essential, to the realist position (or at least to realism about theories). (See for 
example [Putnam 1975], [Newton-Smith 1981], [Laymon 1982], [Miller 1987], [Boyd 
1990] and [Psillos 1999].) However, although noting the current lack o f a satisfactory 
account, many authors have nevertheless maintained their realism even in its absence,
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and often even when not really offering any substantial new account themselves. But it is 
providing just such accounts for just this purpose o f buttressing realism that has been the 
motivation for perhaps the most cited works in the literature [Oddie 1986] [Niiniluoto 
1987] [Weston 1992].
Related to the general realism debate, is a notion o f scientific progress that sees 
successive theories as achieving closer and closer approximations to the truth -  
'convergent realism'. Thus Newton’s laws are taken to be somehow closer to the truth, 
and hence better, than predecessors such as those o f Aristotle. A convergent realist might 
see the sequence from Aristotelean through Galilean and Newtonian and finally 
relativistic mechanics, as representing better and better guesses at the actual true 
mechanics. But o f  course, in order to put philosophical flesh on the intuitive bones o f 
what it means for these guesses to be 'better and better', we then need some account o f 
approximate truth. Authors sceptical o f such convergent realism can point to the lack of 
any such agreed account as a sign that their scepticism is justified [Kuhn 1962] [Laudan 
1984]. And not surprisingly, a desire to underpin the notion o f scientific progress (and 
thence realism) has in turn been a spur behind much work in the field [Aronson, Harre 
and Way 1994] [Barnes 1995].
A variant on this motivation is the critical rationalist position. This o f course disputes 
that we are actually gaining any positive knowledge with each successive theory, 
preferring to speak instead merely o f theories being tested and then discarded if  falsified. 
Nevertheless, it has remained concerned with trying to explicate a realist sense in which 
science might be said to progress. This was the motivation o f Popper, the founder o f the 
modem literature on approximate truth [Popper 1963] [Popper 1972], and also o f Miller, 
one o f its main practitioners since [Miller 1975] [Miller 1994].
So the intellectual provenance o f most o f the work on approximate truth has lain in 
concerns drawn from general philosophy o f science, which have tended to reflect a 
certain concentration on natural science, and especially physics, rather than social 
science. These various motivations matter because they suggest a natural agenda and set
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of methods with which to approach the issue. Can these methods deliver a satisfactory 
result? What can we learn from them? In contrast, we derived our own desiderata from a 
consideration o f the practice o f economics -  a social science. We shall eventually argue 
that, ironically, these latter desiderata may in the end prove the most appropriate ones for 
natural science too. But first let us see how far we can get by following, so to speak, the 
more traditional agenda.
1-2) The logical-similarity approach
General agenda
The first modem recognition o f the issue o f approximate truth, and the first serious 
attempt to address it, came from Popper in the 1960s [Popper 1963], [Popper 1972]. On 
the one hand his general philosophy o f science had a strong realist view that the aim o f 
science is truth, but on the other he recognised that even our best theories are usually 
false. Therefore to make sense o f the notion o f progress in science, it becomes necessary 
to be able to speak meaningfully o f science moving 'closer to the truth' or o f  achieving a 
'better approximation to the truth'.
Popper termed the concept he was looking for verisimilitude, and thus pictured progress 
in science as being a tale o f our theories' increasing verisimilitude. This original 
motivation o f Popper's -  o f  giving substance to the notion o f  scientific progress -  
immediately gave verisimilitude two important characteristics. First, it was perceived as 
being an objective logical notion, and hence nothing to do with epistemic notions such as 
uncertainty. Popper wished to find a way o f expressing the intuition that a theory 
actually is nearer the truth, independent o f whether or not we happen to know that it is.
Second, verisimilitude was to incorporate both accuracy and comprehensiveness, that is
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to say incorporate two different concepts in the one measure. A trivial tautology is 
perfectly accurate but scientifically useless; by contrast, Newton's laws are often 
inaccurate but scientifically hugely valuable. So in order to avoid ranking the tautology 
above Newton, we need to take on board the notion o f comprehensiveness as well as 
mere accuracy -  how much does our theory seek to explain? It is in this latter 
consideration o f course that the worth o f Newton's laws reveal themselves since they help 
to explain a huge range o f  phenomena, albeit imperfectly. In Popper's terminology, good 
science should make 'bold' conjectures. At the same time accuracy must still remain an 
important criterion too, o f  course, since no one is interested in conjectures that are bold 
but fantastical.
This agenda, although arising originally only out o f the specific philosophical concerns of 
the Popperian program, has proved very persistent. In particular, most work has been 
done in a formal context, providing definitions o f distance measures between logical 
statements and so forth. In addition, most authors have tackled both accuracy and 
comprehensiveness together, so as to be able to provide a measure by which to adjudge 
general theories as opposed merely to specific applications o f them.
Our own approach will follow Popper in aspiring to analyse the issue as an objective 
feature o f the world. Nevertheless, it will also eventually deviate in important respects 
from the Popperian exemplar (section 1-1). First, we shall prefer to conceive o f 
approximate truth in ontological rather than logical terms. Second, our scheme covers 
only accuracy not comprehensiveness. This is because, guided by our conclusions from 
section 1-1 ,1 am interested not in the approximate truth o f general theories but only in 
the approximate truth o f specific applications o f those theories. I therefore do not attempt 
to make sense o f the notion o f comprehensiveness. Instead our approach will lead us 
more generally to a rather closer analysis o f  the concept o f (application-specific) 
relevance than has been given before. By this route we can reach a definition o f context- 
specific approximate truth. (The details o f our scheme are not presented until chapter 2. 
This is merely to note from the start its deviation from some o f  the fundamental 
assumptions o f  previous work.) But first we must examine more closely just how the
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traditional approach comes unstuck.
First attempts
Consider two theories, for instance N  (Newtonian') and E ('Einsteinian'). Suppose we 
focus on their deductive consequences, that is to say the theories are defined logically 
speaking by a deductively closed class o f statements in some language. If  we wish to 
find a way o f saying that E is closer to the truth than N, one strategy would be to examine 
the number o f true and false consequences o f each theory. Then we could say that E is 
closer to the truth than N  if  it has more true, and fewer false, consequences than N  (with 
mere equality o f course permitted in one o f these cases). Unfortunately this strategy fails 
immediately since the cardinalities o f all consequence classes even in simple languages is 
countably infinite, and so no theory ever has more or fewer true consequences than any 
other and no false theory more or fewer false consequences. (Moreover, we would only 
be counting atomic consequences and this is strongly language-variant -  on which issue 
see section 1-3.) Therefore any definition o f verisimilitude that works by comparing 
numbers o f true and false consequences, would seem to be hopeless.
Alternatively, we might restrict our definition to those cases where we can express the 
same intuition set-theoretically instead. Thus E has greater verisimilitude than N if  and 
only if  all N 's true consequences are a subset o f E's true consequences, and all o f E's false 
consequences are a subset o f N's false consequences, at least one o f the subset relations 
being strict. That is, for T (F) the set o f true (false) statements in some language, E has 
greater verisimilitude than N if  and only if:
N n  T c  E n  T and E n  F c  N  n  F 
again at least one o f the subset relations being strict [Popper 1972].
Unfortunately, it turns out that on this definition no false theory can ever have more 
verisimilitude than any other false theory [Miller 1974] [Tichy 1974]. So, for example, 
verisimilitude would give us above no means to show the (presumed) superiority o f 
relativistic to Newtonian theory. This devastating result o f course strikes at the heart o f
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the very purpose for which the definition was formulated. True theories would still have 
more verisimilitude than false ones, but this o f course is no real help since perfectly true 
theories seem to be unhappily thin on the ground (especially in social science). (At the 
end o f [Miller 1974], Miller also raises what has become known as the 'canonical 
objection' [Brink 1989, p i 86] to the whole verisimilitude enterprise, namely the problem 
o f language invariance. But we save discussion o f that until section 1-3.)
However, there remains an apparently rather more promising line o f  attack here: instead 
o f counting consequences, we can try instead to construct definitions o f logical similarity. 
(This is what [Niiniluoto 1998] calls the 'second period' o f the verisimilitude research 
program.) The idea is based on the assumption (which may be questioned -  see section 
1-3 below) that the truth, or at least the relevant truth, can be expressed in any language 
as a set o f true propositions. A theory can be expressed as another set o f  propositions. 
The theory's verisimilitude is then seen as the logical 'distance' between the theory and 
the truth, that is the distance between these two sets o f propositions. The goal is to 
construct definitions o f distance that incorporate desired notions o f similarity. This idea 
is most easily illustrated, and hence later assessed, by outlining the two main 
developments o f it, taken from [Oddie 1986] and the exhaustive [Niiniluoto 1987].
O ddie's approach  for the propositional case
The full versions o f Oddie’s and Niiniluoto’s accounts are generalised to arbitrary first- 
order languages (see below). However, following Brink, the basic ideas can be 
conveniently explained with reference to what has become known as the canonical 
example [Brink 1989]. Imagine a very simple weather-language featuring no predicates 
and only three primitive sentences. These sentences are 'it is hot' (or 'h'), 'it is raining' (r), 
and 'it is windy' (w). Assume all three sentences are true, so that the whole truth, so far 
as this language can grasp it, is h&r&w. This is the one true basic conjunction. O f 
course there are also seven other possible basic conjunctions, corresponding to negation 
signs in front o f  one or more o f the three sentences. This gives eight possibilities in all, 
and we shall identify each o f them with a possible 'world', or state o f the world. Thus we
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can draw up the following list for reference, noting respectively the basic conjunction and 





-h& r& w = w5
~h&r&~w = w6
~h&~r&w = W7
-h& ~ r& -w = Wg
Begin with Tichy’s original proposal (applied to this simple case). Consider the distance 
between one basic conjunction and another. The basic idea is that we define the distance 
between them as the sum o f  the basic states over which they disagree, normalised to be in 
the interval [0,1]. So for example the distance between Wi (h&r&w) and W2 (h&r&~w), 
which we denote d(wi, W2), would be 1/3, since they agree on two out o f the three basic 
states while disagreeing on one. Similarly d(wi, W4) = 2/3, d(w7, ws) = 1/3, d(wi, ws) =
1, and so on.
Note immediately two aspects o f such a scheme that we return to later. First, note again 
the assumption that in any given language the exact truth is specifiable. This implies that 
any theory in that language can potentially be made exactly true, analogously to how a 
proposition (or theory -  see next paragraph) in the toy example above can be made 
exactly true simply by rearranging negation signs. It will turn out that this assumption is 
dubious -  see discussion later o f stubbornly false theories. Second, we have already 
implicitly had to introduce a scheme o f weights. In the above calculations, each basic 
state was assigned an equal weight -  one-third -  without any particular motivation.
Later, we shall return to weights as a crucial way o f incorporating necessary extra-logical 
information into our definitions.
Returning to our example, note next that a theory typically is consistent with many
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different basic conjunctions, indeed can be expressed as a disjunction o f  them. Using an 
example o f Brink's, consider the theory (V  say) expressed by the proposition 'if it is hot 
then it is rainy and not windy', i.e. h=>(r&~w). Now this single proposition is consistent 
logically not just with W2 (h&r&~w) but also with all o f W5, W6, W7 and wg featuring ~h. 
Thus the theory reduces by disjunctive normal form to the set {W2, W5, W6, W7, wg}. Now 
each element o f this set o f  course has its own distance from the true world wi, which can 
be worked out according to our procedure above. What Oddie, the chief subsequent 
developer o f Tichy's original approach, proposes here is that we take the arithmetical 
mean o f the distance from wi o f each o f these elements. Thus in this case we would 
calculate the overall distance from the truth o f our theory d(ti, w i) as follows:
d(ti, w i) = 1/5 [d(w2, wi) + d(w5, wi) + d(w6, wi) + d(w7, wi) + d(w8, wi)]
= 1/5 [1/3 + 1/3 + 2/3 + 2/3 + 1]
= 3/5
We can then if  we wish define the theory's verisimilitude to be just (1 - d(ti, wi)), or in 
this case 2/5. (Note again that by taking the arithmetic mean we are implicitly assigning 
equal weights to each o f the theory's disjunct conjunctions.)
Taking the arithmetical mean only works in the simple case where the truth is a single 
basic conjunction. Oddie's objective (in this context) is to define a general distance 
function between any two propositions. He proceeds to outline several more conventions 
by which he deals with all possible variations o f the propositional case. First consider 
two propositions, V  and 13' say, which (as sets) have the same number o f elements. 
Again using Brink's example, suppose in our canonical weather case that t2 is the 
proposition ~h=*(rVw), and that t3 is the proposition h=>(rVw). Then the elements o f t2
are all o f wi to wg with the exception o f wg, and the elements o f t3 all o f the basic states
except W4. So we might write:
t2 = {wi, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7} 
and t3 = (w i, w2, w3, w5, w6, w7, w8}
How should we compute a distance here between t2 and t3? A priori, there would seem to 
be more than one possible method. Perhaps using our previous procedure we should
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compute individually the distance between wi and t3, then the distance between W2 and t3, 
and so on for each element o f t2, before taking some grand average o f all these individual 
distances in order to reach the overall distance. Oddie instead chooses a simpler 
computation: we should compute the distance between corresponding elements o f each 
theory or proposition, and then take the average o f this. Thus we would compare the two 
first elements, here wi and wi, then the two second elements W2 and W2, and so on for all 
the elements, before dividing by the total size o f each set. Thus:
d(t2, t3) = [d(wi, wi) + d(w2, w2) + d(w3, w3) + d(w4, w5) + d(w5, w6) + 
d(w6, w7) + d(w7, w8)] /  7
= (0 + 0 + 0 + 2/3 + 1/3 + 2/3 + 1/3) / 7 
=  6/21
O f course, the problem with this technique is that we can achieve a different final result 
simply by changing the (arbitrary) order in which we write the sets' elements. Thus 
suppose we write t2 as before, but now write t3 in the following order: 
t2 = {wi, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7} 
t3 = (w i, w2, w3, w8, w5, w6, w7}
Now our calculation would proceed as follows:
d(t2, t3) = [d(wi, wi) + d(w2, w2) + d(w3, w3) + d(w4, w8) + d(w5, w5) + 
d(w6, w6) + d(w7, w7)] / 7
= (0 + 0 + 0 +  1/3 + 0 + 0 + 0 ) / 7  
= 1/21, and no longer 6/21
So our measure o f  the distance between t2 and t3 has altered simply through an arbitrary 
reordering o f  how we write their elements. In order to avoid this, Oddie proposes that we 
always take the ordering that gives us the lowest value (in his terminology the 'narrowest 
linkage'). In our example this is the second ordering, which gave a distance measure of 
1/21. In the simple case here at least, this is an intuitively appealing solution in so far as 
our intuition perceives that t2 and t3 'really' only differ by one element.
Again it is worth pausing, in order to note early instances o f  what are common criticisms
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against all the purely logical approaches to approximate truth. First, consider Oddie's 
decision always to take the narrowest linkage, that is to say the ordering o f set elements 
that yields the lowest value for the distance measure. The justification Oddie gives for 
this is an appeal to an extra-logical criterion, namely that some orderings (such as the 
first one considered above for d(t2, t3)) 'artificially' exaggerate the difference between the 
two theories and so should be rejected. Yet rather than smuggle in extra-logical factors 
under cover o f a rather vague and perhaps ad hoc intuition like this, I think it is far 
preferable to try to incorporate them systematically. This is what we shall eventually try 
to do in our own definition (chapter 2).
Second, when computing d(t2, t3), why did we compare each element only with the 
element in the same place in the other set's ordering, rather than compare each with all 
the elements o f the other theory's set? This really boils down to the same point as before, 
since comparing with all the elements would in effect amount to taking as our official 
measure the average rather than minimum (across orderings) distance between the two 
theories. Again, the point is that on purely logical grounds the choice o f  procedure is 
arbitrary so we are forced to incorporate extra-logical criteria, in which case it is arguably 
better to do so more systematically.
Oddie's choice o f  procedure gives rise to further problems if  the sets associated with two 
theories do not have the same number of elements, since then a simple one-to-one 
comparison o f elements is impossible. These more complicated cases necessitate further 
stipulations. I f  the number o f  elements o f one theory is an exact multiple o f  the number 
o f the other, then Oddie proposes essentially that we multiply up the number o f elements 
o f the smaller set appropriately. For instance if  some ti had six elements and some t2 
three elements, then for the purpose o f  computing the distance between them we could 
take each o f t2's three elements as occurring exactly twice. There still remains the 
awkward other case where the numbers of elements do not exactly divide each other.
Here Oddie proposes a system o f multisets, that is sets in which some elements appear 
more than once. (O f course these procedures are each themselves open to similar charges 
o f arbitrariness as before.) Overall, by these means he is able to get for the propositional
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case a complete definition o f logical distance, that is to get d(ti, t2) to be some number 
between 0 and 1 for all pairs o f theories (ti, t2).
N iiniluoto’s approach  for the propositional case
Similar remarks could be made regarding any choice o f procedure here, not just Oddie's. 
The point is not to criticise Oddie's particular choices so much as to note the kinds o f 
decisions and assumptions that any such choices entail. But perhaps there are other 
aspects o f this approach that raise further issues? We can get a sense o f  these by looking 
at the work o f Niiniluoto. In contrast to Oddie, [Niiniluoto 1987] spends much time 
considering different possible distance measures. Nevertheless he ends up by selecting 
one very similar to Oddie's. In the context o f our canonical weather example, Niiniluoto 
would define the distance d(wj, Wj) between two descriptions o f the world as being the 
number o f negation signs on which the two states differ, divided by the total number o f 
basic states. So for instance on this measure 
d(wi, W2) = 1/3
since wi and W2 disagree on only one sign (whether we should have w or ~w) out o f the 
three basic states they must sign in total.
Where Niiniluoto differs from Oddie is in his treatment o f how to extend this basic 
distance function into a more general definition o f  verisimilitude. The issue arises when 
considering propositions, that is sets o f possible worlds. Niiniluoto considers various 
possible distance measures, which can be illustrated as before by positing some theory ti 
and letting Wj be the (finite number of) elements o f ti. He concentrates particularly on the 
following three possiblemeasures:
1) d(wi, ti) = the arithmetical mean o f  the distances d(wi, wj) for all the Wj in ti. 
(This is o f course ju st Oddie's definition from the previous subsection.)
2) d(wi, ti) = the minimum o f the distances d(wi, Wj) for all the wj in ti
3) d(wi, ti) = the sum o f the distances d(wi, Wj) for all the Wj in ti, divided by the 
sum o f all the distances d(wi, Wj) for all possible Wj.
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We can illustrate these with the example of ti we used earlier, namely where ti expresses 
the proposition h=*(r&~w). This corresponds, recall, to the set {W2, W5, W6, W7, wg}. 
What is the distance between ti and wi on each of the above three definitions?
1) Arithmetical mean:
d(wi, ti) = [d(wi, W2) + d(wi, W5) + d(wi, W6) + d(wi, W7) + d(wi, wg)] / 5 
= 1/5 (1/3 + 1/3 + 2/3 + 2/3 + 1)
= 3/5 as before
2) Minimum:




d(wi, ti) = [d(wi, w2) + d(wi, w5) + d(wi, w6) + d(wi, w7) + d(wi, wg)] / [d(wi, wj) + 
d(wi, W2) + d(wi, W3) + d(wi, W4) + d(wi, W5) + d(wi, W6) + d(wi, W7) + d(wj, wg)]
= (1/3 + 1/3 + 2/3 + 2/3 + 1) / (0 + 1/3 + 1/3 + 2/3 + 1/3 + 2/3 + 2/3 + 1)
= 3/4
So here the three different definitions o f verisimilitude yield three different answers.
Notice first that definition 2 in fact corresponds to what we might think o f as accuracy or 
degree o f truth, in that it captures how near to the true state o f affairs a particular theory 
gets at its best, while ignoring its general scope. And notice second that definition 3 in 
turn corresponds to what we might think o f as a theory's content or informativeness, since 
it captures to what degree a theory illuminates the issue at hand, as opposed to remaining 
just a truistic generality. Niiniluoto then picks up on Popper's original two desiderata for 
theories mentioned earlier, namely accuracy and content. Accordingly, he eventually 
concludes that the preferred measure should be some weighted average o f  definitions 2 
and 3, since in his view this corresponds to a weighted average o f  accuracy and content. 
He does not specify what those weights should be precisely. But recall that in Popper's 
scheme neither accuracy nor content alone is sufficient, so we do know at least that both 
weights should be greater than zero.
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It is clear in what sense Niiniluoto sees the logical-similarity approach as being a 
continuation o f Popper's project o f verisimilitude. It thus appears that this approach can 
be used to define the verisimilitudes o f general theories rather than just those o f singular 
cases. O f course, it could also be adapted to the more context-specific task by selecting 
just definition 2 and ignoring the considerations o f content represented by definition 3.
Note though that some o f  the criticisms o f arbitrariness levelled against Oddie also apply 
here. And indeed we shall see (next section) that most o f the problems with the logical- 
similarity approach are common to both. Note also that the use o f definition 2 to 
represent context-specific accuracy would require us to view models just as deductions, 
given certain initial conditions, from general theories. But such a view o f scientific 
modelling now looks rather too simplistic [Morgan and Morrison 1999].
Beyond the propositional case
For any o f these measures o f  verisimilitude ever to be applicable to actual scientific 
theories, it is necessary (all agree) that we be able to extend them beyond just the 
propositional case. In particular, we want to be able to extend them to first-order 
languages so as to be able to include relations and quantifiers. It turns out that Oddie and 
Niiniluoto each suggest very similar ways o f  achieving this.
In our canonical example above, a certain number o f basic states (three in this case) 
generated a certain number (eight) o f worlds, one o f which we took to be the real world. 
When considering the verisimilitude o f some proposition, the strategy was to write it in 
disjunctive normal form, each disjunct corresponding to a world. Thus a proposition 
could be expressed as a certain number o f guesses as to which world is the real world.
We could construct a distance function between a set o f worlds and one particular world, 
and then defined a proposition's distance from the truth according to that function.
The trick now suggested by Oddie and Niiniluoto for the first-order case is to isolate our 
enquiries to a particular depth, 'd' say. Any first-order formula's depth is defined as the
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number o f bound variables used to express it. The key result is then Hintikka's Theorem, 
which states that for any particular depth d we can rewrite a proposition as a disjunction 
o f depth-d constituents. Thus we extend from basic states to basic conjunctions as 
before, and this time also to existential conjunctions. Given Hintikka's Theorem, we are 
then in a position once again to characterise any proposition as being a set o f guesses 
about which worlds might be the real world. As before, for any depth d we take it that 
there is one world that actually is the real world. Finally, we then again define a distance 
function between sets o f worlds and a single world, and take this to be our measure of 
nearness to the truth. Since we can follow this procedure for any depth d, it provides a 
working definition o f  verisimilitude for the first-order case. Our definition can also now 
incorporate variables over infinite domains. Oddie even makes preliminary forays at 
trying to define verisimilitude for yet higher-order languages.
It is technically rather more complicated to define a distance function now, since the 
possible 'worlds' are sets o f trees rather than the simple constituents o f  our original 
canonical case above. Oddie nevertheless sets up a measure essentially exactly 
analogous to his one for the propositional case. Niiniluoto considers various possible 
alternatives before again settling for a generalised version o f his previous preferred 
combination o f accuracy and informativeness, suitably relativised to depth.
But essentially the same criticisms as made earlier apply equally to these higher-order 
efforts, notwithstanding their great technical sophistication. In particular, extra-logical 
criteria are still necessarily appealed to no less than before. Indeed the extra technical 
difficulties lead if  anything to a still greater number o f arbitrary definitional decisions. 
Thus from a philosophical point o f view, the higher-order work does nothing to rebut the 
earlier complaints about the definitions for the propositional case. I f  we are unhappy 
with the definitions for the simple propositional case then we shall still be unhappy, and 
for similar reasons, with the definitions for the higher-order cases too.
Recent extensions
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Schurz and Weingartner show that one way to save Popper's oiriginal definition of 
verisimilitude from the standard Miller-Tichy refutation is to liimit the content o f a theory 
to its 'relevant' consequences [Schurz and Weingartner 1987]. Intuitively, the motivation 
is to restrict our attention to what a theory actually says about ia, problem at hand, and 
ignore what it happens to imply for other things we are not interested in. In this way one 
false theory can after all be shown to have more true, or few er false, (relevant) 
consequences than another. But the exact definition of'relevam t' here is in effect left a 
primitive. More fundamentally, I think the way to focus on juist the relevant 
consequences o f  a theory is to go further and to consider exclusively the accuracy o f a 
context-specific model, foregoing any pretence at also assessimg a theory's 
comprehensiveness. But then we would need to do more than i just blithely classify what 
is relevant and irrelevant exogenously. Rather, we would neecd instead to be analysing 
much more carefully the different importance of the theory's dlifferent consequences. A 
large part o f our own approach is motivated (chapter 2) by justt this task. (Even if, 
Popper-style, we remain concerned with evaluating general theeories rather than particular 
models, still Schurz and Weingartner's proposal would lead to > problems. For if  really 
assessing a theory for comprehensiveness as well as accuracy,, the justification for 
restricting attention to only a subset of'relevant' consequences? becomes obscure. If  one 
were really concerned with comprehensiveness, then: 'it is not: clear why one should be 
interested in such truncated theories' [Niiniluoto 1998, p8].)
There have been several more technical developments in recemt years (for references, see 
[Niiniluoto 1998, pp8-10]). One idea, for instance, is viewing; a statement as a member 
o f the power set o f the power set o f the set of atomic propositions. Then a statement A is 
closer to the truth than another statement B if and only if  each < o f A's members has some 
member o f B as its subset, and each member of B is a subset o)f some member o f A. This 
definition in turn can be extended and reformulated in various ways. Another alternative 
is to construct a definition in terms o f set-theoretic relations beetween the classes of 
models o f  theories rather than the theories themselves. This aga in  can be extended and 
reformulated in various ways.
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The reason none o f these developments has caught on as much as the more mainstream 
similarity and possible worlds (see section 1-5) approaches, is that so far the definitions 
they have ended up proposing have been plagued by one or more undesirable features.
For example, they might imply that a weaker false theory should always be classed as 
more truthlike than a stronger false one -  but as Niiniluoto points out, as a general 
principle this seems implausible. For instance, if  the true number o f planets is nine, it 
seems strange to class the weaker answer TO or 200' as more truthlike than a simple TO'. 
Or perhaps they might imply that the truthlikeness o f a trivial tautology is superior to that 
o f a theory that gets almost but not quite everything right -  but it is familiar now that any 
definition concerned with comprehensiveness should be capable o f preferring the latter 
theory. A slightly different line o f attack has been more internal to Niiniluoto's own 
preferred approach. It concentrates on technical questions such as various ways o f 
incorporating continuous variables.
As with the extensions beyond the propositional case, the key point here is that none o f 
these developments escape the more general critiques o f the logical-similarity approach 
(to come in section 1-3). The judgment criteria driving the literature have, at least 
ostensibly, been purely internal. Definitions have not been evaluated explicitly by how 
well they incorporate extra-logical factors, for example. These latter are only ever 
reflected at best indirectly, perhaps through our intuitions regarding the force o f each 
internal criterion. The agenda o f new research has in effect been the satisfaction o f those 
intuitions for more and more complicated logical formulations. But I argue that our main 
interest should be, recall, not so much the exact definition o f similarity we use so much as 
what actually influences degree o f similarity in the real world. In a sense then our real 
concerns are somewhat tangential to the main thrust o f the logical literature here, and for 
that reason the new developments in the latter do not by our lights really lead to any 
progress. Rather, progress has been by the literature’s own lights only. The real dispute 
concerns, as it were, whose lights we should prefer. Once again, if  we are unhappy with 
the definitions for the simple propositional case then we shall still be unhappy, and for 
similar reasons, just as much now as 10 or 20 years ago.
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1-3) Weaknesses of the logical-similarity approach
Language-dependence: Miller’s objection
A t the end o f his original 1974 rejection o f Popper's definition, David Miller raised what 
has since become (in Brink's phrase) the 'canonical objection' to the whole verisimilitude 
enterprise [Miller 1974] [Brink 1989, p i 86]. This was supplemented a year later by a 
further paper making an analogous point for the quantitative rather than qualitative case 
[Miller 1975]. The shadow o f Miller's objection has loomed large. Indeed sometimes it 
has been taken (including on occasion even by Popper himself) on its own to demonstrate 
the entire literature's lack o f success. We illustrate it here with reference to the 
qualitative case, as outlined in [Miller 1974].
Miller raised his objection in response to an initial suggestion by Tichy for a post- 
Popperian definition o f  verisimilitude. Recall the canonical weather example (originally 
formulated by Tichy), in which we imagined a language containing only three primitive 
sentences -  'it is hot' (or 'h'), 'it is raining' (r), and 'it is windy' (w). Assume that the true 
state o f the world is that it is all three o f hot, raining and windy, i.e. h&r&w. Now we 
add a further component -  Tichy imagined two prisoners, Smith and Jones, each 
conjecturing what the weather is like outside. Jones thinks that it is cold, dry and still 
outside, or in other words ~h&~r&~w. Jones therefore gets all three variables wrong. 
Smith on the other hand thinks that the weather is cold, raining and windy, i.e. ~h&r&w. 
He therefore gets only one o f the three variables wrong (cold instead o f  hot), and the 
other two correct. So Jones makes three mistakes but Smith only one. In the words of 
Tichy, 'it seems hardly deniable that Smith is by far nearer to the truth than Jones' [Tichy 
1974, p i 59]. And accordingly, perhaps we can reach a definition o f  verisimilitude 
simply by counting the number o f  each theory's mistakes in this way. Miller's objection 
shows why this proposal, although at first sight attractive, in fact suffers from a fatal
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weakness. The weakness also applies just as much to the subsequent developments by 
Oddie, Niiniluoto and others that we have just reviewed.
Consider the following reformulation o f the weather example due to Miller. Suppose we 
invent another simple weather-language with just three primitive sentences. One o f these 
is 'it is hot' as before, but in place o f rainy and windy we now introduce two new ones: 'it 
is Minnesotan' (m) and 'it is Arizonan' (a). Now the key is that we can make this new 
language fully intertranslatable with our original one. Define the weather to be 
Minnesotan if  it is either hot and rainy, or cold and dry -  that is, m = (either h&r or 
~h&~r). And define Arizonan to be either hot and windy, or cold and still -  that is, a = 
(either h&w or -h& -w ). The eight possible states o f the world described in the old 
language now correspond one-to-one with the eight possible states described in the new 
one. Listing respectively the world, the old-language description and the new-language 
description:
Wi = h&r&w h&m&a
W2 = h&r&~w h&m&~w
W3 = h&~r&w h&~m&a
W4 = h&~r&~w h&~m&~a
w5 = -h& r& w ~h&~m&~a
w6 = ~h&r&~w ~h&~m&a
W7 = ~h&~r&w ~h&m&~a
w8 = ~h&~r&~w -h& m & a
The two languages are thus logically equivalent. That is, logically speaking we could 
equally have designated the h-m-a language the 'original' one, and then defined a 'new' h- 
r-w equivalent using the transformations r = (either h&m or ~h&~m) and w  = (either h&a 
or ~h&~a). There is complete symmetry. Accordingly, which language we happen to 
use is completely arbitrary, at least from a logical point o f view.
The sting in the tail is the following observation. Recall that Jones's conjecture 
(~h&~r&~w) we judged to be clearly inferior to Smith's (~h&r&w), since it got three
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rather than one variable wrong. But suppose now that Jones and Smith speak the h-m-a 
language, not h-r-a. I f  we translate their conjectures, we see that Jones’s is ~h&m&a, 
while Smith's is ~h&~m&~a. But the truth in the new language is just h&m&a. So now 
it seems that it is Jones who has only got one variable wrong, and Smith who has done 
worse by getting all three wrong. In other words, simply by translating them into this 
new language, our verisimilitude ordering o f the two theories has reversed.
Now if  the languages had been logically different, then it is possible that their 
representation o f the whole truth would have been different too, and thus that the 
translated theories may no longer have been equivalent to the originals. Alternatively 
put, the 'target' (that is, the expression o f the truth in that language) would have changed 
and hence so might have judgments o f truthlikeness. In these circumstances, arguably a 
change o f verisimilitude ranking might still have been disturbing but at least potentially 
explicable. But since our two languages in this example are completely logically 
equivalent so the choice between them is arbitrary, and so it is difficult to see how any 
change o f ranking can possibly be explained away. In Miller's words: 'just as truth is 
language-independent (this is one o f the things that Tarski's T-schema insists on), so must 
judgments o f verisimilitude be, if  they are to have any objective significance at all'
[Miller 1974, p l76 j.
We return to Miller in section 1-4. I believe that his objection is less fatal than it at first 
appears but that in order to deal with it extra-logical factors must be addressed explicitly. 
Our own account will later do just this, but one o f the main weaknesses o f the logical- 
similarity approach is precisely that it does not. Accordingly the Miller objection still 
remains a powerful one against it, but the underlying cause o f  that is in turn other 
weaknesses o f the logical-similarity approach. So we turn to those now.
Pure logic alone is not enough
Begin by going back to before the verisimilitude literature even really began, to Nelson 
Goodman. He presents a general analysis o f  the notion o f similarity, the chief conclusion
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of which is that 'anything is in some way like anything else' [Goodman 1972, p440].
More precisely, just assuming 'similarity' to be a well-defined relation is unjustified. 
Rather, to make sense o f the notion we have to specify in what respects two things might 
be similar. Many intuitive judgments beg this question and are hard to pin down 
formally. We need some specific weighting for importance over all the properties o f  a 
situation in order to give meaning to the similarity relation. Goodman then continues: 
'comparative judgments o f similarity often require not merely selection o f relevant 
properties but a weighting o f their relative importance, and variation in relevance and 
importance can be rapid and enormous'. But: 'importance is a highly volatile matter, 
varying with every shift o f  context and interest', and he supports this thesis with several 
examples. The conclusion is that 'similarity is relative, variable, culture-dependent' 
[Goodman 1972, respectively pp445, 444 and 438].
I endorse Goodman's central points that similarity is ill defined without some notion o f 
weighting, and that exactly which weighting we want is highly context-specific and so 
needs to be adjusted with every application. More interestingly, it seems there is no one 
in the field who actually disagrees. Niiniluoto himself concedes that some system o f 
weights and a certain (logical) arbitrariness regarding choice o f properties is unavoidable, 
and indeed quotes Goodman approvingly in favour o f these arguments. He concludes: 
'this means that degrees o f similarity and comparisons o f similarity are relative to two 
pragmatic boundary conditions: the choice o f the relevant characteristics ... and the 
choice o f the weights for the importance o f these characteristics' [Niiniluoto 1987, p38, 
my emphasis]. More explicitly, 'there are not purely logical grounds for these choices' 
[Niiniluoto 1987, p38]. Oddie also notes that weights can serve to mark the different 
importance o f different aspects o f a situation [Oddie 1986, p56]. He too quotes 
Goodman, largely in the context o f an effort to sidestep Miller's objection, and states:'... 
[it] is surely right that it is a problem for which pure logic cannot legislate the answer' 
[Oddie 1986, p i  84]. Miller him self writes: 'what must be important in the assessment of 
false hypotheses is not simply the amount o f error they commit but also the seriousness 
of the errors committed' [Miller 1994, p200, my emphasis]. And with regard to 
verisimilitude: 'I do not pretend that there is any entirely logical solution to this problem.
32
In fact, I think that we have gone as far as pure logic will take us' [Miller 1994, p207].
So there in fact exists a measure o f consensus on the principle that more than logic alone 
is needed. Nevertheless there remains a strong difference in practice about how to 
respond to this state o f affairs. In the scheme to be developed in this thesis, the focus is 
on context-specificity. In the context o f logical distance measures such as Niiniluoto's, 
this can be understood as implying a constant shifting o f the weights on the different 
logical constituents. But as argued at length in this thesis, I think the philosophical 
interest lies more in what determines these shifting patterns o f weights, and less in the 
surface question o f  the particular definition o f distance. As it were, the choice o f  
measure is only a secondary issue. What is important is not that a model captures a large 
number o f logically correct statements but rather that it captures adequately the handful 
o f important factors in an actual physical situation, even if  these equate to only a few 
logical statements. The weighting, so to speak, is everything; the simple number o f 
logical statements, in itself nothing. Accordingly, we shall focus mainly on issues 
surrounding what it means to capture the important aspects o f  a situation, and not on 
defining a distance measure (although see the appendix at the end o f chapter 2 for this 
latter issue).
By contrast, the main thrust o f the similarity literature has been on refining the definition, 
i.e. on the syntactics. As noted, all concede that extra-logical factors have inevitably to 
be considered, but the focus nonetheless has remained on logical issues and not on the 
extra-logical ones. A good example is provided by Niiniluoto himself. In recognising 
that we need a measure o f the seriousness o f errors as well as their number, he suggests 
that we might do this simply by adding a coefficient to each term [Niiniluoto 1987, 
p 3 14]. (I agree so far, indeed I will use a similar tactic in my own proposed scheme 
later.) [Niiniluoto 1987, p315] highlights as the kind o f thing he has in mind an article of 
his from ten years before, namely [Niiniluoto 1978]. But in that earlier paper he reveals 
himself still implicitly to be wedded to a purely logical approach. He specifies two types 
o f error, 'serious1 and 'non-serious', a distinction which effectively does introduce a non- 
uniform weighting system into his basic distance function. Yet his definition o f these
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two types o f error still turns out to be determined by a priori criteria [Niiniluoto 1978, 
p447]. There is no consideration o f pragmatic contextual factors. Accordingly, he is in 
fact still making no attempt to model the influence o f extra-logical concerns explicitly. 
(O f course, in various guises many authors have noted or implied this defect in the 
similarity approach, for instance [Adams 1990] [Aronson, Harre and Way 1994].)
Oddie meanwhile introduces weights without a passing philosophical glance, almost 
purely as a technical normalising device [Oddie 1986, p45]. There is no suggestion 
anywhere o f non-uniform weightings, or of imputing to the weights any physical 
significance. Rather he emphasises instead their technical usefulness, for instance when 
handling infinite sets [Oddie 1986, p58]. Fundamentally the focus remains purely 
logical, despite the acknowledged relevance o f extra-logical factors. (In fairness to 
Oddie, he is putting, as it were, all his extra-logical eggs into the one basket o f intuition. 
More precisely, he judges the satisfactoriness o f different definitions purely on how well 
they perform intuitively -  according to his intuition -  in several stock examples o f his. I 
think we can do better -  see chapter 2.)
Summing up, we might say that a logical-similarity approach specifies only a logical 
formula. This is good in so far as it leaves us free to choose a target and weights as we 
please, but the drawback is that often it is precisely these choices that are the 
philosophically interesting bit. It also seems that interest-relativity requires us in addition 
to take into account pragmatics (an issue discussed fully in section 2-9). So overall, the 
logical-similarity approach is left at best incomplete.
Finally, a word o f  defence. The critique in this subsection has been that extra-logical 
criteria have been left insufficiently examined. A different criticism, and different also 
from Miller's problem, is that any definition o f similarity or o f logical distance is 
necessarily arbitrary, on the grounds that the need to invoke extra-logical criteria 
automatically renders a definition hopelessly shaky or epistemic. But I agree with 
Niiniluoto when he notes that, once given a particular pragmatic weighting, then we can 
define a verisimilitude ordering wholly logically (see also section 2-10). More to the
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point, this latter criticism seems to yearn for an untenable world where pure logic alone 
can somehow judge approximate truth indisputably.
Language and  reality
As [Weston 1992] points out, the notion that we can capture an interesting sense o f 
comprehensiveness by a purely logical definition is also disputable. This is because that 
definition concerns the logical distance between a theory and the truth, and needs to 
presume that the whole truth can be expressed in the particular language being used. In 
Weston’s words, we need to assume that the vocabulary is known 'to be complete in the 
sense that no further additions will help give a fuller description o f the subject matter' 
[Weston 1992, p71]. But historically this has rarely been the case, and accordingly it is 
doubtful whether such an assumption is reasonable. Niiniluoto him self concedes that 
therefore his truthlikeness 'is not a measure o f... distance from the "whole truth", but 
from a chosen target' [Niiniluoto 1987, p449]. And again more recently: 'my [measure o f 
truthlikeness] is not intended to be a measure o f the descriptive completeness o f a 
conceptual framework, but rather ... is applicable only when the maximum of 
comprehensiveness is first fixed by the choice o f the language' [Niiniluoto 1998, p i  5]. 
But then why be interested in this measure at all? This language-relativity calls into 
question whether a purely logical definition can even assess a theory's 
comprehensiveness in the first place. [McMullin 1987] too questions whether the truth as 
conceptualised in a particular language is an acceptable proxy for the 'whole truth'.
These critiques are o f the comprehensiveness half o f the equation, as it were, rather than 
o f the attempt also to capture degree o f accuracy. But an analogous objection can be 
raised there too. We return to this issue in detail in chapter 2.
McMullin also criticises the very idea o f a 'distance' between two propositions, that is the 
idea that the definitions o f distance offered in the verisimilitude literature correspond to 
anything philosophically interesting. Brink puts the point more gently by noting first that 
the literature takes verisimilitude to be the similarity between possible worlds and the real
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world, and secondly that this similarity is then taken to go hand in hand with a concept of 
linguistic distance. The second assumption is the one at issue here -  why should we take 
it that the abstract distance relations refer to any interesting aspect o f the real world?
Distance between states o f the real world is at the heart o f the pre-philosophical notion of 
approximate truth in the first place. The issue here is not how to measure distance. 
Rather, it is the different question o f  whether or not we can use distance between logical 
propositions as a proxy for that distance between real states o f the world. Brink calls the 
assumption that we can, the "linguistic assumption": 'that we can access possible worlds 
through their descriptions: the syntactic structure o f a theory should in some way reflect 
the common structure o f  the worlds in which it is true' [Brink 1989, p i  88]. Despite its 
importance this assumption has only been weakly, if  at all, motivated in the literature.
Our own strategy by contrast will be to define an ontological distance measure. This 
avoids the problem, since by definition it measures distance between states o f the world 
understood realistically.
Stubbornly false theories
Often with a false theory, it is apparently promising to examine whether small 
modifications will make it true. The idea is that a theory is 'approximately true' when it is 
just a few such refinements away from being strictly true. For example, in a Newtonian 
universe a simple model o f the Earth's orbit o f the Sun is approximately true, but in 
principle could be made strictly true once allowance was made for the small perturbatory 
(but still Newtonian) effects o f the moon, other planets and so on. Unfortunately though, 
many useful theories in fact appear to be stubbornly false, in that there is no obvious 
means o f correcting them in this way. An example is classical fluid mechanics, which 
models fluids as perfect continua. Yet this cannot be strictly true o f the real world of 
atomically granular fluids, and since the assumption o f continua is a basic axiom o f the 
theory it is hard to see how any refinement could remedy this. Nevertheless it certainly 
remains a useful theory, for instance governing the design o f aircraft wings and
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delivering many approximately true predictions. Therefore I think one o f our 
philosophical desiderata here must be the capacity to reflect the worth o f  such theories.
But as Smith notes, the logical-similarity approach appears clearly to lack such a capacity 
[Smith 1998]. As we saw, it defines the verisimilitude o f a proposition to be some 
function o f the distances between each o f that proposition’s disjoined basic conjunctions 
and the one true basic conjunction. It follows that the proposition can be brought nearer 
to the truth by adjusting the pattern o f negation signs (or lack o f  them) it assigns to each 
o f the postulated basic states. In particular, in this scheme it should always be possible to 
make any proposition strictly true simply by achieving the correct pattern o f negation 
signs, so that it replicates exactly the one true basic conjunction. But, in Smith's phrase, 
it is difficult to see how (for instance) classical fluid mechanics could ever be repaired 
merely by 'the simple expedient o f twiddling a few negation signs in the basics in some 
canonical formulation' [Smith 1998, p265].
A similar situation arises in economics. Typically a modem economic model is built on a 
foundation o f rationally maximising human agents, yet no such humans exist in the real 
world. It is not easy to see how these ideal agents could ever easily be fully converted 
into psychologically realistic figures either. Twiddling a few negation signs in the 
axioms o f the theory certainly will not do the trick. Yet notwithstanding this stubborn 
falsity, economic models often do make accurate predictions nevertheless. Similar 
remarks apply to the rest o f social science, and arguably much o f  natural science too. 
Moreover although stubbornly false, there is nevertheless much interest in examining 
how all these theories vary in their usefulness and applicability. As argued back in 
section 1-1, one o f  our most important desiderata for a theory o f  approximate truth is that 
it can help us make sense o f these patterns o f  varying usefulness o f stubbornly false 
theories. But if  we cannot make sense o f their ever being useful in the first place, then 
presumably we also cannot make any sense o f  variations in that usefulness.
This whole issue can perhaps be thought of as another example o f the language 
difficulties o f the previous subsection. The classical theory o f fluid mechanics seems not
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so much to be talking the right language and getting some details wrong, so much as to be 
talking (we presume) a completely wrong language altogether. We cannot be sure that 
the language o f a theory is sufficiently rich to express the truth fully. I f  it is not, then a 
logical distance measure alone is insufficient to judge that theory's approximate truth.
This would appear to be the case with the classical theory o f  fluid dynamics, and indeed 
with all other stubbornly false theories. Neither Oddie nor Niiniluoto provides an 
example o f a real-world application o f their schemes that really makes clear how to meet 
this objection. (See [Aronson, Harre and Way 1994] for similar criticism.)
Finally, two further notes. First, arguably the empirical success o f stubbornly false 
theories could be seen as problem for realism generally, not just for verisimilitude 
theorists. Second, the way our own scheme handles the issue is outlined in section 2-12.
Two m easures in one
Is it possible to capture in a single logical-similarity measure both a theory’s accuracy and 
its range? Oddie's and Niiniluoto's represent the best attempts to do so. As previously 
mentioned, I prefer instead a context-specific focus just on a particular model’s accuracy. 
Niiniluoto is certainly aware that the truthlikeness o f a grand theory needs sometimes to 
be broken down to become intelligible. For instance, he states: 'If  we are asked what 
degree o f  truthlikeness a scientific theory like Newton's mechanics has, we should be 
more specific: relative to which application (solar system, pendulum, free fall, and so 
on)?' [Niiniluoto 1998, p i 3]. Moreover, as we saw, one o f his sample measures 
explicitly captures just accuracy, not informativeness. But nevertheless, he still believes 
that 'for some comparative purposes it may be useful to assess the global truthlikeness o f 
a theory' [Niiniluoto 1998, p i 3].
Perhaps a root o f the logical-similarity approach's difficulties with incorporating extra- 
logical factors is that it is hard to see how to do this while still talking about general 
theories. Our own scheme will get round the problem by understanding causal 
descriptions realistically, and noting that context-specific models can be interpreted as
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amounting to such descriptions and hence can be analysed for approximate truth. But 
abstract general theories per se cannot -  unless they are concretised in the form o f a 
particular model, in which case o f course we are again dealing with a specific context. 
Thus we cannot use our own eventual method to make any sense o f a theory's 'global' 
truthlikeness. Rather, we need always to specify first exactly what concrete situation in 
the world a model is trying to capture -  so not just 'pendulum', but what aspect o f which 
specific actual pendulum? Not just 'free fall', but what aspect o f  which specific actual 
falling object?
It might be wondered too why in any case we should even expect it to be possible to force 
the two separate pegs, as it were, o f accuracy and comprehensiveness into the single hole 
o f just one measure o f truthlikeness. As Adams points out: 'intuitively, 
comprehensiveness seems to be a quality that is desirable in general theories, while 
accuracy is what is wanted o f  the particular statements that make them up, and o f the data 
that support them' [Adams 1990, p i 47]. Moreover, he imagines the possibility o f 
separate theories o f  accuracy and comprehensiveness in turn illuminating the possible 
interrelations between the two concepts.
In the context o f  social science, it is clear that we are not concerned with how close to the 
truth a general theory is, only with how accurate a specific model is. This thesis 
originally grew out o f trying to make sense o f  economic theory's variable pattern o f 
usefulness. This different initial motivation is, I think, useful here: nobody thinks 
economic theories are comprehensively true anyway. Rather, what is o f  interest is how 
their degree o f accuracy varies across different contexts.
Sum m ary
1) The most commonly cited objection to the logical-similarity approach, and indeed to 
all other approaches to verisimilitude so far, is Miller's. This complains that all proposed 
measures generate rankings that are inconstant with respect to arbitrary switches between 
logically equivalent languages. (We return to Miller in the next section.)
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2) I think the most important difficulty is that: a purely logical measure o f approximate 
truth is on its own insufficient since any definition o f similarity must take into account 
the relative seriousness o f  different errors, and this in turn can only be assessed with the 
help o f extra-logical criteria. This point is not really controversial. Nevertheless, in 
practice the literature ignores the obvious inference that we should therefore be moving 
our philosophical attentions away from purely syntactic refinements and over instead 
onto precisely these extra-logical issues. As it were, when reading from a map anyway 
distorted by miles it is pointless devoting energy to perfecting measurements to within 
inches. The first priority is to be able to see the wood for the trees.
3) All the logical distance measures represent truth only relativised to a particular 
language. Accordingly, it becomes questionable whether distance from such a ’truth' 
really captures anything philosophically interesting.
4) Stubbornly false theories that are nonetheless useful, are also difficult for the standard 
approach to handle. Again this difficulty can be seen as stemming from trying to 
characterise truth in a linguistically relativised way. (Points 3 and 4 can in fact arguably 
each be seen ultimately as just further examples o f  Point 2.)
5) Further problems stem from an inherited, but questionable, Popperian attachment to 
viewing science as a sequence o f inductive generalisations. As well as causing 
difficulties, trying to capture both accuracy and comprehensiveness in a single measure 
also seems just ill motivated.
(Note also that logical distance measures arguably also struggle with the problem of 
legisimilitude [Liu 1999], itself perhaps another symptom o f  Point 2. But we save 
discussion o f that issue until section 1-7.)
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1-4) Miller’s objection revisited
Relevance to o u r own eventual scheme
Our own scheme (chapter 2) shall lay heavy emphasis on ontology, and in particular on 
stating models in causal terms. But the heart o f the Miller problem is really the issue o f 
how to justify privileging some languages or parameters over others. Getting the right 
ontology is not enough here; what we need in addition is in some sense to get the right 
vocabulary, if  such a thing exists. The two tasks are not the same, since the same 
ontology can support more than one vocabulary. Therefore even if  we believe that 
certain properties and not others are natural kinds, still that does not uniquely specify the 
right vocabulary. Natural kinds apply to properties, not to the predicates we use to 
describe them. For example, predicates such as Miller's ‘minnesotan’ and ‘arizonan’ 
truly apply to some individuals and fail to apply to others. They are not like the predicate 
'is a phlogiston', which applies to nothing. (The only way out would be some kind o f 
strong Platonic realism with respect to ontology, such that ‘minnesotan’ and ‘arizonan’ 
do not pick out 'real properties', whereas 'rainy' and 'windy' do.)
In particular, there will in general be many different ways o f stating a true causal 
ontology as well. For instance, the conjunction o f a cause and an irrelevant factor will 
itself also typically be a true cause too. So will the conjunction o f  one cause and another 
cause. So even, for some instantiations, will be the conjunction o f a cause and a 
counteracting cause. Unfortunately for our own scheme, there seems to be no such thing 
as a canonical causal vocabulary. In particular, there seems to be no way to rule out 
vocabulary that leads to Miller-reversals -  or at least there is no way to do this purely on 
metaphysical grounds. This suggests that we must go beyond pure metaphysics for the 
solution, which is indeed what we shall now do.
M orm ann and  conventionalism
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I think the correct response to [Miller 1975]'s quantitative examples is presented best in 
[Mormann 1988]. He points out (as have others, for instance Niiniluoto) that Miller's 
examples are all in fact instances o f  a single underlying mathematical fact -  namely that 
homeomorphisms or continuous bijective mappings between topological spaces need not 
preserve metric structure. Definitions o f verisimilitude based on distance functions are o f 
course dependent on a particular metric, so an unpreserved metric structure will 
correspond to varying values for verisimilitude, as per Miller's problem. So it is certainly 
mathematically possible to generate inconstant verisimilitude orderings. The key 
question is: are such transformations, just because mathematically possible, thereby also 
philosophically significant?
Mormann argues that to accept this latter view is in effect to adopt a species o f geometric 
conventionalism. In particular, it is to claim that it is entirely a matter o f convention 
which metrical structure we should adopt when measuring two theories' experimental 
outcomes -  just as much as would be the choice o f  measuring length using metres or 
yards. More precisely put, physical space is metrically amorphous and may be metricised 
in many different ways, and Miller's thesis is just the generalisation o f this that claims 
that 'higher dimensional physical magnitude spaces are metrically amorphous as well' 
[Mormann 1988, p513].
But, following Quine and Putnam, Mormann argues that such a conventionalism is 
untenable:
The meaning of a term (in our case a physical metric or distance function) is not 
exhausted by a short list of axioms ... but is rather a function of an extended net of 
empirical knowledge. That is to say we do not fix the reference of the term 'metric of 
physical space' by convention but by coherence. The fixation by coherence involves 
large parts of scientific background knowledge and proceeds in a series of 
approximations. A first step for the fixation of a physically meaningful metric of 
physical space is to impose the condition that a measuring rod is to stay the same length 
when transported. Reichenbach erroneously thought that this condition would be 
sufficient to determine the metric of physical space uniquely but at least this condition
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excludes our contrived metric [taken from a Miller example]. Further steps of the 
approximation process may take into account constraints concerning the form of physical 
theories, e.g. invariance principles. It seems that in the case of physical space and its 
metrical structure this narrowing down process is quite successful: for middle-sized 
objects and distances there is no other candidate left than the traditional Euclidean metric 
of physical space. The more general case of arbitrary magnitude spaces has not been 
dealt with in greater depth. But there does not seem to exist a principle obstacle which 




... many properties are part of a physical magnitude and ... the meaning of such a term is 
not exhausted by a simple formal definition. The relevant structure of physical 
magnitude spaces is much richer and it depends in such complicated ways on other 
empirical theories and conceptions that it cannot bear just amy prima facie possible 
formal manipulation as Miller asserts 
[Mormann 1988, p517]
In other words, not just any metric will do; rather they must also be physically 
meaningful. When assessing verisimilitude, we must take into account not only our 
calculation's formal procedures but also the scientific context underlying it. Logic alone 
is not enough.
Tellingly, Mormann points out that Miller is later forced to reject his own 
conventionalism himself. Arguing against Good, Miller states: 'reversals o f ordering by 
accuracy can indeed be obtained even in the one-dimensional case if  we are prepared to 
allow discontinuous transformations ... But this cannot be thought to be anything like as 
interesting, since some topological restraints must be insisted on  if  our reformulated 
hypotheses are to be reformulations at all' [Miller 1994, p226]. In other words we must 
bear in mind at least some extra-formal criteria. But as Mormainn asks: 'why is the
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metrical structure [of a magnitude space] conventional while its topological structure is 
not?’ [Mormann 1988, p 5 18] And as he argues, there can be no general answer, only 
consideration in each individual case of what the scientific context tells us should and 
should not be taken as conventional.
It is worth emphasising the one-dimensional case (regarding accuracy o f predictions 
[Miller 1975]). Can we even say that, for example, 5 (units o f some physical quantity) is 
nearer to 6 than to 7? If  he is not anti-conventionalist here, then Miller is hoist on his 
own petard. His own demonstrations o f Miller-reversals themselves rely on us being able 
to make assessments o f approximate truth unambiguously for such one-dimensional 
cases, since the very notion o f a reversal implies the existence o f some well-established 
ordering that can be reversed. But then this requires that we be able to judge one model's 
numerical answer more accurate than another's and, as Mormann asks, what justifies 
being anti-conventionalist only in these cases and not in others?
O f course, anti-conventionalism need not imply that, in Mormann's words, 'a certain set 
o f (traditional) magnitudes is beyond any doubt' [Mormann 1988, p516]. I f  there exist 
alternative empirical parameters that are also physically meaningful, then this would 
present genuine competition as to which parameters to choose. Mormann presents a 
possible such case for the example o f a falling body [Mormann 1988, p516]. One pair of 
parameters is the distance o f the body from the ground, and the square o f its momentum. 
This pair is interdefinable with another pair o f parameters that turn out to correspond to 
the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian o f a body in a gravitational field. Therefore both pairs 
o f parameters refer to physically meaningful magnitudes here. Now it turns out that the 
new pair of parameters give a basis for a metric different from that o f the old pair, and 
accordingly it is entirely possible that the verisimilitude ordering o f two false theories 
may change depending on which metric we choose, just as Miller demonstrates. The 
difference now would be that this new pair o f parameters is not just arbitrary, but rather is 
physically meaningful and therefore potentially a serious candidate for scientists' 
attention. As it were, the bottom line is that it is only this latter kind o f ambiguity that is 
philosophically interesting.
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Miller himself appears tacitly to accept Mormann's analysis. At least, in his discussion in 
[Miller 1994] he scarcely rebuts a single one o f Mormann's points. Indeed, rather the 
contrary: 'from a formal point o f view false hypotheses that predict values for the same 
set o f quantities are on a p a r . ... If  one such false hypothesis is preferred to another, then 
presumably one family o f quantities is preferred to another. In my 1975,181-86,1 made 
faces at such preferences, accusing them o f essentialism, anyway in the general case.
That was no doubt an excessive reaction, as [Mormann 1988] justly observes' [Miller 
1994, p231]. In other words we should not accept Miller's own implicit geometric 
conventionalism.
Where does this leave us?
Mormann provides the only precise diagnosis for [Miller 1975]’s quantitative example.
In a similar spirit, regarding [Miller 1974]’s qualitative propositional formalism o f  the 
weather example the general response has again been an appeal to pragmatics. Weston 
lays great stress on the pragmatic use o f background knowledge and theoretical criteria 
for determining an appropriate 'sense o f  approximation'. For example, in classical 
mechanics we are justified in disregarding the centrifugal and Coriolis 'forces' which 
appear in rotating coordinate systems, and preferring instead inertial formulations o f the 
laws, notwithstanding mathematical equivalence [Weston 1992, p68]. In other words, we 
need to go 'beyond just the mathematics'. In line with this, he argues against Miller 
essentially by saying that therefore we are justified in privileging some quantities for 
measuring accuracy, namely the ones that are actually (in a realist sense) causally 
significant. Niiniluoto concludes similarly: 'real-life applications o f the concept o f 
truthlikeness to scientific hypotheses and theories should be made relative to those 
conceptual frameworks ... that are actually used by scientists' [Niiniluoto 1998, p i 7].
And Oddie agrees that we 'must grant certain properties, magnitudes or constants a 
privileged status', and that 'it may be that [extra-logical] considerations will set some 
properties apart from others' [Oddie 1986, p i 59].
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One way or another, all -  Weston, Oddie, Niiniluoto, Mormann -  agree that in order to 
answer Miller's objection, it is necessary to introduce extra-logical considerations.
Indeed, from the start so did Miller himself: 'I do not know o f any logical way o f 
distinguishing the fundamental constants (or parameters) from the remainder' [Miller 
1975, p l85 , my emphasis]. This o f course recalls our biggest criticism o f the logical- 
similarity approach (section 1-3), namely precisely its neglect o f  just such extra-logical 
factors.
More generally, a concentration on actual scientific practice suggests that we are 
worrying about the wrong things here. We started with the motivation from economics 
that a key issue is the applicability o f models to particular real-world situations. There is 
no interest in economics in whether theories as a whole are progressing nearer the truth 
since it is universally accepted that they deal in fictional simplifications; rather, the 
methodological interest is in context-specific degree o f applicability. We shall see in the 
next chapter (section 2-6) that similar remarks may apply to the great majority o f work in 
natural science too. Moreover, what is typically not in dispute are the choice o f ontology 
and vocabulary. Therefore Miller-reversals are largely irrelevant to the actual practice o f 
science. In a nutshell, the Miller problem is (overwhelmingly) no problem 
methodologically. Therefore any definition o f approximate truth seeking to be relevant 
methodologically should be concentrating not on Miller reversals, but rather on those 
factors that are important methodologically.
It is precisely those factors that will feature in our own definition in the next chapter. We 
shall emphasise there getting correct causal strengths, where these in turn are defined in 
terms o f certain empirical outputs. Hence there will still be, so to speak, a rigorous 
connection between our scores for approximate truth and the external world. The only 
thing missing will be objective metaphysical validation for concentrating on some 
empirical outputs rather than others. But the point is that from a methodological point o f 
view no such validation is required anyway -  we just are interested in whatever 
parameters we happen to be interested in and this needs no justification. Approximate 
truth relativised to those parameters is what matters; approximate truth in some absolute
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metaphysical sense is irrelevant.
Finally, we may note a connection here with more general naturalistic views o f science. 
The claim is that philosophy should focus not on a priori problems, but rather only on 
those problems that are actually important in the practice o f  science (see e.g. [Maddy 
2000]). On this view Cartesian fundamental scepticism, for instance, sets the 
epistemological bar too high. In practice, epistemological controversies in science are, so 
to speak, conducted at a lower level o f  certainty. In actual science, whether or not some 
fact is considered sufficiently well-established does not turn on whether it passes 
Descartes's fundamental sceptical test; rather, the tests that prove useful are rather less 
strenuous, for instance significant empirical support, coherence with existing background 
knowledge, plausible causal mechanism, and so on. And this applies even though, 
logically speaking, Descartes's fundamental sceptical challenge arguably has not been 
satisfactorily resolved. Analogously, in the actual practice o f science some notion o f 
approximate truth is indeed important. But that notion is, I claim, something akin to our 
own definition o f it, that is to a definition that does not assume that choice o f ontology 
and vocabulary is always in dispute. Just as science can progress satisfactorily without 
solving Descartes's problem, so it can progress satisfactorily without solving Miller's.
And so just as useful methodological work does not focus on Descartes's problem, neither 
-  when addressing approximate truth -  need it focus on Miller's. The practice o f science 
does not require so perfect a notion as Miller asks for. If  we are interested in, as it were, 
some absolute metaphysical conception of approximate truth then its language- 
dependence is indeed a significant problem; but methodologically language-dependence 
is largely irrelevant.
1-5) Some other possible approaches
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Possible w orlds
The Kripke-Lewis notion o f possible worlds, as opposed to the possible worlds of 
classical semantics, is familiar for instance from its role in the analysis o f counterfactuals. 
It can also be put to use for the study o f approximate truth. The starting point is the idea 
that a sentence is approximately true in our world if and only if  there is another world 
sufficiently close to our world in which the sentence is exactly true. So a central element 
must clearly be some grasp on what we mean by one world being 'close' to another here. 
[Hilpinen 1976] develops for this purpose a proposal due originally to [Lewis 1973].
The basic notion is that we can define a set o f nested spheres o f classes o f  possible 
worlds, with the actual world being at the centre. A world is less similar to the actual 
world the further away the sphere on which it lies is from the centre. Any statement 
implies a set o f possible worlds in which it would be true. Then, roughly speaking, the 
closeness o f a statement to the truth is the distance o f the spheres containing its possible 
worlds from the actual world at the centre. And one statement is nearer the truth than 
another if  its associated spheres are nearer the centre. There are various technical issues 
over the exact definition o f this 'distance', for instance whether we should take the 
distance from the nearest o f a theory's spheres, or the furthest one, or some sort o f 
average, and so on. But the philosophical strengths and weaknesses o f the approach are 
more or less independent o f these precise concerns, so we disregard them here.
The Lewis-Hilpinen project carries one immediate advantage, noted in [Smith 1998] -  it 
enables us to make sense o f the approximate truth o f stubbornly false theories. Thus the 
classical theory o f fluid dynamics, for example, cannot it seems be easily adjusted into a 
true theory. In other words, its linguistic representation cannot easily be adjusted into a 
true one. Nevertheless, it may still be that the theory is true o f a (Lewis-type) possible 
world that is very similar to the actual one. But o f course we now need to explicate more 
this new notion o f similarity between whole worlds. And this is the possible worlds 
approach's fatal weakness -  it explicitly just takes similarity to be a primitive.
Note first that leaving similarity a primitive leads to a potential equivalence between the
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possible worlds and logical-similarity approaches. In particular, this will be so if the
function between worlds. Indeed [Niiniluoto 1987] remarks on the possible connection, 
although it remains disputed to what degree a unification o f the two approaches could 
really be feasible. Nevertheless, it is perhaps no surprise that many o f  the points from 
section 1-3 against logical-similarity definitions also recur here.
Since all is effectively subsumed by the possible-worlds approach into the black box o f 
the primitive 'similarity', it is clear that a lot o f the burden o f defining similarity between 
possible worlds is likely to fall on extra-logical considerations in order to assess the 
differential seriousness o f  errors. Thus the real driver o f verisim ilitude judgm ents will 
again be these extra-logical factors, yet leaving similarity a primitive leads instead to a 
concentration on the definitions' formal structures, recalling our similar objection to the 
logical-similarity literature. Next comes the problem o f relativising the truth to a target 
in a particular language. This issue is again subsumed by the possible-worlds approach 
into the black box of'sim ilarity '. Until forced to judge two worlds' similarity, issues o f 
representation can be kept at bay. What o f theories that are approxim ately true but 
stubbornly false? As noted previously, the concentration on similarity between worlds 
rather than between linguistic representations in principle enables the possible-worlds 
approach to deal with such cases more easily. But although the possible-worlds scheme 
does provide a potential route out, again leaving similarity a primitive means in effect it 
tells us nothing about how actually to find that route.
Lewis him self adjudges that any judgm ent o f comparative similarity o f  worlds must be a 
'messy business' [Lewis 1986, p24]. In particular, he agrees with the basic point that it is 
necessary to weight some aspects more than others when assessing similarity. But he 
offers no real constructive proposal beyond these observations, except apparently to hint 
that our choice o f  weights should be almost intuitive in just the right way as to reflect our 
original pre-philosophical intuition o f closeness to the truth [Lewis 1986, pp24-7]. But I 
think it is possible (and desirable) to say a little more than that (section 1-6 and chapter
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Finally, [Smith 1998] convincingly outlines one further decisive objection -  redundancy. 
His point is that the entire metaphysical detour via possible worlds is in fact unnecessary, 
since effectively the same definition o f approximate truth can equally well be obtained by 
an ontological approach without any need to invoke all the possible-worlds apparatus in 
the first place. To illustrate, take the classical theory o f fluid dynamics again. This 
theory is only approximately true when we focus on macro-patterns o f  fluid flow; in other 
respects, it is not particularly close to the truth. Now in order to make the possible- 
worlds approach work here, we need the theory itself to inform our sense o f similarity 
between worlds. So the possible-worlds account o f approximate truth would say first, 
that classical fluid dynamics is approximately true if  and only if  the world in which it is 
strictly true is similar to the actual world, and second, that in turn these worlds will be 
similar only if  we are giving weight to the particular phenomenon (i.e. macro fluid flows) 
that the theory is concerned to explain. But as Smith asks, in which case just when will 
the actual world be appropriately similar in this way to the model's posited world? The 
answer -  precisely when the model's posited structure o f the particular phenomenon o f 
interest is similar to the actual structure o f that phenomenon. Therefore once we have 
weighted our attention exclusively onto as it were just a particular subset o f the world 
(macro fluid flow), we find that the world's background facts and nomological structure 
are no longer playing any role in our estimation o f approximate truth. All that matters is 
the similarity between the model's posited structure o f the phenomenon at hand and the 
actual structure, regardless o f the rest o f the world. But now this is precisely the context- 
specific definition o f approximate truth we find in an ontological approach, a version o f 
which we shall develop in chapter 2. In other words, both the possible-worlds and 
ontological definitions boil down (in this example) to the similarity between actual macro 
fluid flow and the classical picture o f macro fluid flow, ignoring other aspects. So there 
is no need after all to invoke the grand metaphysical apparatus o f possible worlds; a 
simple ontological definition instead gets us to the same place anyway.
Str u ctu relikeness
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Associated particularly with Sneed and Stegmueller, the structuralist program develops 
Suppes’ original conception o f scientific theories as abstract structures, which are then 
taken to correspond to particular phenomena in the real world. The relevance to us is that 
this offers another way o f conceiving approximate truth. Roughly speaking, it conceives 
it as being the similarity between on the one hand the abstract structure representing the 
theory, and on the other the second structure that is actually instantiated in the real world. 
O f course, the task is then to specify more closely what kind o f structures these are and 
what kind o f similarity is being invoked. A characteristic o f the approach is to reduce all 
such structures to those o f set theory. Depending on the author, different notions o f 
similarity are invoked, sometimes the Bourbaki concept o f uniformity, sometimes a 
specific metric or pseudometric [Niiniluoto 1998]. As Niiniluoto notes, uniformities here 
'have arbitrary features and are often insufficient for the comparison o f  false theories' 
[Niiniluoto 1998, p i 2]. In the case o f specific metrics on the other hand, often the 
resultant definition o f approximate truth has a formal parallel in the logical-statement 
approach. Indeed Niiniluoto’s work, like that o f Kuipers (see shortly), can be read in part 
as an attempted synthesis o f the structuralist and verisimilitude traditions.
[Smith 1998] notes a problem with representing all theories in terms o f  sets. Suppose 
that a standard model, for example the ideal pendulum, is held to be strictly true o f some 
system in the real world. This implies that a certain real-world set belongs to the set o f 
ideal pendulums. The difficulty arises if  we want to say that the model is only 
approximately true o f some real-world pendulum, because then we would appear forced 
to say that the real-world set is only 'approximately' a member o f the set o f ideal 
pendulums. But this o f course in effect passes the definitional buck onto the unexplicated 
notion o f approximate set-membership. And being approximately a member o f a set 
seems no less problematic than was the notion o f being approximately true in the first 
place. Sneed him self frankly acknowledges the difficulty, adding that the solution 'is not 
clear to me' and 'I have no suggestions how such an account is to be provided' [Sneed 
1971, p25].
Problems familiar from previous sections also recur here. Thus it is not always clear how
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to understand the posited structures realistically. What realist ontology is thought to 
correspond to the abstract structures o f set theory? An answer to this would help inform 
us about the extra-formal factors crucial to resolving the conundrum o f  approximation.
As things stand, a concentration just on formal matters can tend instead to direct attention 
away from the important point. On the other hand, arguably structuralism does tend to 
concentrate more on context-specific as opposed to general approximate truth, since real- 
world instantiations o f ideal structures are often considered singularly.
The most notable recent development o f structuralism in the direction o f approximate 
truth has been the work o f Theo Kuipers. In the canonical example, the various 
combinations o f hot, rainy and windy, or their negations, gave rise to eight different 
possibilities. So far we have taken just one o f  these possibilities to be the truth, what we 
can label here the 'descriptive truth'. But [Kuipers 1987] introduces a second concept, 
what he calls 'theoretical verisimilitude'. Thus suppose that only a subset o f those eight 
possibilities is actually physically possible -  for instance, imagine in the canonical 
example that for some reason it is physically impossible for it to rain when it is also 
either cold or still. In these circumstances, three o f the standard possibilities (cold-rain- 
wind, cold-rain-still, hot-rain-still) are no longer physically admissible. The remaining 
five possibilities therefore summarise all the physically permissible states -  Kuipers 
names this set the 'theoretical truth'. His descriptive verisimilitude is then just closeness 
to the descriptive truth, and theoretical verisimilitude closeness to this theoretical truth. 
(Kuipers's theoretical verisimilitude is closely akin to what later (section 1-7) we shall 
discuss as 'legisimilitude'.)
Broadly speaking, for descriptive verisimilitude Kuipers is happy to endorse Niiniluoto's 
metric. For theoretical verisimilitude, on the other hand, label the set o f  physically 
possible worlds W. Then a theory or proposition A can be taken as the assertion that the 
two sets A and W are equal, in which case any world in A would be in W, and vice versa. 
Kuipers's first suggested definition o f distance from the truth here was then essentially 
the symmetric difference o f A and W, i.e. (A -  W) u (W -  A). However, in developing 
this measure Kuipers ran into a variety o f technical problems. As a consequence he went
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on instead to presume a notion o f 'structurelikeness' as a primitive, and to define a 
qualitative relation o f between-ness relative to that structurelikeness [Kuipers 1992].
That is to say, one theory can be thought nearer the truth than another if  its structure lies 
'between' that o f its competitor and the truth. No attempt is made to define this 
quantitatively. But this approach too turns out to require some strong assumptions, and 
has also run into various technical problems [Niiniluoto 1998].
This theoretical verisimilitude promises to avoid the problems for the logical-similarity 
approach pointed out in [Liu 1999] (see section 1-7). And at first sight, it might also 
seem that one thing its qualitative approach could make sense o f  is the phenomenon o f 
useful but stubbornly false theories. Perhaps this between-ness relation can place one 
such theory between another and the truth? But on closer examination, the relation is still 
defined essentially by counting true and false constituents. Thus it remains difficult to 
see how it could really capture the usefulness of, for instance, the classical theory o f  fluid 
dynamics. More generally, most o f the other now-familiar objections to the 
verisimilitude and related literatures apply equally to Kuipers's work. Thus for example 
there is no treatment o f  the differential seriousness o f errors, and hence o f the role o f 
extra-formal factors.
Partial truth
So far, all the work we have reviewed has accepted the bivalence o f truth values into true 
and false, and attempted some measure essentially o f how much truth as opposed to 
falsity a theory captures. None has proposed that the truth o f an individual statement, as 
opposed to whole theory, might itself be a matter o f degree. But one line o f research 
could be to challenge this fundamental assumption o f bivalency itself, and to try instead 
to formulate a notion o f 'partial' truth. Many-valued logic is o f course not itself a new 
idea (see section 2-11). But (to my knowledge) none o f its research strands has really 
been used directly to address our issue o f approximate truth in philosophy o f science -  
except one. The recent work o f Steven French and others attempts to develop rigorously 
a notion o f  partial truth specifically applicable to the evaluation o f  scientific theories and
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idealisations. (For details see, for instance, the account in [French and Ladyman 1998].)
The classic Tarskian definition o f truth requires a language ('L', say), and an 
interpretation P o f that language in a structure. Then a sentence S o f  L is true or false 
only with reference to the particular interpretation P. French adapts this scheme in the 
following way. The heart o f his approach is to view the models underlying 
interpretations not as completely or exactly mapping some given domain D, but rather as 
only partially mapping it. Following Kripke, to do this he defines a 'partial structure' 
such that whereas in the classical case all elements o f D are either true or false, now they 
can be true, false or also unspecified. This in turn enables him to define a partial 
interpretation o f the language in the structure, and hence a notion o f a sentence S being 
partially true if  it is fully true with respect to the partial interpretation. So the novelty 
really lies in the definition o f the restricted or partial structure rather than in the definition 
o f truth itself.
French's motivation is to make sense o f idealisation from the point o f view o f the 
semantic view o f theories. That means, in his view, explicating a formal definition o f 
how an idealised model might be said to have captured the truth o f some o f a situation. 
But this formulation o f partial truth can be seen as suffering from the same drawbacks as 
the other purely logical formulations. Imagine a theory deemed to be partially true in 
French's sense, that is to say strictly true within a partial domain. Then for our purposes 
the formulation omits a crucial further consideration -  just how significant a part o f  the 
whole does this partial domain actually cover? Or equivalently, how important are the 
bits o f the total domain in which the theory is not true? This query is o f  course analogous 
to the seriousness-of-errors point from earlier sections.
French and Ladyman comment: 'Clearly, [the partial structure] is not conceived o f as 
reflecting the (total) structure o f D, but as only partially mirroring D. Nevertheless the 
partial model ... has to capture some fundamental aspects o f D, or some "elements o f 
truth", although it does not mirror D perfectly' [French and Ladyman 1998, p57]. O f 
course, all hinges on what precisely is meant here by 'capture some fundamental aspects'.
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Implicitly, the understanding of'fundamental' must presumably be with reference to 
extra-logical criteria, so this just amplifies the objection o f the previous paragraph. The 
formulation o f partial truth in itself gives no guidance as to just what aspects should be 
understood to be 'fundamental'. Once again, in effect relevance is left a primitive. 
Another problem is that if a theory is strictly true within part o f a domain, then this 
implies that it must have successfully captured exactly the true structure o f at least some 
portion o f  reality. But this seems to leave no scope for the now familiar phenomenon of 
useful but stubbornly false theories.
1-6) First ontological approaches
In troduction
All approaches we have tried so far have foundered on similar problems, in particular the 
failure to incorporate extra-logical factors in a systematic way. In order to remedy that, 
rather than just the definitions o f measures themselves I think it is necessary to focus 
much more on the interpretation o f the components o f those measures. And in order in 
turn to perform this semantic task, it is necessary to frame our definition in terms of 
entities or variables presumed to exist in the real world. Hence we shall term this an 
'ontological' approach. By this means, and by also incorporating pragmatics explicitly, 
we shall also be able to give an exact definition of'sim ilarity' rather than just take it as a 
primitive.
The full development o f our own scheme follows in the next chapter. But attempts have 
already been made to tackle the issue in this kind o f way. So first we shall look more 
closely at the three main examples o f this, each o f which seeks to specify explicitly a way 
o f incorporating extra-logical factors. It is clear that I think this approach is the best way 
forward, so I take the following papers to be as it were the vanguard o f work in the field
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and worth examining in more detail. They represent the first attempts at an ontological 
account o f approximate truth -  what can we learn from them?
Giere as a precursor
An early precursor o f ontological approaches is the work o f Ronald Giere [Giere 1988]. 
He was disturbed essentially by the 'stubbornly false' critique from section 1-3 earlier. 
That is to say, purely logical metrics have difficulty explaining how a theory like 
classical fluid dynamics can be approximately true, since it does not consist o f mostly 
true propositions mixed with a few false ones but rather seems to be everywhere false. 
Giere preferred instead to think o f a theory being (exactly) true o f some abstract model, 
and then o f that model being similar to some specified real-world system. The notion o f 
approximate truth is then contained in this relation o f similarity. The key is to move 
away from general theories and instead to focus on comparing directly a specific real- 
world structure with a postulated model o f it. This way o f conceiving o f  approximate 
truth is the precursor o f  all ontological approaches, including our own one. But 
unfortunately, like the possible-worlds theorists, Giere’s own work leaves his 'similarity' 
a primitive.
So is this approach really so new? Niiniluoto, for instance, allows both for the idea o f a 
theory's best model being close to the real-world system (what he calls approximate 
truth), and also for the idea o f its whole class o f models being close to the real-world 
system (verisimilitude). Hence in Niiniluoto's scheme, if  the theory is maximally 
informative and has only one model then the distinction between approximate truth and 
verisimilitude collapses [Niiniluoto 1998, pp 18-19]. In other words, if  we are 
considering a singular model not a general theory, then the Giere approach o f assessing 
the similarity between that model and the real world is in fact just exactly what 
Niiniluoto's approach does anyway. Moreover (unlike Giere) Niiniluoto o f course also 
goes on to provide a metric for defining that similarity.
However, notwithstanding the above, I do not believe that Niiniluoto can escape so
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quickly here, or indeed ultimately really escape at all. At root, he does not address the 
stubbom-falsity critique nor the consequential imperative to move away from his purely 
logical definition o f approximate truth, even though it is this critique and imperative that 
in fact lie at the heart o f the motivation for Giere's approach in the first place. Putting the 
burden for defining approximate truth onto 'similarity' was really intended by Giere as a 
way precisely o f avoiding having to count true and false logical propositions. Instead, 
perhaps some other way o f assessing similarity might be possible and the key is to find 
this. This o f course is precisely what Niiniluoto's scheme does not achieve. The 
criticism o f Giere that really hits home, and which is made by [Aronson, Harre and Way 
1994] among several others, is rather that he left his notion o f similarity a primitive. In a 
sense, the challenge since then has been to put extra-logical flesh onto that particular 
bone. The first really to attempt this in an ontological framework was Aronson.
Type-hierarchies and verisimilitude
This account is only fully developed in [Aronson, Harre and Way 1994], but much o f it, 
especially its application to the issue o f approximate truth, is prefigured in [Aronson 
1990]. For ease o f  exposition, we shall therefore hereon refer to the authors just as 
'Aronson'. The heart o f their scheme is to take scientific theories to be positing type- 
hierarchies, in turn intended to capture actual structural relationships between natural 
kinds. These structural relationships, being between natural kinds, are to be understood 
realistically -  Aronson take them to be metaphysical primitives, in other words they are 
just the way that the world actually is. If  two types are close in a type-hierarchy, then it 
is because they are indeed really close, since the hierarchy represents by definition the 
true state o f affairs. Aronson's main motivation is to formulate an understanding of 
approximate truth compatible with, and hence supportive of, realism. (An inspiration is 
that such hierarchy frameworks have turned out to be useful for knowledge representation 
in artificial intelligence.)
How does this scheme for a realist representation o f theories lead to an account of 
approximate truth? Roughly speaking, a theory is approximately true if  its hierarchy
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picks out a type that is similar to the actual type. Two types are deemed similar if  they 
occupy similar locations in the hierarchy's tree. An example o f one o f  these hierarchies 
might be one with higher-level nodes such as 'mammal', intermediate-level nodes such as 
'cat', and lower-level nodes for individual tokens such as 'my cat Smokey'. Then 'cat' and 
'dog' are similar in that they are both subtypes o f the same supertype 'mammal'. To get a 
full definition o f verisimilitude it is necessary to list all the supertypes the two subtypes 
have in common, plus all those possessed by one but not the other, and then compare the 
two subtypes for similarity. (Aronson borrow a measure from the psychologist Tversky 
for this last operation.) Some nodes may be assigned greater weight than others, as 
determined (potentially non-circularly) by scientific context (p i22). Finally, full truth 
can then be seen as the limiting case o f increasing verisimilitude, where the type a theory 
picks out is identical to the type o f the actual object.
An initial query is: where exactly do these type-hierarchies come from? It is disputable 
whether the world is really objectively carved up in these ways, or whether on the 
contrary 'natural' kinds are in fact just a matter o f convenience or context [Psillos 1995]. 
For instance, in biology it is now considered doubtful whether the species types used as 
illustrations above can in fact even be considered natural kinds at all, given their 
evolutionary mutability. But if  the choice o f hierarchy might ultimately be just 
conventional, why then should we assign any objective weight to some particular choice? 
In fairness, Aronson do explicitly state that the ordering o f  natural kinds is to be taken as 
a metaphysical primitive. But Psillos's real claim here is that this still leaves Aronson's 
definition o f approximate truth at risk from a kind o f vicious context-dependence.
I think this charge is itself uncompelling, but it is interesting to see why. Note first that 
Aronson fully agree that similarity is context-specific, and that degree o f  similarity may 
well vary depending on which type-hierarchy we employ (p i29). Thus suppose that the 
true type is a dolphin, but that one competing theory thinks it is actually a fish and 
another that it is a cat. On one type-hierarchy, both the fish and dolphin are subtypes o f 
'sea animal', whereas the cat is not. But on another, both the cat and dolphin are subtypes 
of'mammal', whereas the fish is not. Therefore the ranking o f similarity depends on
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which type-hierarchy we adopt, which in turn will depend, Aronson say, on the context of 
the particular problem we are concerned with. But Psillos claims that this leaves 
Aronson’s definition o f verisimilitude still open to precisely the charge o f arbitrariness 
that the invocation o f  objective type-hierarchies was designed to relieve in the first place. 
So have we actually gained anything?
But Aronson are explicit that they are interested in accuracy rather than 
comprehensiveness: 'when it comes to truthlikeness, we are simply comparing the thing 
or system the proposition refers to with the real thing or system; we are not comparing 
entire possible worlds in which these things or systems exist' [Aronson 1990, plO]. In 
order to assess accuracy, we must specify the target situation we are tying to model. And 
any such specification is inevitably ‘subjective’. The key thing is: once given the 
specification o f a problem, can we still then give an objective treatment o f how well a 
particular model tackles it? And Aronson’s scheme does remain objective in that -  the 
important -  sense. Once we know what we are interested in, then the posited objective 
ordering o f  natural kinds represented by the hierarchy does yield us an objective measure 
o f similarity. Given a specification o f our problem (in other words, given a particular 
choice o f type-hierarchy), then we can objectively define approximate truth (in other 
words, then we can objectively define relative location within that hierarchy).
Psillos complains that such 'contextualism' means that the same theory might score 
differently, depending just on which type-hierarchy we choose to ground our measure o f 
similarity. In other words, Aronson's method offers no technique for measuring the 
approximate truth o f  theories in toto (i.e. verisimilitude), only for measuring the accuracy 
o f specific models. This is true, but as already argued I do not think is a weakness. 
Context-dependence is indeed a problem if  we are wishing to rank general theories, but 
not if  we are concerned only with context-specific models. And I think that any context- 
specific definition o f approximate truth must take on board the pragmatic issue o f 
interest-relativity. The important thing is to do it satisfactorily, and I think that Aronson 
do. (See section 2-9 for a full discussion o f our own treatment o f this issue.)
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In my view, a more potent criticism o f Aronson concerns their choice o f  ontology. In 
particular, as Psillos points out, the use o f type-hierarchies is open to the charge o f a 
certain circularity:
’[Aronson, Harre and Way] construe similarity in terms of locations in a type-hierarchy. 
But what determines a type-hierarchy in the first place, if not some similarity relation 
between the types chosen to stratify the hierarchy? If this is so, then it seems rather 
trivial -  and not explanatory -  that type-hierarchies determine similarity relations; they 
are meant to do so. They insist that they do not take the notion of similarity as primitive 
but that they try to analyse it in terms of locations in type-hierarchies. I agree that given 
that type-hierarchies are somehow given, their approach to similarity is cogent and really 
casts new light on the nature and significance of similarity judgments. But, I think, it is 
not enough to declare the ordering of natural kinds as a "metaphysical primitive" (pi 23). 
For this does not advance our understanding of how hierarchies of natural kinds come to 
being.'
[Psillos 1995, pl81]
In other words, ultimately their notion o f similarity rests on the provenance o f the type- 
hierarchies, yet Aronson take the latter as a primitive. So in fact we hardly seem to have 
moved the invocation o f  the primitive much further back than Giere had it.
I endorse this criticism, and think it is better to choose instead an ontology that tracks the 
causal structure o f the world. And what better for doing that than the actual causal 
structure itself? Just assuming a causal structure clearly does not in itself thereby also 
smuggle in a similarity ordering, so the charge o f circularity can be avoided. Moreover, 
postulating such a causal structure is surely much less controversial than postulating type- 
hierarchies o f natural kinds, and it is therefore correspondingly less controversial to claim 
a realist interpretation o f  it. We can also thereby avoid the need to invoke macro-scale 
natural kinds in contexts such as biology, and presumably social science, where their 
existence is doubtful. Furthermore, whereas sometimes it is unclear which type- 
hierarchy should be invoked, presumably there is unambiguously available (on a realist 
account) only the one actual causal structure o f the world. (The possibility o f  there being
60
many different valid descriptions o f that structure is not a problem here -  see chapter 2.) 
Formulating weights across these causes is then surely a more flexible method o f 
incorporating interest-relativity than switching between relatively unwieldy type- 
hierarchies. (And note that even then, Aronson still wished also to be able to weight 
across the nodes o f those hierarchies.) And where really valid, type-hierarchies should 
presumably anyway be expected to 'fall out' naturally from a correct causal description of 
the world, so we certainly are not losing anything valuable in the switch. O f course, all 
this now leaves us the task o f defining some notion o f similarity in terms o f  causal 
structure since, as it were, we are no longer receiving it gratis, built-in to the definition of 
the hierarchies. That is the task for chapter 2 (see especially its appendix).
Sm ith 's geom etric ontology
Peter Smith has developed an interesting and original ontological notion o f  approximate 
truth [Smith 1998]. It arises from his more general study o f  dynamical systems, and o f 
how the mathematical models o f chaos theory can be thought to explain the actual world. 
He too is following the lead o f Giere in that he proposes first that we understand a model 
as being exactly true o f some abstract description, and then second this description as in 
turn bearing a degree o f similarity to some actual system. Approximate truth is then just 
this degree o f similarity between the real world system and the model's postulated 
system.
His particular twist is that most dynamical systems theories are what he calls 'geometric 
modelling' theories. That is, they posit a particular geometrical structure, and when 
applied to the real world they are in effect attributing a certain geometrical structure to 
real phenomena. These phenomena in turn presumably do possess some particular, 
possibly different, actual geometrical structure. The definition o f approximate truth is 
then some measure o f geometrical similarity ('close-tracking') between these two 
geometrical structures. Since defining such a measure presents no particular technical 
difficulty, so neither should defining approximate truth. By thinking o f similarity 
explicitly in these geometrical terms it also becomes easy to define it precisely, since
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there are many readily available measures o f geometrical similarity. His approach carries 
other advantages too, to whit the usual welcome benefits o f an ontological approach -  
thus it is inherently context-specific, and it is able easily to accommodate the 
approximate truth o f stubbornly false theories.
Nevertheless Smith’s approach has shortcomings, and as with Aronson I think they stem 
ultimately from the choice o f ontology. Geometry seems well-suited to the assessment of 
models from dynamical systems, but less well-suited to scientific theories in general. 
Most theories are not specified, or easily re-expressed, in geometrical terms. In fairness, 
Smith himself concedes that his account applies only to the special case o f dynamical 
systems theories, and indeed explicitly does not present his definition as a candidate for a 
general measure. But notwithstanding this, he still addresses general issues in the 
approximate truth literature.
The strategy depends critically on our being able to understand the ontology concerned 
realistically. (Aronson had this point in mind when specifying that their type-hierarchies 
must represent the actual orderings o f natural kinds.) The problem in this case is that 
Smith is in effect invoking a geometrical ontology, but that such an ontology is difficult 
to understand in the required realistic way. We already noted above its apparent lack o f 
general applicability. And when Smith speaks o f  being able 'canonically' [Smith 1998, 
p264] to express a theory in a particular geometrical form, this seems to me to assume a 
realism that, as it were, needs to be built into the ontology, not added in from outside 
theory. Similarly, his abstract geometrical descriptions o f an ideal pendulum [Smith 
1998, p260] implicitly require additional realist assumptions in order to do their 
philosophical work -  just abstract descriptions on their own are insufficient. And 
ironically, it is Smith him self who introduces an example that seems to me to illustrate 
especially well the benefits o f a more realistic, and hence more generally applicable, 
ontology.
Suppose we have two models o f planetary motion, one Ptolemaic and one Newtonian. 
Suppose next the parameters in them are so chosen, as is perfectly possible, that the
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Ptolemaic model actually tracks the apparent movement o f the planets better than the 
Newtonian one does. How in this case can we capture the sense that the Newtonian 
model is still closer to the truth? This example embarrasses a geometric definition o f 
approximate truth, since here it is the Ptolemaic model that would seem to be close- 
tracking the planets' trajectories better. In response, Smith is forced to appeal to a wider 
context o f Hempelian unification. In particular, we should consider (he argues) the 
Newtonian model only as part o f a package o f generally successful Newtonian theory, 
and the Ptolemaic model by contrast only as part o f a relatively more failing package. 
Viewing matters in this broader light, we become justified in preferring the Newtonian 
model after all. Although the Ptolemaic one may give a better geometrical track right 
here, in other contexts a Newtonian approach has shown itself superior. But this kind of 
holism runs counter to one o f the principal advantages o f the ontological approach, 
namely its ability to make sense o f singular judgments o f approximate truth. It implicitly 
is saying, for apparently arbitrary reasons o f convenience, that the geometric definition 
should in this case be applied only to general theories, not to particular models.
The point is that the problem may become much more manageable if, rather than 
geometry, we talk instead in terms o f causation. Then we can easily imagine that the 
Newtonian model more accurately captures the actual causal processes at work in the 
heavens, and accordingly that on some causal definition it will be assigned greater 
approximate truth. Admittedly, even when working with causation the analysis o f  this 
example turns out to be tricky due to the different ontologies o f the competing models, 
and a holistic element may enter the interpretation o f the reference o f  each model (see 
sections 2-12 to 2-14 for extended discussion). And admittedly also, we saw that getting 
round the Miller problem involves holistic considerations too (section 1-4).
Nevertheless, it still seems to me desirable to be able to express the sense in which the 
Newtonian model is preferable without a forced reference in our very definition to 
extraneous contexts and the performances o f other models in other problems. At root a 
causal ontology, on a realistic interpretation, enables us straightaway to target as it were 
what is actually going on in the world, whereas the geometric ontology is revealed by this 
example to carry only a more instrumental flavour.
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Finally, a quick note on the analysis of interest-relativity. Like almost everyone 
(including us), Smith agrees that any judgment o f approximate truth must unavoidably be 
relative to the particular aspects o f a problem in which we happen to be interested: 'a 
theory is approximately true if  the world exhibits a relevant structure sufficiently similar 
to the abstract structure specified by the theory (though which similarities to weight will, 
no doubt, be interest-relative)' [Smith 1998, p264, first emphasis mine, see also his 
footnote 9 p259]. But when the issue crops up again later in the paper there seems to be 
more confusion. In dynamical systems, a very small difference in initial conditions can 
'explode' into a huge divergence in final outcomes. Thus the same model may seem to be 
approximately true o f the initial conditions, but not at all approximately true o f the final 
outcome. In order to get round this ambiguity, Smith proposes that: 'we need to stress the 
fact that chaotic theories prioritize other, more abstract, metric and topological similarity- 
relations between the chaotic models and worldly behaviour, and the theories can count 
as getting near the truth in virtue o f these similarities' [Smith 1998, p274]. The 
implication is that there exists a unique answer here and that we can resolve the apparent 
ambiguity objectively. But my own view is that in such cases there is an unavoidable 
subjective element -  namely, are we interested in the initial conditions, or the final 
outcome? Once we have characterised our subjective interest, then we can formulate an 
objective measure. So here the ambiguity can only be resolved subjectively, and after 
that -  but only after that -  we can bring in an objective apparatus. I think this is an 
important point to be clear about -  see section 2-9 for a full analysis o f interest-relativity.
Barnes's approximate causal explanation
To sum up so far: both Aronson and Smith suggest interesting, essentially ontological, 
ways o f defining approximate truth. But despite many virtues, each in the end is 
handicapped by its actual choice o f ontology. A causal ontology on the other hand, 
understood realistically, may be more promising and is the basis o f our own scheme in 
chapter 2. In this subsection we look at the (to my knowledge) one serious attempt in the 
literature at such a causal explication -  Eric Barnes's development o f the notion of
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approximate causal explanation [Barnes 1995], which he offers as a more reliable 
instrument for demonstrating scientific progress than bald approximate truth. As he 
notes, the literature on approximate explanation is remarkably sparse. He gives one 
reference to [Tuomela 1985], which recalls Giere's work. Otherwise, almost the only 
precursor is [Pearce and Rantala 1985], but that paper is chiefly concerned with whether 
an approximately true theory can nevertheless be thought to furnish deductive- 
nomological explanations in the same way as a strictly true one. No account is given o f 
approximation itself, nor indeed much fresh insight into Barnes's specific concern o f 
scientific progress. (We discuss ourselves the relation between approximate truth and 
approximate explanation in section 2-8.)
Barnes nowhere mentions Giere, nor indeed any explicit metaphysical program for 
tackling the issue o f approximate explanation. But he takes there to be an underlying 
causal reality and in effect defines approximation by the extent to which different 
theories capture it, and this o f course is just the ontological approach we have been 
advocating. Giere takes theories, or models, to posit a structure in a possible world which 
can then be compared for similarity with one in the real world. If  this comparison is o f 
the different worlds' causal structures, then Giere and Barnes would seem to be following 
the same strategy. (This is in fact also the strategy advocated in [Tuomela 1985], but 
[Barnes 1995] only refers to it briefly.)
Barnes uses for illustration a simple example o f his own invention, where we are to 
imagine a brick being pushed off a table due to the action o f three separate forces 'a', 'b' 
and 'c'. These forces are individually necessary but only jointly sufficient to cause the 
brick to fall. The complete causal explanation is therefore A&B&C, where the 'A' means 
the theory states that force 'a' was applied, and so on for all the three forces. Consider 
now two competing explanations: Xi states -A&B&C, while X2 states ~A&~B&~C. The 
intuition is then that, although both false, o f the two explanations we nonetheless prefer 
Xi since it at least gets two o f the three contributing causes right, whereas X2 gets all 
three wrong. Although, being false, neither theory counts as a full explanation, Barnes's 
aim is to explicate a sense o f approximate explanation which enables us to express the
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intuition that Xi is somehow preferable all the same.
The main burden o f Barnes's paper is to demonstrate that we can circumvent Miller's 
problem by focusing on the underlying causes a, b and c rather than on the linguistic 
expressions o f them A, B and C. To do this, he needs to set up a slightly cumbersome 
apparatus of'conditional contributing causes' [p219], which arguably runs into some 
technical problems (see [Niiniluoto 1998, p i 7]. But I do not believe that his approach 
would really circumvent Miller's problem in any case since, as Niiniluoto comments: 
'Barnes seems to assume realism about the forces a, b and c, whereas a Millerian 
translation might be applied to them as well' [Niiniluoto 1998, p i 8]. I believe that 
Barnes's concentration on Miller's problem is misguided (section 1-4), and distracts him 
from addressing other more pressing issues associated with a causal approach. (In 
fairness, Bames does explicitly acknowledge that his account is likely to leave much 
scope for further development.)
Among the basic possibilities that Bames does not address is what happens when some 
causes are more important than others. Suppose cause X raises the probability o f an 
effect by 0.7, cause Y by 0.1 and cause Z by 0.01. On Barnes's account, an explanation 
citing Y and Z should be awarded a higher score than one citing just X, but this seems 
unsatisfactory. Similarly, what if a model cites a cause but gets its strength wrong, for 
instance quoting X above as increasing the probability o f the effect by only 0.5 instead o f
0.7? Our own scheme will be tailored precisely to handle such considerations.
[Niiniluoto 1998, pp l 7-18] also correctly raises questions about Barnes's treatment o f the 
composition o f causes, another lacuna in his account. This issue cannot be dealt with 
satisfactorily here without looking at how to define the strengths o f composed causes, a 
good analysis o f which turns out to depend critically on adopting a context-specific 
approach (chapter 3). Barnes's discussion o f his own conditional contributing causes 
arguably also suffers for want o f a greater focus on context-specificity. Therefore, 
although starting out with an apparently very similar approach to our own, Barnes's paper 
ends up heading in a rather different direction.
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Finally, two other acknowledgements. First, [Weston 1992, p68] also supports the 
adoption o f a realistically understood causal ontology for tackling approximate truth. His 
actual scheme is rather different to the approach advocated in this chapter though, 
concentrating as it does on the evaluation o f general theories rather than context-specific 
models. Second, much the closest anticipation comes from Paul Humphreys, who points 
the way to exactly the kind o f scheme we develop ourselves in the next chapter:
'I believe that this kind of causal approach also captures rather better than do traditional 
accounts how we approach closer to the whole truth. Many accounts o f ... verisimilitude 
use a counting measure on the degree of correspondence between correct state descriptions 
and proferred state descriptions. That can be replaced by a similar counting measure on 
[the set of causes mentioned in an explanation]. One can make this more precise and 
include a measure of the relative contributions of causal factors ... but I shall not pursue 
that here. ... The more factors cited and the more they contribute to the explanandum, the 
better and more complete the explanation. We may rank explanatory factors according to 
the degree to which they contribute to the effect.’
[Humphreys 1990, pi 15 footnote 28]
However, this passage comes from a footnote, and unfortunately (as far as I know) 
Humphreys nowhere developed this idea any further than in these words above.
1-7) Idealisation, laws of nature 
Idealisation and approximate truth
Idealisation examines the relation between an abstract model and the messier real world. 
Typically such a model will capture only some aspects o f the world, or will only 
resemble rather than exactly represent it. Clearly therefore idealisation has a connection 
with the issue o f approximate truth. Moreover, many strands o f work in this field follows
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our own eventual scheme in being framed context-specifically and also causally, and so 
may appear promising as a source o f insights. However, it turns out that its concerns are, 
as it were, typically somewhat tangential to ours. In particular, much o f  the focus has 
been methodological, with a resultant lack o f precise proposals -  as opposed to general 
approaches -  for defining approximate truth. We shall mention here only that work 
which most closely anticipates our general concerns.
An early proponent o f  causal metaphysics was J.S. Mill [Mill 1846]. He saw that 
economic laws were rarely empirically fully correct, but felt that they did seem 
nevertheless to capture something o f the world -  essentially the intuition with which we 
also started (section 1-1). His solution was the notion o f ‘tendency laws’. These capture 
causal factors that do indeed actually operate in the world, but the reason their predictions 
often fail empirically is the simultaneous operation o f other causal factors muddying the 
water. Only when these other factors, or ‘disturbing causes’ in M ill’s phrase, are not 
present can the operation o f tendency laws actually be observed unimpaired.
Mill’s account o f scientific models describing causal factors that may form only part o f 
the total causal structure actually present in a situation, anticipates in part our own 
approach. Moreover, his account is also implicitly context-specific, as we desire. 
However, as it stands we need to add to it in order to reach a useful conception o f 
approximate truth. We want, recall, an understanding o f to what degree a particular 
model does actually capture the truth of a particular problem. Clearly a key factor in 
determining this must be some way o f expressing how serious the disturbing causes are in 
any specific context. For any particular case, how much do the disturbing causes disturb? 
Mill never really analyses this issue in detail. He therefore correspondingly never really 
provides us with a detailed way o f saying that one model captures the truth o f  a particular 
situation more than does another. In the parlance o f this thesis, Mill provides neither a 
metric nor any detailed treatment o f the differential seriousness o f errors. (Moreover, his 
scheme also provides no way o f incorporating errors in a theory’s specification o f the 
tendency law itself, independent o f any disturbing causes, making it difficult to 
accommodate useful but stubbornly false theories.)
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Similar remarks apply to other strands in the literature otherwise reminiscent o f our own 
approach. The idealisation-concretisation procedure o f Nowak and associates o f the 
Poznan school [Nowak 1992] sees idealisation as a two-stage process: first, an idealised 
model is abstracted from a real-world situation; then second, concretising factors are 
added back to the idealised description in order that the idealised model may describe 
empirical reality accurately. For instance, a model o f an ideal pendulum may be 
abstracted from reality, its properties studied, and then concretising factors such as air 
resistance and so on re-introduced until the idealised model describes actual behaviour 
accurately. As with ceteris paribus laws, this requires well-founded criteria to motivate 
the reintroduction o f its concretising factors else the scheme could be applied in support 
o f any theory at all, no matter how apparently crazy. Nowak recognises this, saying that 
the concretising factors should be those most relevant to the particular real-world 
situation, but this ’relevance' is in effect left a primitive. For this reason, the scheme 
gives us no precise measure for how well an idealisation matches the real-life situation, 
and hence no precise measure o f approximate truth.
Maki’s method o f isolation-deisolation for our purposes has similar strengths and 
weaknesses to Nowak’s idealisation-concretisation. And his notion o f ‘essesimilitude’ -  
closeness to the relevant truth -  while encapsulating nicely our idea o f  approximate truth, 
must again be taken as in effect a primitive since it is not really analysed in any way 
[Maki 1991, 1994]. Cartwright’s metaphysics and methodology [Cartwright 1989, 1999] 
also closely resemble those o f our own eventual scheme, but again it is not part o f her 
project to furnish a precise definition o f approximate truth. Thus: 'Models, I say, 
resemble the situations they represent' [Cartwright 1999, p i 93, her emphasis]. This 
shows her support for an ontological conception o f resemblance and hence implicitly o f 
approximate truth, but the term 'resemblance' itself is left in effect as a primitive. Where 
Mill left disturbing causes unanalysed, Nowak the relevance o f his concretising factors 
and Maki his essesimilitude, Cartwright leaves her ‘resemblance’ unanalysed too.
Similar remarks applied also, as we saw, to Lewis’s similarity o f possible worlds (section 
1-5) and to the work o f Giere (section 1-6). In all cases, in effect no exact definition of
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approximate truth is offered.
The problem  o f legisimilitude
A perennial concern in the literature is the relation between idealisation and laws of 
nature. This has led in turn to a concern in the eyes o f some with the possible relevance 
o f laws o f nature to the problem o f approximate truth. Science is sometimes seen as an 
attempt to 'carve nature at its joints' or, put more mundanely, an attempt to isolate laws of 
nature. According to this view, what we should be concerned with is therefore not 
closeness to mere empirical facts but rather closeness to these laws. In a phrase, our goal 
should be ‘legisimilitude’ rather than verisimilitude [Liu 1999]. We saw (section 1-2) 
that the logical-similarity approach expresses propositions in disjunctive normal form, 
and geometrically we can take this to define a space in which each o f the disjuncts forms 
an orthogonal axis. As Liu shows, it is natural to think o f this space as Euclidean, and 
indeed most suggested measures boil down to some variety o f Euclidean distance 
function within it. But from the point o f view o f legisimilitude, such a measure o f 
closeness to the truth now gives rise to serious problems.
We adopt an example o f Liu's. Suppose for argument's sake that the special theory of 
relativity is true, and that the speed o f light is precisely 300,000 km/s (in vacuum). 
Suppose next that an object is accelerated, no doubt with great difficulty, to a speed o f 
299,000 km/s. Now consider the following two statements:
1) the object is accelerated to a speed o f 297,000 km/s.
2) the object is accelerated to a speed o f 301,000 km/s.
As Liu points out, using a Euclidean metric to represent approximation both these 
statements are equally close to the truth, each getting the speed wrong by exactly 2000 
km/s. But given the truth o f special relativity, statement 2 cannot possibly be true since 
we must presume it to be physically impossible. Liu argues that, when employing an 
idealisation in science, often the 'truth' we are seeking to model is a particular pattern, or 
law, o f nature rather than a brute one-off empirical accuracy. Therefore when assessing 
closeness to the truth here we should prefer statement 1 to 2, but on the face o f  it a
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Euclidean metric is unable to capture this. The nature o f physical reality seems to imply 
that our Euclidean space for representing closeness to the truth should, so to speak, be 
thought o f as non-flat.
Now an obvious rejoinder is to claim that the space o f basic disjunctions incorporates, so 
to speak, the laws o f nature in its structure in the first place. So in our example the space 
would somehow incorporate the special theory o f relativity so that statement 2 would no 
longer be measured closer to the truth than statement 1. One issue arising immediately is 
how much weighting we should assign to law-transgressions -  should statement 2 be 
adjudged ten times further from the truth than statement 1? A hundred times? Infinitely 
many? Should we expect our logical formulation somehow to give us the answer 
endogenously? But leaving that issue aside, Liu shows how in any case a little 
examination suggests we would be hard put to incorporate as desired laws o f  nature into 
the space's very structure.
Consider a second example [Liu 1999, p253 footnote 8]. Suppose our universe consists 
only o f  balls o f plutonium and that none o f these balls is above the critical mass required 
to trigger a catastrophic chain reaction. Hence no such chain-reaction occurs, and all the 
atoms remain plutonium. Now consider two possible models o f this universe:
A) one o f the plutonium balls is above the critical mass, and there is a catastrophic chain- 
reaction.
B) one o f the plutonium balls is above the critical mass, but there is no catastrophic 
chain-reaction.
Just counting the categorical properties o f the atoms, statement B is certainly closer to the 
truth than statement A -  according to it, all the atoms remain plutonium, which is correct, 
and all but one balls are below the critical mass, which is almost perfectly correct again, 
going wrong only by citing the one overweight ball. In statement A by contrast, because 
o f the catastrophic chain-reaction many o f the atoms do not remain plutonium, exactly 
contrary to the real world. O f course, the difficulty is that if  there were an overweight 
ball, then according to the laws o f physics there should be a catastrophic chain-reaction. 
So although on any logical measure closer to the truth, statement B suffers (unlike
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statement A) from implicitly violating the laws o f physics by postulating a world in 
which an overweight ball does not lead to a chain-reaction.
The suggested escape route for a logical measure here would normally be to state that the 
rest o f the world under statement B would be extremely different from the actual world, 
due to the different laws o f physics implicitly postulated, whereas this does not apply to 
statement A. Therefore taking into account the rest o f the world, statement A would in 
fact end up being measured closer to the truth after all. This already begs questions about 
how we are weighting between different aspects o f the world when performing our 
measure o f closeness to the truth. But in any case the manoeuvre does not work here 
since we took by assumption our universe to consist only o f these plutonium balls, and 
hence the 'rest o f the world' looks the same for either statement, namely non-existent. 
Thus it seems that a logical measure must inevitably and unsatisfactorily rank statement 
B closer to the truth than statement A.
The only remaining remedy would seem to be simply to declare statement B and all 
statements like it physically impossible, and therefore removed from our consideration. 
But o f course any incorrect statement o f laws is 'physically impossible' -  yet that does not 
stop us wanting to be able to judge the closeness to the truth of, for instance, a Newtonian 
model o f the moon's orbit (as opposed to the relativistic model, or whatever the true state 
o f affairs actually is). The whole point o f a notion o f approximate truth is in part 
precisely to cover cases o f this sort. Moreover, how are we to make the decision as to 
what models are to be considered inadmissible due to their physical impossibility? Our 
current ideas as to what is and is not physically possible may be mistaken -  they certainly 
have been many times in the past. Plus when assessing physical impossibility we are 
clearly again being forced to smuggle in extra-logical considerations.
(Niiniluoto is aware o f this line o f criticism. He suggests an answer to it in which the 
initial cognitive problem is taken to include modal statements. The basic framework o f 
his similarity approach can then be employed as before, except this time the distance 
between a proposition and the truth is in part a distance between modal basic statements.)
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The same issue also arises in connection with other approaches to approximate truth. For 
instance, if  the possible-worlds approach is taken to be equivalent to the logical-similarity 
one (section 1-5), then the same problems would apply equally as much there. But 
depending on how exactly 'similarity' is understood, it is possible by contrast that 
Hilpinen's nested spheres do take nomological considerations into account. In this latter 
case, the difference between the possible world o f an approximately true statement and 
the actual world, would be factual and within the limits o f laws o f nature. But as Liu 
points out, this particular understanding o f similarity, while sidestepping one problem, 
now leaves little scope for capturing the approximate truth o f nomologically incorrect 
theories. Thus we would seem forced to conclude unsatisfactorily that there is no sense 
in which, for example, Newton's laws are approximately true. Moreover the first 
problem raised in [Liu 1999] would still remain unaddressed -  namely that sometimes a 
statement may be factually closer to the truth than a rival, but nevertheless seem less 
preferable if  at the same time it is reflecting an underlying law less adequately.
As Liu points out, even [Weston 1992]'s attempt to put flesh on the bones of'similarity' 
between worlds still leaves question marks on this point. 'The determination o f 
[Weston's] sense o f approximation is left with so much liberty (or so dependent on the 
contexts o f a theory whose statements are under evaluation) that one cannot be sure 
whether the problems apply' [Liu 1999, plO]. Liu judges that in one concrete example o f 
Weston's [Weston 1987, p60], they still do.
O ur solution
I think that the problem o f legisimilitude is indeed a serious one for all non-ontological 
approaches. Perhaps it can be viewed as another example o f the seriousness-of-errors 
problem. The legisimilitude response is to invoke laws o f nature, but in this thesis we 
shall prefer instead to invoke causation. Legisimilitude's focus on general theories is 
troublesome in the light o f our preference for a context-specific approach to approximate 
truth. Certainly, Liu offers no definition o f legisimilitude and the only thing close in the
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literature that I know o f is Kuipers's ’theoretical verisimilitude', which suffers from its 
own problems (section 1-5). Accordingly, I think it is best to respond to legisimilitude's 
criticisms in a different way. The underlying problem they react to -  namely the 
inadequacy o f a purely logical definition o f approximate truth -  can be addressed without 
the need to invoke laws o f nature.
We shall need to anticipate here our own eventual definition o f approximate truth 
developed in chapter 2 -  briefly, this consists of comparing for similarity true values for 
relevant causal strengths with the values postulated by a model. Return now to Liu's 
special relativity example and its two errant models, only one o f which implied 
superluminal speed. Armed only with the models' numerical predictions, we have 
insufficient information to determine just what causal strengths each is positing. Perhaps 
the superluminal one is indeed relativistic and has just a minor calibration error, whereas 
the subluminal one is merely a simple Newtonian model. In that case, legisimilitude 
might well now prefer the superXumimX model. A realistically understood accuracy o f 
causal description, not an abstractly understood fidelity to laws, is the more illuminating.
To see this more clearly, turn now to Liu's plutonium example and re-express it in causal 
terms. Recall, model A posited there was one ball above critical mass and hence a 
catastrophic chain reaction, model B posited one ball above critical mass but -  contrary 
to the laws o f physics -  no resultant chain reaction, while the true situation was that there 
were no balls above critical mass (and hence no chain reaction). It is crucial here to be 
clear just what our focus o f interest, and hence our target causal strength, is. One 
possibility is that we are interested in the strength o f gravitational attraction and hence in 
the total mass o f all the balls, discounting (let us assume) the mass o f any energy released 
as heat or light by a catastrophic chain reaction. Suppose for simplicity that there are 10 
plutonium balls o f mass 1 each (in some units), that a ball above critical mass would have 
a mass o f 1.1 units, and that the balls are so arranged that the explosion from a chain 
reaction in one would in trigger chain reactions in the others. Suppose that this 
catastrophic scenario would leave as a by-product new material totalling a mass o f 0.8 for 
each original plutonium ball. That would mean that the true total mass is 10 units, that
74
model B posits a total mass o f 10.1 units, and model A a total mass o f 8 units. Clearly, 
model B is the more accurate here, and with respect to this particular causal strength it 
therefore should be preferred.
Still, it might seem that we do also want to be able to reward fidelity to the laws of 
nature. But the point is that we can equally well do this too -  if  (and only if) it is such 
fidelity that is our focus o f interest. Thus we can imagine a second causal strength, this 
time one which in effect incorporates a concern with a model's legisimilitude, and then 
see how close to the truth each model scores this time. So imagine now a causal strength 
that correlates with the variance o f the masses o f the balls. Then the true situation is that 
this variance is zero since all the balls have the same mass o f 1 unit. Model A also posits 
zero variance since all the balls now have 0.8 mass, while model B posits a small but 
positive variance since it posits one ball with a mass o f 1.1 and all the rest with masses o f
1. Thus with respect to this new causal strength, now it is model A that is correctly 
judged to be closer to the truth.
In this toy universe the law o f nature implies that the variance o f the atoms must always 
be zero, either because there is no ball above the critical mass (as in actuality), or else 
because one did slip above critical mass and triggered a chain reaction after which all 
balls are left with the new lower mass. Thus this new causal strength serves as a good 
proxy for legisimilitude. But the key wider point, and one much emphasised in chapter 2, 
is that which model is 'closer to the truth' will depend critically on which aspect o f the 
truth we are interested in. And, rather than always giving automatic priority to 
legisimilitude, I think it is desirable that our definition incorporate that flexibility.
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2-1) The basic idea
In troducto ry  exam ple
What happens when, standing on the Earth’s surface, we drop a ball? O f course, the ball 
falls to the ground. But if, for instance, we wish to know how fast it falls we need some 
more detailed picture. In particular, we would need to know the causal strength o f the 
gravity at producing the effect o f accelerating the ball downwards. Assume for now that 
the world is like the simplified one o f a Newtonian model. Thus we have a perfect 
vacuum, the ball is a point-mass, its mass negligible compared to that o f  the Earth, there 
are no other forces to take into account, and so on. Assume also that the gravitational 
attraction o f the Earth on the ball can be represented as the sum o f the gravitational 
attractions o f the Earth’s component parts.
Next suppose that there is a large mountain near where the ball is being dropped. In this 
case, the true pattern o f  gravitational pull on the ball is a large amount from the main 
body o f the Earth, plus a little extra from the nearby mountain. Now a standard 
Newtonian model o f the situation assumes among other things the Earth to be a perfect 
and uniform sphere, and so would neglect the existence o f the mountain. Therefore there 
is a mismatch between the true causal structure, which includes the gravitational pull 
from the mountain, and the model’s posited causal structure, which does not. We might 
represent the true state o f affairs by (1,1), where for (x,y) x  is the gravitational pull due to 
the main body o f the Earth and y  the extra pull from the mountain. Then the model’s 
posited state o f affairs would correspond to (1,0).
So reality is (1,1), the model (1,0). How to assess the closeness-of-fit here? An obvious 
strategy is to interpret these representations as vectors, presumably defined on some 
abstract vector space o f  causes. Assessing closeness-of-fit then becomes a geometrical 
matter o f  comparing the similarity o f  two vectors. Various measures are possible -  
which one to choose is discussed in the appendix. The point here is that the assessment 
o f approximate truth would have been reduced to a geometrical issue. And to recap, such 
an approach to approximate truth promises to fulfil our various desiderata from chapter 1:
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it is ontological and context-specific. It is also o f general applicability, and moreover 
easily made quantitative.
Causal strengths: an objective weighting function
Suppose we have a second model which captures the gravitational pull on our ball due to 
the mountain, but which ignores the pull from the main body o f  the Earth. Using our 
previous notation, this model can be represented by a vector (0,1) in our hypothetical 
cause-space. Now suppose we want to compare the relative performance o f  the two 
models, (1,0) and (0,1), in capturing the reality (1,1). By most geometrical measures, 
(0,1) will presumably be as close to (1,1) as (1,0) is. So as it stands it seems we would 
have to adjudge the two models to have performed equally well. But this offends 
intuition badly. The gravitational pull from the mountain is only a tiny fraction o f that 
from the rest o f the Earth. Therefore we want to say that a model capturing the Earth’s 
pull but not the mountain’s must be much nearer the truth than one the other way round.
The root o f this objection lies in reality itself- the pull o f the Earth really does greatly 
outweigh that o f the mountain. Or, alternatively put, the causal strength here o f the Earth 
is much greater than that o f the mountain. (Throughout this thesis, we shall understand 
‘causal strength’ to be a particular, i.e. the strength a cause has in one particular situation 
rather than generally -  for instance the degree o f gravitational pull on the ball when it is 
dropped rather than the general inverse-square law.) Accordingly, we are justified here 
in putting more weight on the Earth’s pull than the mountain’s, and this justification 
stems ultimately from objective properties o f the actual causes involved. Therefore we 
can postulate some ‘weighting function’ that represents these objective properties. In this 
instance the Earth might have, say, ten million times as much mass as the mountain, in 
which case we could represent reality not by (1,1) as before, but instead by (lOmn, 1). 
Then the model capturing the Earth but not the mountain would be (lOmn, 0), and the 
model o f just the mountain would be (0,1). And so finally the Earth-model would score 
for approximate truth in proportion to the similarity between (lOmn, 1) and (lOmn, 0), 
and the mountain-model in proportion to the similarity between (lOmn, 1) and (0,1). We
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can now easily imagine measures o f geometrical similarity that rank the Earth-model the 
better fit here, as we would desire.
If  we did not use objective causal strengths to license weighting functions like this, we 
would be left prey to unpleasant paradoxes. Suppose we subdivided the causes in a new 
way, into the main sphere o f the Earth as before, but now splitting the mountain by 
considering its western half and eastern half separately. Without weighting functions we 
might represent the three components by (1,1,1) in a new three-dimensional hypothetical 
cause-space. So now the model capturing all the Earth but none o f the mountain would 
be represented by (1,0,0), and the mountain-only model -  capturing both its halves -  by 
(0,1,1). Clearly we would expect (0,1,1) to score higher than (1,0,0) for similarity to the 
true state o f affairs (1,1,1) -  i.e. the mountain-model would score more highly than the 
Earth-model. And yet previously, without weighting functions, the two models scored 
the same - for exactly the same physical situation. In other words simply by changing 
our arbitrary partition o f the different causal elements, the ranking o f  the two different 
models changed. This is surely unacceptable -  we want our measure o f  approximate 
truth to reflect how well a model captures the physical reality ‘out there’, and this 
certainly should not be affected by such an arbitrary change in our representation o f it. 
With this new subdivision there would also follow the intuitively unpalatable conclusion 
that the mountain-model is now ranked better than the Earth one.
But by taking into account causal strengths and hence our weights, both these difficulties 
can be avoided. The objective causal strengths o f the Earth and each half o f  the mountain 
would now be, respectively, (lOmn, 0.5, 0.5). The Earth-model would be represented by 
(lOmn, 0, 0), and the mountain-model by (0, 0.5, 0.5), which clearly suggests that the 
Earth-model would still score much the better, just as desired. (See the appendix for 
more on the problem o f arbitrary re-description.) Use o f  a weighting function therefore 
in effect solves the problem we earlier labelled 'seriousness o f errors' (section 1-3). Our 
approach adjusts to take into account a model’s errors and, more importantly, it adjusts in 
proportion to the seriousness o f those errors. Thus in the final example above, the 
mountain-model's single omission was shown to be much more serious than the Earth-
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model's two.
Several o f the suggested definitions in the literature, for instance Niiniluoto's, do formally 
allow scope for incorporating a weighting function over their linguistic statements. But 
none o f them relates the role o f these weights to ontological considerations, and hence 
none can motivate any objective interpretation o f them. We are therefore already well 
ahead o f the performance o f such metrics.
This then is the basic framework o f our own approach. In chapter 3 the issue o f how to 
define causal strengths is looked at in detail. In this chapter our examples will, as above, 
merely quote causal weightings somewhat schematically in order to illustrate the 
philosophical point at hand. In the next few sections, meanwhile, we shall examine an 
important conceptual wrinkle in what we even mean by 'approximate truth' and how our 
definition therefore needs to be refined in the light o f it.
2-2) Two different intuitions
I think a central, although rarely emphasised, aspect o f approximate truth is that -  
contrary perhaps to our naive pre-philosophical expectations -  it does not turn out to be a 
univocal notion, even in principle. Rather, there seem to be two distinct ideas o f 
approximate truth, and it is necessary to disentangle them. Only then can we examine to 
what extent it may be possible to reconnect them again, as it were.
Imagine two astronomical models. The first is Ptolemaic, comprising a complicated 
geocentric system o f epicycles, and yields a prediction for the movement o f  a certain 
planet in the night sky. The second is Newtonian, comprising a heliocentric gravitational 
system, which also yields a prediction for the movement o f the same planet. Assume that
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all agree on which patch o f light in the sky corresponds to this planet, and that all also 
agree on how to measure its movement and all other relevant auxiliary assumptions too. 
Suppose that, as is perfectly conceivable, it turns out that the predictions o f the Ptolemaic 
model are more accurate than those o f the Newtonian one. (This example is adapted 
from one in [Smith 1998].)
Which o f the two models should we prefer for approximate truth? On the one hand, it 
seems that the Newtonian one is clearly preferable. After all, nobody supposes anymore 
that the other planets orbit around the Earth in accordance with complicated epicycles, 
whereas we do suppose that they orbit around the sun as the Newtonian model describes. 
To be sure, the Newtonian theory o f gravitational attraction has o f course itself been 
superseded by the relativistic one. Nevertheless, there still seems to be a clear intuition 
according to which the Newtonian model is closer to the true ontological situation than is 
the Ptolemaic one.
But on the other hand, if  we restrict ourselves purely to empirical predictions about the 
movement o f the planet, the situation is reversed. Now, notwithstanding its weird array 
of epicycles, it is the Ptolemaic model that scores more highly. That is, the predicted 
position o f the planet is closer to the true position (as viewed from Earth) in the 
Ptolemaic than in the Newtonian case. Thus, for example, a navigator dependent on 
knowing the future movement o f this planet across the sky would be better advised to 
consult the Ptolemaic model, notwithstanding its ontological peculiarity.
Perhaps it might be objected that the Ptolemaic model’s greater predictive accuracy is a 
cheap artefact that we should not take seriously, for it is possible to add extra epicycles 
into the Ptolemaic system in an ad hoc way so as to predict any particular planetary 
movement more accurately. And, the objection runs, it seems strange to reward such ad 
hoc and indeed fictitious additions. Nevertheless, judging purely by predictive accuracy, 
the Ptolemaic model remains better. The fact that the epicycles are fictitious impinges 
only on the first, ontological, sense o f approximate truth. The epicycles may be fictitious, 
but the predictive accuracy is not. And while to be ad hoc may indeed be undesirable
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methodologically, all the same it is irrelevant according to the narrow criterion o f 
predictive accuracy.
No doubt also Newtonian theory generally, in addition to its greater ontological appeal, 
can point to much greater success than Ptolemaic theory generally, even in narrowly 
predictive terms. (Ultimately, this was presumably the reason it was preferred to it 
historically, o f course.) Thus Newtonian theory may illuminate a huge range o f 
phenomena about which Ptolemaic theory says nothing, including a great range o f 
astronomical phenomena. All this translates as saying that Newtonian theory’s general 
predictive accuracy is much the more impressive. But recall our conclusion (chapter 1) 
that approximate truth can only sensibly be understood context-specifically. That means 
here that the greater general success o f Newtonian theory is irrelevant. All that matters is 
the approximate truth o f  this particular Newtonian model relative to this particular 
Ptolemaic one. And according to the narrow predictive criterion, concerning only these 
models and the position o f this particular planet, it is by assumption the Ptolemaic model 
that fares the better.
There is thus no evading the fact that there exists a distinct sense o f approximate truth 
according to which the Ptolemaic model in this example is preferable. Label this sense 
empirical approximate truth, or EAT. The other sense o f approximate truth, according to 
which the Newtonian model is to be preferred, label ontological approximate truth, or 
OAT. So in this example OAT and EAT give opposite rankings. We have just argued 
that EAT is indeed distinct from OAT. If  desired, this distinctness could also have been 
seen the other way round, so to speak -  it turns out that OAT cannot be reduced to EAT 
either.
Moreover, and importantly, this is not quite the distinction common in the literature 
between a theory's scope and its accuracy. Newtonian mechanics has much wider scope 
than a quantum-mechanical model o f a laser while being ontologically inferior, so 
scoring well for OAT does not necessarily correlate with wide scope. And while it is true 
that scoring well for EAT does seem to correlate with what we mean by accuracy, even
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this comes with the caveat that scores for approximate truth must inevitably be interest- 
relative (section 2-9). Loosely put, perhaps we can think charitably o f  the OAT/EAT 
distinction as corresponding to the scope/accuracy one as adjusted for a context-specific 
scheme such as ours. ([Aronson, Harre and Way 1994], one o f the pioneers o f an 
ontological approach to approximate truth, also make an ontological/empirical distinction 
in exactly this way.)
2-3) More on ontological approximate truth
Suppose we have two models o f a situation, Mi and M2, say. Then if  M l cites the correct 
ontology and M2 an incorrect one, Mi will always be preferred by OAT, regardless of 
predictive accuracies. This seems straightforward. But what now if  two models cite 
different incorrect ontologies? For example, according to relativity theory Newtonian 
and Ptolemaic models o f celestial mechanics are both ontologically mistaken, but in 
different ways. (We assume for the sake o f this discussion that relativistic and 
Newtonian mechanics should be thought ontologically incompatible.) In such 
circumstances, OAT has two possibilities: either both models are ju st equally wrong, or 
else we need somehow to find a way o f  saying that one incorrect ontology is closer to the 
true one than is the other.
The key question is whether there is any sense, independent o f  empirical considerations, 
in which the Newtonian ontology is ‘closer’ to the true relativistic one than is the 
Ptolemaic ontology? I cannot think o f any. To be sure, the accumulated weight o f 
empirical evidence across many different contexts may indeed tend to support a 
Newtonian over a Ptolemaic approach. But it seems impossible to define any satisfactory 
purely abstract and non-empirical measure o f ontological similarity that gives the same 
result. Therefore we conclude here that, when two models are both ontologically
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mistaken, OAT must adjudge them equally wrong. Hence in the Ptolemy-Newton case, 
assuming that the real world is non-Newtonian, OAT must adjudge the two models 
equally far from the truth. The intuition that the Newtonian ontology is somehow closer 
to the true one than the Ptolemaic ontology, we take to be a result o f illicitly 
incorporating from other contexts empirical EAT-type considerations.
What if  two models both cite correct ontologies? Then again OAT must be neutral, 
merely awarding full marks to them both. Any finer-grained distinction could again, for 
similar reasons, ultimately rest only on illicitly imported empirical considerations. For 
example, suppose that there were three different causes o f some event, say that a boulder 
fell off a ledge as a result o f three different pushes on it (all three pushes being actually 
required to move the boulder). Suppose model Mi cited the first two o f  these pushes, and 
a second model M2 only the third one. At first sight, perhaps this would suggest that, 
although Mi and M2 both cite the correct ontology, still we would have a reason to prefer 
Mi to M2. But what if  the third ‘push’ was in fact a composite o f three individuals 
pushing simultaneously? Should this not then count as three factors, not ju st the one? In 
which case, o f course, now it would be the second model that was preferred instead o f the 
first. We conclude that such 'head counting' is too crude a way to compute ontological 
accuracy -  problems o f individuation turn out to matter. The only way around these 
problems is to assign differential weights to each factor, but it is hard to see how this 
could be motivated except by incorporating some empirical warrant. In our own scheme, 
we weight different ontological factors by their causal strengths, but it is explicitly 
acknowledged that this goes beyond purely ontological considerations since our 
definition o f causal strength (roughly speaking) will in turn be defined in terms o f the 
quantity o f effect that a cause leads to -  which is an empirical, or at any rate extra- 
ontological, input. The whole issue recalls one o f our central criticisms o f the similarity 
approach to approximate truth (section 1-3) -  namely the seriousness-of-errors problem. 
There, the only solution was to incorporate extra-logical factors; analogously, here the 
only solution would be to incorporate, as it were, extra-ontological factors.
To re-emphasise an important point: it follows that OAT is unable to prefer one model
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over another when they each have the correct ontology -  even when one o f those models 
is empirically superior to the other. For instance, suppose that one ontologically correct 
model asserts that the Earth rotates about its axis every 24 hours, and so is empirically 
wrong but only slightly (since the actual period o f rotation is fractionally under 24 hours). 
Suppose a second model is also correct ontologically but this time is grossly incorrect 
empirically, proposing a period o f only 2 hours, say. Although it seems obvious that the 
first model is preferable, OAT is unable to capture this judgment. Indeed, if  the first 
model were Newtonian and the second Ptolemaic, so that the first now seemed superior 
to the second both ontologically and empirically, even then OAT must adjudge the two 
equal -  given our earlier remarks about all false ontologies being judged equally false.
So a fine-grained ‘pure’ OAT definition seems to be impossible. It follows that OAT can 
therefore only ever offer crude qualitative verdicts. I f  one model has the true ontology 
and a second one does not, then (and only then) the first one is preferred. In all other 
cases, two competing models must be adjudged equal. For this reason, a pure OAT 
definition alone seems clearly unsatisfactory.
Finally, we should specify just what we mean by a theory or model's 'ontological 
commitment'. I shall assume a standard Quinean account, so that a model is 
ontologically committed just to all the things it quantifies over. Note in particular that 
therefore the entities a model is held to be committed to ontologically will include all the 
things it cites as causes, since in our scheme the key variables will be the levels o f 
strength models assign to each cause. Since we are concentrating on context-specific 
models, a Quinean approach will tend to mean a model being judged ontologically 
committed only to variables relevant to the problem at hand. In any case, it turns out I 
think that the criticisms in this section o f a purely OAT approach, and our analyses later 
o f the complicated relation between a model's ontological commitment and what we can 
say about that model's approximate truth, do not turn out to be unduly sensitive to our 
precise definition o f ontological commitment anyway.
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2-4) More on empirical approximate truth
With the Newtonian and Ptolemaic models, from the point o f view o f OAT we were 
struggling even to render them commensurable. This o f course is the attraction o f 
switching to empirical predictive accuracy -  we always have a common currency of 
accurate predictions (although see section 2-12 later). Thus we could have compared the 
Newtonian and Ptolemaic models’ predictions for the movement o f the planet, and 
thereby adjudged one o f them more accurate than the other. Then, assuming some 
measure o f similarity, we would have our score for approximate truth. So is this the 
panacea? Unfortunately, no it is not. The reason is that the ontological factor is left 
completely ignored, and this turns out to lead to unsatisfactory consequences. Also, EAT 
alone is particularly vulnerable to Miller’s problem.
Begin with Miller. [Miller 1975], recall, demonstrates that our rankings for approximate 
truth will vary depending on which empirical parameters we choose to measure it by. 
More precisely, for any two parameters A and B, we can in general define two new 
parameters C and D -  themselves defined in terms o f A and B -  for which our ranking of 
two models will reverse [Miller 1994]. It is therefore not enough just to specify 
approximate truth in terms o f empirical predictive accuracy. Rather, we must also 
specify exactly which empirical parameters we need to be predictively accurate about. 
Recall that the answer to the Miller problem is to be able to justify privileging one choice 
o f parameters over another. The point now is that just which parameters we so privilege 
may depend in part on our prior ontological commitments. Perhaps ontological factors 
may influence one investigator to focus on the parameter pair A and B and another on the 
pair C and D. In which case, since EAT may depend on this choice, EAT in turn may 
depend indirectly on our ontological commitments after all. (Miller makes the point that 
the mere completion o f Brahe's data would not on its own render Kepler's laws fully true 
-  or in our terms, that EAT on its own is insufficient for a full account o f approximate
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truth [Miller 1994, p223].)
More commonly though, I suspect that in practice competing modellers will likely agree 
on which empirical parameter on which to concentrate, even given ontological 
disagreements. For instance, our Ptolemaic and Newtonian astronomers may well have 
agreed on which observations would decide the matter -  namely the apparent movement 
o f the relevant planet. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that they would not also 
have agreed on what counted as good evidence for this, given the uncontroversial nature 
o f the relevant auxiliary assumptions. Similarly, phlogiston and modem theorists o f 
chemistry might well agree on how to collect a particular reagent in a test tube, measure 
its weight or volume, and so on. At any rate, it seems plausible that often scientific 
dispute will not concern the choice o f the relevant observables, so in those cases the 
Miller issue will not arise. But even then, still there would remain another important 
reason why EAT alone is unsatisfactory -  namely that often one model may seem much 
preferable to another even when their relevant empirical predictions agree.
Consider the following example. For the last 17 (or thereabouts) US presidential 
elections in a row, the following relation has held: if  the Washington Redskins American 
football team has won its last home match before the election, then the incumbent 
(defined to mean the sitting president, vice-president or candidate from that party) has 
won the subsequent election; if  the Redskins have lost, then so has the incumbent. (The 
Redskins’ loss in November 2000 was thus a reliable indicator that Bush would 
subsequently be (declared) the winner over Gore in Florida...) Suppose now we cite two 
models o f US presidential election results: Mi attempts to incorporate all the usual 
political factors, such as candidates’ personalities, state o f the economy, and so on. M2 
postulates instead something more direct -  that it is the result o f the relevant Redskins 
game that ‘magically’ determines the subsequent election. Suppose that both models 
(retrospectively) predict the results o f the elections equally successfully. (Assume that 
M2 quantifies over its magical relations, so that it is indeed deemed committed to them 
ontologically. Assume also, plausibly, that each model also agrees on what the relevant 
empirical parameters are, i.e. on who won each election.)
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How then should we rank them for approximate truth? EAT would be forced to say that 
both score equally. Yet intuitively, o f  course, we want to say that the political model Mi 
is much superior to the magic model M2. It seems clear that Mi has captured more o f 
what is ‘really going on’. Similarly, any ‘model’ that gave the list o f election winners 
correctly would have to be ranked by EAT equally with Mi, no matter how ad hoc or 
arbitrary the proferred explanation. For instance, we might simply copy the list o f 
winners from a book, and model this by saying that ‘fate willed it’. Essentially, the 
problem is that EAT must rank all competing explanations the same, given the successful 
'prediction' o f the final explanandum. This leaves it no resource for distinguishing 
between true and false explanations. A corollary is that it is unable to recognise the 
concept o f ‘fluke’ correlations (i.e. correlations between A and B even though there is no 
causal relation between A and B, nor any common cause o f  them). Yet distinguishing 
between true and false explanations, or between flukily and ‘genuinely’ correct models 
(i.e. where there is some causal connection between A and B), is surely at the core o f 
science, else we must take seriously any wild ramblings so long as they happen to predict 
a relevant variable correctly. In the case o f historical explanations the correct value o f 
variables is already known, so such wild ramblings would become still less impressive 
and the need to deny them high scientific status a still more acute desideratum. Any 
definition o f approximate truth unable to do this must, I argue, be seriously deficient.
The intuition here is o f course the same as the one supporting the Newtonian model in 
our Newton-Ptolemy example, which was our original motivation for formulating OAT. 
In cases like the Redskins-election correlation though, the motivation is even stronger. 
Whereas we assumed that the Newtonian model was empirically inferior to the Ptolemaic 
one, which did provide at least some argument in favour o f the latter, here the magic 
model o f elections does not even have the crutch o f superior empirical support. Thus 
there is no positive reason for preferring it, and still the same ontological reason for 
disliking it; as it were, the balance o f arguments is even more in favour o f the political 
model than it was for the Newtonian model.
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To sum up where we have got to so far: first, there exist two distinct senses of 
approximate truth, labelled by us OAT and EAT. Second, OAT on its own is 
unsatisfactory since it can offer only crude qualitative verdicts and cannot incorporate 
considerations o f empirical accuracy. Third, EAT on its own is also unsatisfactory since 
it cannot discount false explanations or fluke empirical successes, which stems from its 
inability to incorporate ontological considerations. So the question now is: is there any 
satisfactory way we can combine the two? Is it possible to get, so to speak, the best o f 
both worlds?
2-5) Our own scheme
Initially, this is perhaps most easily illustrated via an example. Suppose we are interested 
in the Earth’s atmosphere, and in particular in how it may have been changing in recent 
decades, perhaps in part due to global warming. One actual study recently looked closely 
at the altitudes o f different layers in the atmosphere, and in particular at the altitude o f the 
tropopause, which is the boundary between the troposphere and stratosphere [Santer et al 
2003]. This has risen through the second half o f the twentieth century, indeed several 
hundred metres since 1979 alone. The researchers examined five possible causes o f this 
change: the level o f greenhouse gases, sunlight reflected from airborne solid particles, 
atmospheric ozone concentration, the sun’s output o f heat and light, and dust injected into 
the atmosphere by volcanoes. The first three o f these five were considered to be man- 
made, the latter two natural. It is known from previous work that all five o f  the causes do 
affect the air temperature at different altitudes, and hence will impact on the heights o f 
different atmospheric layers, and hence in turn on the height o f the tropopause. The exact 
causal mechanisms by which the altitude o f the tropopause is influenced are complicated. 
The researchers built a model of this overall process, drawing o f course from previous 
knowledge o f atmospheric dynamics, and on the basis o f  this model sought to explain the
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observed change in the empirical variable o f interest, namely the height o f the 
tropopause.
So far, so uncontroversial -  just another case o f scientists seeking to explain observations 
via a model. The interesting thing is how we should interpret what their goal is, and how 
we should conceptualise how successful they may or may not have been in achieving that 
goal. What the researchers found was that the five causes could fully explain the 
observations (in their model), but that no combination o f just four causes could. That is, 
all o f  the five causes had non-zero importance or strength (with respect to this effect, 
namely the recent change in the altitude o f the tropopause). However, the researchers 
also found that most o f  the effect seen in the latter half o f the twentieth century was due 
to just two o f the factors, namely the level o f greenhouse gases and the ozone 
concentration. The headline conclusion was therefore that important changes in the 
atmosphere were due mainly to man-made rather than natural causes. But the main point 
for us is that these results essentially boiled down to claims about causal strengths. In 
particular, the overall finding was that, whereas none o f the five causes had zero strength, 
still two o f them did have greater causal strengths than the other three.
This, I shall claim, illustrates a general template for understanding the degree o f success 
o f scientific work. No one supposes that, for instance, the modellers o f the atmosphere 
have the exact truth, given the huge multi-causal complexity o f this real-world system 
and the relative simplicity even o f sophisticated models o f it. Nevertheless, we do 
suppose that some attempts to model the atmosphere are better than others. For example, 
a model that claimed that the rise in the tropopause was because o f unusually windy 
conditions or because o f an excess o f rain dancing, would seem to be clearly inferior to 
the advanced multi-causal model we have just been discussing. Moreover, we often 
further suppose that any individual model can be assigned a particular degree o f partial 
success, or what since chapter 1 we have been terming approximate truth. So there are 
two desiderata here: that we be able to evaluate models in absolute terms and also in 
relative terms, that is both quantitatively and qualitatively. (O f course, the former would 
presumably imply the latter.) Our claim is that a focus on causal strengths can deliver us
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both o f these (but see section 2-7 below). In particular, once given a causal ontology and 
a target effect, we assume first that there is a unique fact o f the matter about what the true 
strengths o f these causes are, and second that any given model in turn proposes particular 
values for these strengths. The approximate truth o f that model is then the degree o f 
similarity between its assigned causal strengths and the true causal strengths. For 
example in the atmospheric case, if  we take it that there is some true answer as to the 
relative importance o f each o f the five causes, we can then compare that with the relative 
importance the modellers assign to them.
This then is our basic definition: given a set o f relevant causes, approximate truth is the 
degree o f similarity between a model’s postulated weights across them and the true 
weights across them. This proposed definition o f course immediately raises many issues, 
and we shall devote the remaining sections o f this chapter to discussing them. Note now 
that our scheme provides a way to define the approximate truth only o f particular models, 
not o f general theories. But our original desideratum from chapter 1 was for just such a 
context-specific scheme, in which case this is not a weakness. And it turns out that 
causal strengths are (on our definition -  chapter 3) anyway also definable only context- 
specifically. But it does mean that under our scheme the nearness to the truth o f a whole 
theory or set o f theories, such as ‘Newtonian mechanics’ or ‘special relativity’, cannot be 
defined. My own view is that such general approximate truths, like also general causal 
strengths, cannot be made coherent sense of. So if, unlike us in this thesis, one’s goal is 
to make sense o f the notion that science as a whole is progressing nearer the truth, then 
our definition can provide no help. The progress it can elucidate is progress within a 
particular problem, so to speak -  for instance, one model o f the rising tropopause may 
well be adjudged better than a preceding one, so progress is possible with respect to that 
particular issue. But my own view is that we simply cannot make any rigorous sense o f 
progress in the broader sense, so claims that science as a whole is somehow ‘progressing 
nearer the truth’ should be abandoned as impossible to substantiate. (Perhaps this 
supports Kuhn’s famous contention that we can speak o f scientific progress with respect 
to individual puzzle-solving within periods o f normal science, but not in the global sense 
o f one theory or paradigm being closer to the truth than its predecessor.)
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The important merit o f this approach to approximate truth is that it captures the virtues o f 
OAT and EAT while simultaneously avoiding their weaknesses. Recall, OAT on its own 
was unsatisfactory, since it could offer only crude qualitative verdicts and made no 
allowance for empirical accuracy. Our definition now can offer detailed quantitative 
verdicts and, as we shall see shortly, in effect does incorporate considerations o f 
empirical accuracy, thus capturing the merits o f EAT. EAT itself, on the other hand, was 
also on its own unsatisfactory because its disregard o f ontological considerations meant 
that it could not discount either bad explanations or fluke empirical successes. It is 
precisely these latter weaknesses that our own definition is, as it were, designed to 
remedy. This it manages by in effect taking into account just those ontological factors 
that EAT ignores, thereby also capturing the merits o f OAT. A re-worked example will 
help illustrate these claims.
Return to the correlation between the results o f American presidential elections and 
certain Washington Redskins American football games. To explain the election results, 
we imagined a model Mi based on the usual political factors like the candidates’ 
personalities and the state o f the economy, and a second model M2 citing instead some 
‘magical’ influence o f the football results. Let us adjust this example, so that now M2 
postulates something more direct and less ontologically unconventional -  say, that the 
result o f the relevant Redskins game influences voters’ respect for Washington and hence 
for the governing party, and thereby determines the subsequent election. We can set up 
the problem so that the two models are now in agreement as to the relevant causal 
structure -  that is, they both postulate the same electors with preferences and various 
forces that may influence those preferences. They disagree only over how much 
weighting to attach to these causes. In particular, Mi assigns high weight to economic 
factors and so forth and only a low weight to the results o f football games, whereas M2 
assigns its weights just the other way round. Assume as before that both models are 
empirically successful, i.e. that they pick the right election winner each time.
In these circumstances, OAT would not be able to pick a winner between the models -  by
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assumption now, both have the same ontological commitments and so must be adjudged 
equal for OAT. And since the two are equally empirically successful, each picking the 
election winners successfully, EAT would be unable to prefer one over the other either. 
Yet still there remains the clear sense that Mi is somehow much closer to the truth than 
the apparently ridiculous M2. And our own definition o f approximate truth can capture 
this -  even though Mi and M2 are, as it were, equivalent both ontologically and 
empirically, still it may be that they have different weightings across causes from each 
other, and hence one o f their set o f weightings may be closer to the true one than is the 
other’s. For example, suppose the true causal strengths were 9 for economic factors and 
1 for the football results. Then if  Mi cited 10 and 0 respectively for these causes, and M2 
cited 0 and 10, it would follow that Mi was adjudged nearer the truth (at least for all 
likely candidates for a measure o f similarity).
In general, bad explanations or fluke empirical successes will likely be picked up by our 
definition. For example, suppose that two people push a ball, person A with a force o f 5 
units and person B with a force o f 5, so that the total force (and hence acceleration o f the 
ball) is 10 units. Suppose that two models agree that the causes o f interest are these two 
pushes, and that the observable effect o f interest is the acceleration o f the ball. Suppose 
that Mi postulates pushes o f force 5.5 units from person A and 4.5 units from person B, 
while M2 postulates pushes o f 9 and 1 unit respectively. Thus, in obvious vector 
notation, the true weightings should be (5, 5), Mi postulates (5.5, 4.5), and M2 postulates 
(9,1). Intuitively, it seems clear that Mi is closer to the truth o f the situation than M2.
But in terms o f the simple final result M2 does equally well, since although it greatly 
overestimates person A ’s push and greatly underestimates person B ’s, these two errors as 
it were fortuitously ‘cancel out’ so that the total push comes out at the true value o f 10. 
Consequently, EAT is unable to prefer Mi in this situation. Our definition, by contrast, is 
so able.
We can adapt the same thought-example to illustrate how our definition also avoids a 
weakness o f OAT’s. Suppose that Mi still posits (5.5, 4.5) as before, but that now M2 
posits (2, 1). Clearly M25s prediction for the total effect o f only 3 units is now also
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seriously awry, so that EAT will immediately prefer Mi to it. But since Mi and M2 still 
posit exactly the same universe ontologically, disagreeing only over some particular 
causal weightings, OAT must still adjudge them equal -  despite the empirical superiority 
o f one over the other. Our own definition, although not being based simply on the final 
empirical prediction in the manner o f EAT, will still also prefer Mi to M2 here (again on 
any plausible measure o f similarity). That is, although incorporating ontological factors 
sufficiently to avoid the pitfalls o f EAT, our definition is in effect still able to incorporate 
considerations o f empirical accuracy too, thereby avoiding an egregious fault o f OAT. It 
does this ultimately because our definition o f causal strength in effect incorporates 
empirical factors (chapter 3), even while our overall focus on component causes serves 
also to incorporate ontological factors. That is, we combine consideration o f  surface 
empirical measurements with consideration too o f the underlying causes. It is in this way 
that we are able, as it were, to get the best o f both worlds.
2-6) Methodological utility
Simplicity
Our definition o f approximate truth is conveniently simple. (Or at least it is given a 
reasonably simple definition o f similarity -  see appendix.) It ju st compares postulated 
causal strengths with the actual ones. All the causal terms are expressed in the language 
the scientist is naturally working in, and the causal strengths are also defined in a natural 
way (chapter 3). Thus, there is no need to mention epistemic probabilities or what the 
research community regards as reasonable values for them, no need to formulate sets o f 
all conjunctions o f empirical regularities perhaps subdivided into those independent or 
not o f the current theory, no need to think about margins o f imprecision or maximising 
some abstract mathematical function, and no need to have to consider what are the 
minimal points into which the relevant logical space can be divided in order to sum over
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them to calculate an expected verisimilitude -  merely to quote all those quantities 
occurring in [Bonilla 2002]’s structuralist definition. [Niiniluoto 1987] and [Oddie 
1986]’s definitions -  perhaps the standard ones in the field if  any are -  are no less 
complex. As [Kieseppa 1996, p424] states, for these reasons 'it would be absurd to 
suppose that the theory o f  verisimilitude were valuable as a sociological theory 
concerned with the methods that are actually used in the special sciences.' Nor are these 
complaints equivalent to claiming that a child catching a ball must know complicated 
trigonometry, for there are no short-cut pragmatic rules offered by these definitions for 
their calculation.
Can we do better? I think it is possible to imagine, by contrast, two real-life scientists 
performing something precisely like our calculation, at least implicitly, when arguing 
over which o f two models is best. O f course, there will be disagreement over what the 
true causal weightings should be -  else there would be no dispute! The point is that the 
criterion by which disputes are to be judged, namely degree o f  accuracy about causal 
strengths, is not itself in dispute but rather is the implicit common currency. Unless real- 
life scientists can be shown to be maximising these other complicated definitions o f 
approximate truth without realising it -  which seems to me unlikely -  those definitions 
fail descriptively.
Normative warrant
A similar point applies to the normative issue. It is clear that a high score on our own 
definition is a desirable thing -  it means that a model replicates closely the true causal 
strengths. And on our definition o f causal strength (chapter 3), this in turn licenses more 
successful causal interventions (section 2-7). Hence, ultimately, our scores for 
approximate truth are sanctioned empirically in the sense that those models scoring 
highly can as a direct result expect to predict the results o f interventions more accurately.
It may be that similar normative arguments can be mounted in favour o f the alternative, 
more complicated definitions, but such a task would seem to have to be based on a priori
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philosophising and at the least seems likely to prove rather more challenging. Even 
Popper was sceptical about the prospects: ’I do not suggest that the explicit introduction 
of the idea o f verisimilitude will lead to any changes in the theory o f method' [Popper 
1963, p235]. And as Kieseppa argues, on the definitions o f such as the logical-similarity 
or structuralist approaches, it is in fact not clear why we should even want to choose a 
theory judged by them to have higher verisimilitude. [Laudan 1981, p30] points out that 
there is no obvious connection between being successful and being verisimilar in the 
sense o f Popper's early definitions, and [Kieseppa 1996, p432] demonstrates how Oddie's 
and Niiniluoto's favoured rules can yield contradictory rankings in actual cases.
Applicability
Perhaps our own definition's biggest vulnerability is to the cases when it is not just the 
strengths across causes that are in dispute but rather also the very causal ontology itself 
(sections 2-12 to 2-14 -  note though that no competing definition performs any better in 
such cases). If  it were common for competing models to disagree ontologically, then 
there would be a correspondingly powerful case against our definition. In the rest o f this 
section we shall argue that in practice it is, on the contrary, much more common for 
scientific disputes not to concern fundamental ontological commitments in this way.
That is, controversy concerning what ontology to pick is rarely (although o f  course not 
never) at issue in typical scientific debates. Similar remarks apply with respect to the 
separate issue o f choice o f vocabulary -  namely, that in practice scientific disputes rarely 
concern choice o f  vocabulary either. (This extra remark is relevant because the same 
ontology can support many different vocabularies and because in turn, as the Miller 
problem famously shows, rankings for approximate truth may be sensitive to the choice 
between these vocabularies.) Rather, typically scientific controversies concern what 
weighting to put on various existing causes, or else concern whether some new cause 
might be relevant (i.e. should now have a non-zero weighting). In other words, as we 
have been claiming, usually new work concerns the sizes o f relative strengths across an 
undisputed list o f causes, or else simply establishes a new causal connection for future 
use. This view boils down to seeing science typically to be in the business o f  furnishing
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causal explanations (on which see section 2-8 below).
Similar points apply perhaps still more strongly when thinking o f historical explanations, 
namely that scholarly controversies again typically concern which causes were or were 
not at play and important, rather than more fundamental matters o f ontology or 
vocabulary concerning the specification o f  those causes in the first place. By ‘historical 
explanations’ we have in mind not just conventional human history, but also all the other 
historical sciences, for instance much in medical diagnosis, palaeobiology, evolutionary 
biology, astronomy, geology and archaeology. A good piece o f historical work can be 
thought o f as one that has a relatively accurate weighting o f the causes behind the effect 
o f interest, and a bad work as one that has not. (I do not o f course deny that there is also 
a role for pragmatic factors like originality when assessing whether a piece o f  work is 
‘good’; still, there remains a sense in which a model is or is not accurate independent o f 
whether it is also original, and it is this sense which our definition is seeking to capture.)
To reiterate an earlier point: often scientific research will be aimed at establishing a 
previously unsuspected causal relationship, rather than arguing over weightings across 
already known causes. But this can still be thought o f as attempting an accurate causal 
description. Indeed, one might think o f such work as assigning a positive weight to a 
cause previously thought to have zero weight and thus indeed to be about weightings over 
causes after all. O f course, nothing in thesis should be taken to be denigrating the 
methodological benefits o f such work in helping supply the raw ingredients for 
subsequent causal explanations o f other phenomena.
O f course, not every piece o f science fits the particular template o f proposing new 
weightings over ontologically uncontroversial causes. In particular, cases o f  science 
proposing radically new ontologies, like the Newtonian or Einsteinian revolutions, do not 
fit this pattern. Our claim here though is that most actual science, and hence most 
scientific dispute, concerns cases where the choice o f ontology is common ground and it 
is the causal weightings within that agreed ontology that are at issue. In Kuhnian terms, 
most science is normal science within a paradigm, not revolutionary science shifting
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paradigms. In more concrete terms, my claim is that our example o f an investigation into 
atmospheric chemistry is typical o f scientific work in this respect, and thus that our 
definition o f approximate truth will typically -  albeit not always -  be easily applicable.
As mentioned in chapter 1, this view o f science stemmed initially from my background in 
economics. There, in practice arguments rarely revolve around fundamental issues o f 
ontology or vocabulary. The concern is, say, with whether and how a particular 
monetary policy will reduce unemployment or increase growth, not with whether 
different researchers mean the same things by ‘monetary policy’ or ‘unemployment’ or 
‘growth’. And even when those latter issues are debated, still the questions at issue are 
not really ontological. For example, the various definitions o f unemployment in the 
literature are in no sense ontologically incompatible. Similar remarks apply to other 
areas o f economics, for instance single currency areas, industry structures, designing an 
optimal tax regime or auction format, or identifying a profit-maximising price. Arguably, 
similar remarks apply to social sciences and history as a whole, or at least apply to them 
as they are overwhelmingly practised.
Examples from natural science
What o f the natural sciences? We do not offer any systematic survey or definition o f 
what a ‘typical’ piece o f  natural science consists in, only a rather more anecdotal account. 
Nevertheless, this may be o f some value to illustrate that there is much science that does 
fit our description, or at least to make that claim seem plausible. So take some stories 
from a single week as representatives o f natural science as it is practised.
Sunlight can be used in medical operations
A prototype solar concentrator was shown to be able to kill a section o f liver tissue in 
anaesthetised rats [Gordon et al 2003]. This represents a report o f  a causal event in the 
laboratory. An extrapolated claim is that a similar causal relationship will hold strongly 
enough, or may do soon after further technological development, for the same technique 
to be used on humans. A further implicit claim is that this may prove cheaper or more
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convenient than existing alternative medical techniques.
Why you yawn when other people do
People tend to yawn when they see others yawning. Psychology experiments now show 
that those who do not follow this pattern also tend to be bad in other tests at putting 
themselves in other people’s shoes [Platek et al 2003]. This is evidence for one 
explanation o f why we yawn when others do -  namely that identifying with another’s 
state o f mind when they yawn may cause an unconscious impersonation. It would also 
explain why schizophrenics, who have particular difficulty doing this, rarely catch yawns.
Threat o f overpopulation
New census data o f people and wildlife suggest that the most important cause o f species 
extinction will be the sheer number o f humans [McKee et al 2004]. Or more precisely 
put, in order to reduce species extinctions it may be more profitable to concentrate on 
limiting overpopulation rather than changing the habits o f those already alive. ‘Even if 
we live as vegetarian saints we’ll still be having the same impact on biodiversity’, in the 
words o f project leader Jeffrey McKee. Other researchers dispute the conclusions, 
opining that the causal mechanisms are more complicated than assumed and that as a 
result behavioural factors are after all as important as population size. Thus the original 
research is in effect a claim about relative causal strengths, and the subsequent debate 
concerns just this issue too. (For discussion o f the issue o f different levels o f causal 
structure, see section 2-9 below.)
Nickel in foliage
The foliage o f a particular plant was found to contain unusually high concentrations of 
nickel. O f course, this is perhaps more a discovery o f a new effect itself requiring causal 
explanation than o f a causal relation itself. But understanding better the causal relation 
underlying it may help in the development o f plants specially designed to ‘mop up’ 
polluted areas by absorbing excess nickel and other metals -  a potentially very useful 
new causal capacity. (From New Phytologist.)
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Catalyst in liquids
A new catalyst has been discovered which dissolves in liquid reactants, converts them to 
liquid product, then precipitates out as a solid ready for re-use. This is a new sequence o f 
causes, useful o f course environmentally, especially as the process requires no solvents so 
waste production is minimal. (From Nature.)
A historical discovery
The diet o f ancient dolphin-like ichthyosaurs included birds and baby turtles, contrary to 
previous wisdom. This was inferred from the discovery o f the preserved contents o f a 
fossilised ichthyosaur stomach. (From Proceedings o f the Royal Society.)
The typical pattern here is that new particular effects or causal relations are established, 
under certain circumstances. Or, alternatively put, a context-specific causal strength is 
established. Often the question is whether the same causal strength can be manufactured 
so as to obtain under different, more practical circumstances (‘technological 
development’). Implicit is often the claim that the causal strength thus obtained will be 
greater than that o f rival causes, or else that this cause will have a lower strength than the 
others with respect to some different, undesirable effect (e.g. cost or pollution) while 
being equally strong with respect to the desired effect. In one case (the effect o f 
overpopulation), a comparison o f  causal strengths was explicit. There was also one 
clearly historical case, following a similar pattern to the others. All o f  these examples 
can thus be seen as establishing particular causal strengths o f one sort or another. The 
key point is that in no case is there any dispute about the appropriate causal ontology; 
rather, the research concerns the value o f causal strengths with respect to certain effects 
from within an ontology already agreed. Note also that all the causal strengths 
discovered are context-specific in the sense that their extrapolation to different contexts 
cannot just be blithely assumed. This chimes well both with our earlier insistence that 
approximate truth can only be defined context-specifically in this way, and in addition 
with our insistence later that causal strengths can also only be defined context- 
specifically.
100
The examples considered so far are, so to speak, pieces o f relatively pure research. When 
we move on to more applied work, we find that the above patterns are confirmed there 
too. Indeed, it is even more common to see comparisons o f causal strengths explicitly 
becoming the key issue. It can seem that, as it were, the more pure research furnishes the 
portfolio o f causes to consider, and the applied research then does that ‘considering’ -  i.e. 
the applied research then checks which o f the portfolio o f causes has the greatest 
importance to the issue at hand, much as earlier the rise o f the tropopause was ascribed 
primarily to greenhouse gases and ozone concentration rather than to the other possible 
causes. (O f course, the divisions are nothing like as neatly-drawn as this in reality; the 
point is just to note a certain general trend.) We shall note just two cases, for illustration.
First applied example: the Hiroshima bomb
A large team o f researchers have tried to reconstruct accurately the precise effects o f the 
tragic nuclear blast [Straume et al 2003]. Apart from pure historical interest this also 
helps current research into the health effects o f radiation, since the exact nature of the 
explosion has hitherto been uncertain. New evidence has included recently discovered 
detailed contemporary town maps, enabling for the first time researchers to piece together 
which o f the survivors were partially shielded from the blast by buildings for instance, as 
well as more accurate estimation o f previously suspected effects such as the shelter 
provided by a small hill. Another novelty was the availability o f  sophisticated computer 
models o f the blast, with better modelling of, for instance, the way radiation travels 
through air. And another big improvement came from new radiation measurements taken 
from old lightning rods and guttering. New techniques o f chemical analysis also enabled 
researchers to refine previous estimates o f radiation levels, for instance by taking into 
account how one particular kind o f radiation (so-called fast neutrons) can transmute 
copper into a particular isotope o f nickel -  the levels o f such nickel had never been 
measured before. Such analyses showed that previous estimates o f radiation levels near 
the blast were much too high, as had been suspected by many, but on the other hand that 
they were still fairly accurate for the zones in which most survivors were found. Much 
detailed data already exists on the bomb survivors and their subsequent degrees of
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suffering from radiation-related diseases; the uncertainty lay in knowing exactly what 
dosages o f radiation the bomb had originally delivered them. Finally, in developing the 
new reconstruction researchers have been able to trace the angle and direction o f 
radiation striking buildings and the ground back to their point o f origin: the bomb. This 
has enabled them to conclude both that the exact point o f the (mid-air) explosion was 
slightly different to what was previously thought, and also that the overall power o f the 
bomb was slightly greater.
The new research reduced many uncertainties from previous data, as well as ironing out 
several apparent contradictions in it. To perform this reconstruction the scientists had to 
integrate very carefully many different models, for instance those o f the blast itself, o f the 
interaction o f radiation with buildings, its interaction with people, its interaction with 
landscapes, o f where people actually were at the moment o f detonation and how reliably 
they remembered that, and so forth. All o f these involved estimates o f  causal strengths. 
These causal strengths, while o f course informed by background theory, had to be 
calibrated very carefully to this specific instance. That is, what mattered were the net 
causal strengths in this particular circumstance, not their values in laboratory conditions. 
The improvement o f the new over previous research is captured very naturally by our 
definition o f approximate truth. There are many different causal strengths involved in the 
estimation, for instance the carcinogenic dose each survivor received, and the detailed 
reconstruction work enables us now to have much more accurate estimates o f these 
strengths -  that is, the new work scores a much higher degree o f approximate truth. And 
once again, there is no disagreement between the different pieces o f research as to which 
causal ontology we should be focusing on, rather only disagreement as to what the 
relative causal strengths actually were.
Second applied exam ple: S undarbans
Sundarbans world heritage park in southern Bangladesh is the world’s largest mangrove 
forest and indeed largest coastal forest o f any sort, and a major habitat for tigers. Rivers 
and creeks running through it provide a breeding ground for fish and prawns and a
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livelihood for up to 300,000 small-scale fishermen. The forests are also important for 
honey, wood and leaf collectors. Moreover, more than 3 million people depend on the 
forests to take the brunt o f  the intense annual cyclones and tidal surges from the Bay o f 
Bengal. However, the forests are now only half the size they once were and in danger o f 
shrinking further. What is the explanation o f this? The forests are silting up, trees are 
dying because not enough fresh water is reaching them, and a raft o f economic problems 
is driving locals to destroy the forest for wood. This much is not disputed; what is more 
controversial is the underlying causes behind these proximate factors, or rather which of 
those underlying causes is o f greatest strength. We consider here two possible such 
causes, one the fault o f a past Indian government, the other that o f a past Bangladeshi 
one.
First, in the mid-1970s India built the Farraka barrage across the river Ganges 18km from 
the Bangladeshi border. As a result the flow o f the Ganges and its tributaries has been 
halved for much o f  the year, and from January to March you can now walk across it. The 
effect, claims the Bangladeshi minister o f water, has been that: ‘there has been salinity 
intrusion, rivers have lost their navigability, the north o f Bangladesh is turning into a 
desert, the Sundarbans are being seriously affected, we have bad water-logging and when 
the Indians release the water we have bigger floods. We have too much water or too 
little’ (quoted in The Guardian 31st July 2003).
Second, in the 1960s thousands o f miles o f high coastal embankments were built by the 
Bangladeshis with international money. The idea was to protect the population from 
cyclones and allow farmers to grow high-yielding crops such as rice. While for a time 
this appeared to work well, longer-term negative ecological effects have now become 
apparent. The tides were denied entry to the protected areas, which meant that silt 
deposited by the rivers was not washed away and so accumulated. And whereas 
monsoons used to drain away surface salinity and be released through sluice gates, now 
the rising levels o f silt are blocking those sluice gates so that the rainwater cannot be 
drained away and thus the monsoons lead to flooding. This combination o f rising silt 
levels and flooding has led many to abandon agriculture for prawn farming, especially as
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the increased salinity has killed off much o f the vegetation. The switch away from 
labour-intensive agriculture has created great unemployment, in turn leading many to the 
forest to log for wood, thereby damaging it yet further.
We do not address here the issue o f why these particular government decisions were 
made. Although no doubt interesting in themselves, and likely to touch on wider aspects 
o f the world economy, they are different explananda. (See section 2-9 for analysis o f 
interest-relativity.) Rather, we shall concentrate here just on which o f  these two 
decisions had the greater impact on the forest's area. The example is interesting for a 
number o f reasons. First, it is clearly politically controversial -  the question o f which of 
the two causes has the greater strength is extremely charged, yet it seems clear that there 
should be an empirical fact o f the matter as to the answer. This fact o f the matter may not 
in itself necessarily immediately mandate any moral or political consequences, o f course 
-  no doubt other things will also come into play there. But nevertheless, notwithstanding 
the political controversy, it seems clear that there is no great ontological aspect to the 
disagreements here. All accept and use the same physical concepts o f  salination, 
flooding, siltation, deforestation and so on. In philosophy o f social science it is 
sometimes casually asserted that ideological clashes will render empirical arbitration 
impossible because o f just such ontological incommensurabilities, but in this example 
that does not seem to be the case. (Perhaps, outside academia and in the real world o f 
actual political disputes, such a conclusion is typical.)
A second interesting aspect is the highlighted need to be very clear on our focus of 
attention. As mentioned, we are not interested here in the background politics behind the 
original government decisions. Moreover, the causal processes by which the decisions 
led to deforestation are themselves clearly complex and interesting, and involve, as it 
were, many sub-explananda. But again, here we are interested not directly in how the 
government decisions led to deforestation, only in how much they did so (although see 
the next paragraph too).
A third interesting aspect is that we must take into account plentiful causal interaction.
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For example, the impact on the Sundarbans o f the Indians building the Farraka barrage 
was partly through increased flooding. But the degree o f increased flooding it led to was 
likely also influenced by the Bangladeshi coastal embankments. In other words, the 
causal strength o f the Indian action was greater than it would have been otherwise 
because o f the Bangladeshi action. Similar remarks would apply when trying to isolate 
the causal strength o f the Bangladeshi embankments. At first sight, it might seem that 
such interactive effects render establishing these causal strengths difficult or even 
impossible. But in fact it turns out that our definition o f  causal strength can incorporate 
interactive effects without trouble (section 3-3). (Note that our original example 
concerning atmospheric chemistry and the height o f the tropopause likely also would 
have involved extensive interactions between the different causal factors.)
So which is more to blame, the Indian barrage or the Bangladeshi embankments? Which 
would be the truer explanation? We can now frame this very naturally in terms o f our 
definition o f approximate truth -  there is a true weighting for each o f  these two causes, 
and the two putative explanations will differ on how accurately their accounts reproduce 
it. As the above paragraphs argued, our definition can capture this happily even in a case 
o f political controversy, many explananda, and complicated causal interactions.
To sum up: o f course, this section is in no way a systematic survey o f all o f science. Nor 
is it a proper detailed case study o f any single instance o f  science. Rather, it is intended 
to illustrate that the following claims are plausible: that our definition o f approximate 
truth is sufficiently simple that it can be easily applied to real-life scientific work and 
disputes. That typically such work and disputes do not revolve around questions o f 
ontology, nor do they revolve around questions o f vocabulary; rather, they concern 
attributions o f causal strength within a generally agreed ontology and vocabulary. That 
they often concern very context-specific models, or else combinations o f models very 
specific to one particular circumstance, and also that they often involve the need to allow 
for many interactive effects between the causes in question. All these latter features are 
well catered for by our definition. Accordingly the suggestion is that, for the great 
majority o f cases, our definition o f approximate truth is adequate for the assessment of
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science as it is actually practised. And although the few cases that are exceptions to this 
have been much discussed in the literature and indeed in philosophy o f science generally, 
still it is well to remember that proportionally they are in fact very few in number.
2-7) Relative versus absolute approximate truth 
Relativisations
Our definition o f causal strength yields results that are fully quantitative (chapter 3). It is 
not difficult also to design a measure o f similarity that is similarly quantitative (see 
appendix). Can we therefore say that our measure o f approximate truth is likewise 
quantitative? The short answer is ‘yes’ -  but only relativised to its particular causal 
scheme. There are several problems with interpreting its results to be in any sense 
indicators o f ‘absolute’ approximate truth.
To begin with, recall the demand from much o f philosophy o f  science that a good notion 
o f approximate truth be able to make sense o f general scientific progress. As already 
noted, our own scheme cannot do this. Or rather, it can only make sense o f progress in a 
way narrowed to a particular context. It can make no sense o f the notion o f one general 
theory being more approximately true than another.
Now if this were the only argument against interpreting our quantitative judgments of 
approximate truth absolutely, we would still be licensed to claim some authority for its 
context-specific scores. Thus we might claim that a score o f  0.9 (say) indicated that a 
particular model was ‘90% approximately true’ o f  one particular bit o f reality. But 
unfortunately there are reasons to doubt even then whether any such confident 
pronouncement could really carry much authority. First, as repeatedly noted, our 
definition requires prior agreement on what the correct causal ontology is. Therefore its
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scores can only ever be relative to a given ontology. Second, the scores are also relative 
to choice o f vocabulary, even once given a particular ontology -  the classic Miller point. 
Now it may be that in practice, as argued at length in section 2-6, disputes in science 
hardly ever turn on these particular issues. That is, within any particular context we 
usually do have agreement on both ontology and vocabulary. But even if  this were true, 
it would give us confidence regarding the preference for one model over another only in 
that particular context. That is, it would only give us confidence regarding relative 
judgments o f approximate truth, i.e. regarding qualitative judgm ents between two models 
already agreeing on vocabulary. But to take the absolute numbers seriously, we would 
implicitly be comparing the approximate truth o f a given model with the approximate 
truths o f all other models everywhere, and this is a much larger step. In particular, 
although it is true that competing models indeed typically do agree on vocabulary, it 
probably is not true that the same applies to all different models in different contexts. 
Thus we conclude: methodological practicalities indeed license us to give weight to 
relative, qualitative judgments o f approximate truth, but not to ascribing any deeper 
authority to the absolute scores.
Note again also that all results for approximate truth are relative to focus o f interest 
(section 2-9), as indeed are the very values o f causal strengths to choice o f  context 
(section 3-2). There is also a final factor against which any results must be relativised -  
namely, our exact choice o f measure o f similarity. In particular, i f  there exists more than 
one possible such measure, as o f course there does, then there exists a danger that 
judgments o f  approximate truth will be unsatisfactorily measure-dependent. It may well 
be that, for any reasonable choice, in practice almost all our rankings between models 
will not be choice-of-measure-sensitive in this way. Thus, rather as for choice o f 
ontology and vocabulary, so far as most actual scientific disputes are concerned, the 
choice-of-measure problem turns out to be, as it were, only potential rather than actual. 
Nevertheless, again similarly to the previous two cases, the issue still casts doubt on the 
authority o f any absolute scores. For while the qualitative rankings between two models 
may be unlikely to vary with choice o f measure, clearly the absolute scores will. On the 
other hand, in this thesis we shall end up recommending only one measure as our
107
preferred definition (see appendix).
Note that even our qualitative verdicts will nonetheless still be considerably more 
detailed than those available from a pure OAT measure. Recall that any two models with 
the correct ontology must be adjudged equal by OAT, which makes it somewhat useless 
for practical purposes. But our scheme can and does routinely discriminate between 
correct-ontology models on the basis of the accuracy o f the causal strengths they 
postulate.
Causal interventions
There remains though an important sense in which our definition does still yield useful 
quantitative information after all, notwithstanding the earlier caveats. That sense is with 
respect to causal interventions. Our definition o f causal strength is (roughly speaking -  
see chapter 3) such that if  a cause has a strength o f  2 units, say, that means that, given the 
background conditions prevailing, implementing the cause will lead to 2 units o f the 
specified effect (in the natural units o f that effect). Thus our absolute scores for 
approximate truth will reflect the absolute accuracy o f relevant causal strengths, and 
hence in turn the absolute impact o f particular causal interventions. In this sense 
therefore the absolute scores are indeed meaningful.
This argument assumes that the cause in question is well specified, which means in turn 
that the reliability o f our interventions will be dependent on having a (sufficiently) 
correct ontology. To see why, imagine that phlogiston was awarded a causal strength o f 
2 with respect to creating some gas. This would not enable us then to apply phlogiston 
and create 2 units o f that gas, since phlogiston does not exist and so cannot be a cause o f 
anything. When adding 'phlogiston' we would presumably actually be adding something 
else which we were mistakenly thinking to be phlogiston. This ‘something else’ would 
have its own causal strength with respect to the gas, which presumably might differ from 
the value we had assigned to phlogiston. Thus having an incorrect ontology could leave 
us vulnerable to miscalibrated interventions, and it is in this way that our causal strengths
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and hence ability to intervene accurately are relativised to ontology.
Note though that it would not necessarily follow that our interventions went awry even if 
our ontology were incorrect. The reason is that in a given context our ontological error 
might have only a small effect -  arguably the case when Newtonian interventions are still 
effective even though we take them to be ontologically mistaken. Or perhaps the error 
would not be costly at all if  the causal strength were calculated for something that was 
accurately specified but merely mislabelled with respect to our wider ontology. For 
example, if  we incorrectly labelled some actual chemical as 'phlogiston' but calculated an 
accurate causal strength for it, then an intervention would still be accurate even though 
we would have misunderstood what was happening ontologically. Hence accurate causal 
intervention is still possible even with imperfect science. It would o f course have been 
worrying had we not found this to be the case, given the long history o f effective human 
interventions before modem science, not to mention similarly effective interventions by 
animals and babies, and not to mention the presumed ontological fallibility even o f our 
best current models. (See sections 2-12 to 2-14 for more discussion o f how to handle 
models with incorrect ontologies.)
Nevertheless, the accuracy o f our interventions is still in general dependent on choice of 
ontology. However (once given a correct ontology), it is not dependent in the same way 
on choice o f vocabulary, and so is not, as it were, subject to the Miller problem. For 
example, suppose the effect we were concerned with was 'making uncovered grass wet'. 
Then rain would likely be assigned a high causal strength. But Miller's predicate 
'Minnesotan' in the canonical weather example, defined remember as (either hot&rainy or 
not-hot&not-rainy), would now be assigned a different causal strength (its exact value 
depending on the context-specific relative frequencies o f its two disjuncts). That is, each 
choice o f predicate has its own causal strength. Accordingly, supposing fancifully we 
had the power to control the weather, we would know the effect o f  creating rainy weather 
and the (expected) effect o f creating Minnesotan weather, and in either case would 
thereby have an accurate idea o f how to calibrate our intervention. So a M iller switch 
from one vocabulary to the other, which so confounds measures o f approximate truth,
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would not confound the accuracy o f our interventions, since the causal strengths on 
which we would base those interventions are already defined predicate-specifically, so to 
speak (assuming all along o f course that our scores for the relevant causal strengths were 
themselves accurate). Therefore although our ability to intervene accurately is ontology- 
dependent, it is not -  once we have a correct ontology -  vocabulary-dependent. This of 
course is fortunate, else the effectiveness o f our interventions in the world would be 
language-dependent; but o f course they are not, so it is well that our definitions should 
reflect this.
When would we even want absolute approximate truth?
So how does all this relate to the issue o f relative versus absolute approximate truth? The 
point o f it is to demonstrate that the quantitative elements in our approximate truth 
calculation -  namely the assignments o f strengths for each individual cause at hand -  do 
have some objective significance. Given the lack o f ontological dispute typical o f most 
o f actual science they are in fact typically objectively significant. Or at least, they are 
with respect to intervention. My real claim now is this: that it is only with respect to 
interventions that we actually really care about quantitative or absolute results in the first 
place. By contrast, we are not really greatly concerned about quantitative judgments o f 
approximate truth; in this latter case, qualitative is all that matters. It is clear that we are 
concerned about exact quantitative results when planning causal interventions and, we 
have just argued, the results that our definition o f causal strength provides us are indeed 
objective and authoritative enough for that purpose. But our concern with approximate 
truth in science is typically only relative. That is, we are typically concerned to know 
whether one model is nearer the truth than another. (Even the classic concentration on 
general progress in science is concerned with relative judgments, in particular with the 
notion that successive theories or paradigms are nearer the truth than their predecessors. 
It is rare for philosophers to ask 'how approximately true is Newtonian mechanics in 
absolute terms?1 Rather, the more typical question is: 'is Newtonian mechanics more 
approximately true than Aristotelean mechanics, but less approximately true than 
relativistic mechanics?' Or rather, usually it is assumed that the answer to this is 'yes', o f
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course, and the real demand is for some satisfactory way o f representing the pre-existing 
intuition.)
Therefore the fact that our definition's scores for approximate truth are rather more 
authoritative when interpreted relatively than absolutely, is in fact no particular 
weakness. It is important to distinguish between interventions on the one hand and 
comparison o f models on the other. In practice, our approach in this thesis can only 
really provide (usually) authoritative quantitative advice in the former case, but the point 
now is that that is the only time we even need such quantitative succour.
To sum up: our scheme primarily delivers only qualitative approximate truth verdicts. 
Even these are relativised to choice o f ontology, language and measure o f similarity, as 
well as to focus o f interest, but in practice this qualification is rarely onerous. Our 
scheme does also deliver quantitative approximate truth verdicts too, but the various 
relativisations make it hard to attach objective weight to the exact scores. Nonetheless, 
once given a (sufficiently) correct ontology our scheme can also license accurate 
quantitative interventions, thanks to our definition o f causal strength. Happily, this latter 
context also seems to be the only one in which we really even need such quantitative 
verdicts.
2-8) Approximate truth or approximate explanation?
Our definition deals exclusively with causal descriptions. This makes it well suited to 
analysing causal explanations, and also as we saw to licensing causal interventions. But 
what o f two different non-causal descriptions o f entities -  perhaps our definition is not so 
well suited to comparing two o f those? For example, suppose that one model says the 
solar system has 10 planets and another that it has 15. It seems natural that the first
111
model should be deemed nearer the (let us still assume) true figure o f  9 than the second, 
but it is not obvious how to express this in terms o f causal strengths. Similar remarks 
would apply to estimates o f physical distance: suppose the true distance between two 
objects is 5cm, one model claims it is 6cm, and another model that it is actually 8cm. A 
slightly different example might involve biology: suppose the true animal that passed 
during the night was a dolphin, but one model claims it was a shark, while another claims 
it was an elephant. Or suppose the true colour o f some plant is red, one model claims it is 
orange, and another that it is blue. How should approximate truth be thought o f in the 
context o f these examples, and is our definition able to meet the challenge? Should our 
definition really be seen not so much as an account o f approximate truth, but more as one 
merely o f approximate (causal) explanation?
To an extent, I think this point is well taken. However, I do not see it as a serious 
problem, for three reasons. First, because our causal emphasis carries compensating 
advantages, in particular it enables us to solve the seriousness-of-errors problem.
Second, because if  necessary the supposed non-causal counterexamples above can be re­
expressed in causal terms after all. And third, because in practice most scientific disputes 
do concern explanations in any case, and so it is a merit o f our definition to be much 
better suited to them than are rival ones. The first point was discussed in chapter 1, and 
the third one in section 2-6. Here, let us flesh out the second one.
Our own definition can in fact handle the apparently acausal examples given above; 
indeed, we shall argue that it handles them better than other approaches, due to just the 
seriousness-of-errors considerations already mentioned. Take the biological examples 
first. It might well be wondered whether claiming that a red plant is orange is a greater or 
worse error than claiming it is blue. Most other approaches would probably mark the two 
models as equal for approximate truth since each has made one mistake -  unless perhaps 
it was argued that since orange is nearer red in the electromagnetic spectrum than is blue, 
somehow therefore the orange model is preferable. The very fact that it is unclear 
whether or not to give this latter argument weight is itself in fact a reflection o f the 
undesirable vulnerability to such questions o f any approach not giving explicit attention
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to extra-logical considerations (section 1-3).
What would our own definition say here? The point is that which model is closer to the 
truth depends crucially on context -  and it is a major advantage or our definition that it 
automatically incorporates this through our context-specific definition o f causal strength. 
Thus suppose that our context was the visibility o f  these plants to particular insects whose 
vision works only in the low-frequency end o f the visible (to us) spectrum, so that they 
can see red and orange but not blue. With respect to this effect o f visibility-to-insects, the 
error o f  the orange model in terms o f the causal strength will clearly likely be much less 
than that o f the blue model, and hence the orange model will score better for approximate 
truth. Now consider a different context, say some war game where one side's positions 
are marked by yellow plants and another by orange plants, all other colours being deemed 
neutral. In this new case, with respect to the effect (say) o f drawing enemy fire, it is now 
a much more serious error to label the red plant orange than it is to label it blue, and so 
now -  with respect to this new causal strength -  it is the blue model that will be more 
approximately true. Thus our ranking o f the two models should be varying by context, as 
with our definition. In still other contexts, o f course, it may be that the error o f the two 
models is equal and so they would score the same.
A similar analysis applies to the other examples -  in each case, the problem can readily 
be re-expressed in causal terms and hence our definition applied, thereby also 
incorporating desirable context-specificity. Thus, in one context it may be that a dolphin 
is deemed nearer an elephant, because both are mammals and so, for instance, pregnant 
females will display much reduced speed prior to giving birth, which would mean a 
greater causal strength with respect to an effect o f increased-easiness-to-hunt at such 
periods. But in a different context, say if  the relevant effect were the bumping o f a boat, 
the dolphin might now be deemed much nearer a shark because both are sea creatures. 
Thus the elephant or shark models could after all each be given a score by our definition, 
and moreover these scores vary desirably with context. Likewise, there are many causal 
strengths that vary with distance, and so we would be able to rank the two models of 
different physical distances. And we could similarly imagine causal strengths that varied
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with the number o f  planets.
This ease o f applicability o f a causal approach was precisely one o f  the advantages o f our 
own definition over previous ontological ones (section 1-6). It would be difficult, for 
instance, to see how to apply the geometrical ontology o f  chaos theory, or type- 
hierarchies o f natural kinds, to our examples above. On a similar note, Newtonian 
equations o f force are often described as acausal in the sense that there is nothing in the 
equations themselves that implies (for instance) the time asymmetry characteristic o f 
causation. But despite this, we have seen how straightforward it is to analyse Newtonian 
examples in terms o f causal strengths, perhaps because causality enters Newtonian 
models naturally once they are applied to specific contexts o f intervention or explanation. 
Note also that almost all policy issues involve interventions o f one sort or another, and so 
our definition o f approximate truth will automatically be applicable to all o f those too.
Finally, the relativity o f our definition to choice o f ontology and vocabulary (previous 
section) sits well with describing it as an account o f approximate explanation rather than 
approximate truth. Recall also our earlier discussion (section 1-4) about adopting a 
methodological rather than metaphysical conception o f  the issue, which also sits well 
with a focus on explanation.
In summary then, in a manner o f  speaking it is indeed true that our definition reduces 
approximate truth to approximate causal explanation. However, this does not in practice 
limit its applicability, and on the positive side confers important advantages.
2-9) Interest-relativity 
Does our scheme just reduce to EAT?
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One objection might run as follows: our scheme focuses on the strengths assigned to the 
different causes o f an effect, but ultimately those strengths are in turn defined just by the 
individual quantities o f effect these causes each lead to, in other words by a set o f 
empirical variables. That is, although our definition admittedly does not boil down just to 
the level o f headline composite effect as EAT does, still it is only going one level down, 
as it were -  its results just boil down to the levels o f effect due to the underlying causes 
instead. The focus is purely on the value o f particular empirical variables rather than 
anything ontological. Therefore is our definition really distinct from EAT?
The answer is ’yes' because even shifting the empirical focus just one level down is 
sufficient to circumvent EAT's main difficulties. This is most obvious when comparing 
two competing explanations. If, as is frequently the case, both explanations yield the 
same (actual) final effect, then EAT has no way o f  separating them. But what matters is 
whether the explanations have identified, and given the right weightings to, correct 
causes o f  the effect. To be sure, the weightings on these causes are indeed defined by us 
empirically, but typically this is no longer a problem since the competing explanations 
will be offering different weightings -  this is why they are competing. EAT is helpless 
given empirical equivalence at the level o f the final composite effect, which 
unfortunately is a common occurrence. Our definition would only be helpless if  there 
was similar equivalence for every postulated underlying cause as well, which is 
extremely uncommon -  or rather, if  there was such equivalence all the way down, then it 
is not clear in what sense the two competing explanations would even be distinct. Similar 
arguments apply to the case o f fluke correlations. Once again, going one level down is in 
practice enough to distinguish -  unlike EAT -  between genuine explanations and ones 
that are correct merely flukily. In this way, our approach is indeed a significant advance 
on EAT.
Note here also two other points from elsewhere in this chapter. First, when -  as is 
usually the case in science -  there is no ontological controversy, the particular 
weaknesses o f EAT remedied above by our scheme are the only major ones needing to be 
remedied (section 2-4). And second, when there is ontological controversy, EAT is
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arguably equally as vulnerable as our own definition to the difficulties that follow 
(section 2-12). Thus our scheme is not adding to EAT any weaknesses not already 
present. In combination, these points imply that we cannot do worse under our approach 
than under EAT, and in many cases will do strictly better.
W hich level down?
On a couple o f occasions in the previous section, we mentioned going 'one level down'. 
Yet this seems an unsatisfactory phrase -  surely there is nothing in principle to stop us 
going any number o f levels down, and there is left unresolved the issue o f  ju st which 
'level' o f  underlying causes we should focus on exactly. To see this, take now a very 
different and more tragic example -  the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima 
in 1945. Suppose we have three competing causal explanations. The first says that since 
it was fine weather on that day, unlike on the preceding days, so the bombing mission 
was enabled to proceed. The second states that the USA dropped the bomb because it 
wanted to induce a quick Japanese surrender. And the third says that the development of 
human scientific knowledge had reached a level that made use o f such a bomb inevitable 
sooner or later. Now these three models are not mutually contradictory, so therefore it 
must be possible that all three o f them are simultaneously correct. Yet if  there is 
apparently only one explanandum -  ‘the decision to drop the bomb’ -  it would seem to 
follow that there is only one target set o f true causal strengths, so how could it possibly 
be that three very different models all simultaneously score well?
Consider the causal sequence that led up to the bomb. It ends with the physical 
detonation and then, working backwards, to its dropping from the plane, to the decision 
to undertake the bombing mission, then in turn to the course o f the war before that, and 
so on back into history. And o f course there exists not just one simple linear chain, so 
much as a whole web. Thus the decision to undertake the bombing mission required the 
joint occurrence o f several factors, all o f which were independently necessary -  the state 
o f the war, the fine weather that day, the technical development o f the bomb and so forth. 
Many different chains lead back, and overall the antecedent causal web is complicated.
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The key point is that each o f the three models is an attempt to capture a different part o f 
this causal web. It is perfectly possible that each could give a fine account o f their own 
segment o f it while simultaneously offering no account at all o f the others’ segments. 
That is, they might all focus on their own particular areas within the web and not even 
attempt ‘complete’ explanations o f their subject. This is arguably a common state of 
affairs in social science. So a fundamental part o f any account o f context-specific 
approximate truth must be a definition o f just which segment o f  the causal web we are 
interested in. For example, the ‘fine weather’ model is perhaps a good explanation of 
why the bomb was dropped on the precise day that it was at the precise place that it was. 
But it is not a good explanation o f why it was dropped that year rather than another, or on 
that country rather than another. So it is vital to distinguish the many subtly different 
focuses o f interest all consistent with the same explanandum o f 'the decision to drop the 
bomb'. In other words, for a full treatment o f approximate truth we are going to need to 
incorporate pragmatics as well as semantics.
O f course, these are familiar points. (Even [Miller 1994] accepts that judgments o f 
approximate truth must vary depending on which question a theory is taken to be trying 
to answer.) The question is: can we deal with them fully in our scheme? I think the 
answer is 'yes'.
Choice o f causal strength
Let E be the effect o f deciding to drop the Hiroshima bomb, and specify two causes: let C 
be the state o f the weather, noting that it was sunny today but cloudy yesterday. And let 
D be the state o f technology, noting that this incorporated nuclear bombs this year but no 
such bombs 100 years ago.
To start with, suppose we are concerned with why the decision was made today rather 
than yesterday. In particular, we are interested in comparing the causal strengths (with 
respect to this effect) o f the weather and o f the state o f technology. In the case o f the
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weather, we note whether the bomb would have been dropped today if  it had been 
yesterday’s cloudy weather (no), and whether it was dropped with today’s actual sunny 
weather (yes). We then compare the two answers, and ask whether the change from 
yesterday’s to today’s weather made a difference? Clearly here it did, and therefore we 
adjudge that the weather has a high causal strength with respect to the short-run 
explanandum. A key point is that these causal strengths must be calculated holding 
background conditions fixed, to avoid confounding the effects o f the cause o f interest 
with those o f other factors that may be varying (section 3-2).
Turn now to an analogous calculation for the long-term cause D, the state o f nuclear 
technology. Comparing that state today and yesterday, it is clearly the same. Therefore, 
in contrast to the weather case, the switch between yesterday’s and today’s nuclear 
technology would have made no difference. That is, holding constant the background 
condition o f today’s sunny weather, the bomb would have been dropped just as much 
given yesterday’s nuclear technology as given today’s. Hence with respect to this short­
term explanandum the level o f technology has zero causal strength.
What about the second, longer-term explanandum -  which factor, weather or technology, 
has the higher causal strength with respect to the effect o f the bomb being dropped this 
year rather than 100 years ago? Again, we compare the effects o f changing the relevant 
cause while holding others fixed. Thus, given today’s state o f technology, the weather of 
100 years ago would presumably have the same significance as the weather o f today -  
namely sometimes sunny and therefore allowing the dropping o f  the bomb at some point 
during the year. Thus switching between the two states o f the weather now makes no 
difference and so has zero causal strength. (Note that if  the weather had so altered, for 
instance if  100 years ago it was always so cloudy that not even one bombing mission 
could have been attempted, then the change in climate since then might indeed 
legitimately be seen as causally important even with respect to the long-term 
explanandum.) By contrast, holding the weather constant, the change from the 
technology level o f 100 years ago to that o f today would be significant. Thus the results 
are, as desired, the reverse o f  those for the short-term explanandum -  now it is the level
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of technology, not the weather, which has the high causal strength.
The key underlying suggestion here is this: that interest-relativity boils down to the 
choice o f  causal strengths on which our definition o f approximate truth should operate.
In particular, in this example the short-term explanandum implied the calculation o f one 
particular set o f causal strengths, while the long-term explanandum implied the 
calculation o f a different set. Moreover, technically the causal strengths we were 
defining above were relative strengths, defined as the difference o f two absolute ones 
(see section 3-2 for more on these). So while Nature, as it were, yields the same 
objective causal strengths regardless o f our subjective interests, still we can choose to 
focus on any o f an infinite number o f different relative strengths according to our fancy. 
These relative strengths, once specified, would in turn be determined objectively, as were 
the ones above for instance. Thus we have two dimensions o f freedom, as it were: we 
can select between different absolute strengths, or choose any particular relative strength. 
Summing up, interest-relativity boils down to the subjective choice o f  which causal 
strengths to focus on. But once that choice is made, the actual values o f  those strengths 
(relative or absolute) are determined objectively and hence so would be the scores for 
approximate truth calculated from those values. (For more on subjective and objective, 
see section 2-10.)
(Again, refer to chapter 3 for a more rigorous discussion o f how to define causal 
strengths. Some o f the subtleties o f picking out different absolute and relative causal 
strengths go beyond the scope o f this thesis. For a more fundamental treatment, see 
[Northcott 2004].)
Completeness versus accuracy again
Suppose we are interested in the causes o f lung cancer and we have two models o f this. 
The first cites smoking and gives a very accurate estimate o f smoking's causal strength. 
However, it makes no mention o f  asbestos. The second model mentions both smoking 
and asbestos and gives estimates for both their causal strengths, although these estimates
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are not as accurate as the first model's for smoking. Which o f the two models should be 
preferred? On the one hand, the first one is, as far as it goes, the more accurate of the 
two. On the other hand, the second one has captured more o f the factors at play and so 
although less accurate is also more complete. It seems that there are two distinct 
desiderata here, accuracy and comprehensiveness, and our scheme does not tell us how to 
balance them.
This issue was o f course precisely one o f the reasons why we criticised attempts to define 
approximate truths o f general theories, arguing instead for our context-specific model- 
centred approach. But can we really avoid it now even in our scheme? I think that our 
treatment o f interest-relativity shows how we can. We may be interested in one o f two 
different things -  either the strengths of all the causes o f lung cancer, or else the causal 
strength just o f smoking only. I f  the former, then it may well be (depending on the exact 
accuracies and choice o f definition o f similarity) that the less accurate but more complete 
second model is preferred to the more accurate but narrower first one. I f  some model 
only gets part o f the picture, so to speak, then even if it gets that particular part very 
accurately there is no offence against the meaning o f approximate truth to judge it only a 
poor approximation o f the picture as a whole. (Imagine if  the first model had furnished 
an accurate causal strength just o f asbestos; given the relative lack o f  statistical 
importance o f that cause o f lung cancer, such a model would hardly have qualified as an 
approximately true picture o f the overall causation o f lung cancer.) Thus the smoking- 
only model may make a true causal claim, and may even calibrate that claim exactly 
correctly, but it does not follow that it should therefore always score best for approximate 
truth.
If, however, we were interested instead in the causal strength only o f smoking, then now 
all that would matter would be the accuracy o f the estimation o f that particular variable 
only, and so by assumption our narrow but accurate first model would score the better. 
Because o f the now narrowed range o f interest, the only part o f the second model that 
would even be relevant would be its estimation o f smoking's causal strength, and from 
the point o f view o f this particular calculation o f approximate truth the model's furnishing
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also o f a causal strength for asbestos would no longer gamer it any credit.
Thus which o f the two models would score best for approximate truth varies, on our 
definition, according to what we are trying to explain. Mere accuracy is not itself 
enough; we need also relevant accuracy. This seems to me a highly desirable feature for 
any definition o f approximate truth. A model may be useful in some contexts but not in 
others. In terms o f our earlier evocation o f vectors in a hypothetical cause-space, we can 
imagine that interest-relativity means that the target 'truth-vector' can now vary. As it 
were, even though there exists only one physical world, still our definition is able to give 
due accommodation to the stupendous variety o f human scientific investigations o f it.
A corollary o f this is that it is possible for many different models o f the same event each 
to score highly for approximate truth -  with respect to different focuses o f interest. The 
decision to drop the Hiroshima bomb had many different causes; interest-relativity 
specifies in which particular ones we are interested. Thus a ‘complete’ account o f an 
event, in the sense o f one covering all that event's causal antecedents, is not always 
necessary for achieving a high score for approximate truth; and neither, if  too narrow, is a 
merely accurate account sufficient. (Similarly, a satisfactory causal explanation need not 
necessarily cite the causes behind the immediate causes, the causes behind those ones, 
and so on ad infinitum back to some hypothetical first cause. Rather, interest-relativity 
would specify exactly which bit o f the sequential chain is o f interest, and a good model o f 
this bit o f the chain could then achieve a high score without any need to produce a first 
cause.)
Interest-relativity and the literature
O f course, in one sense allowance for interest-relativity must presumably be obvious and 
uncontroversial. Nevertheless, I think there is value in highlighting the issue so 
explicitly. It has usually been ignored, although an exception is the characteristically 
thorough Niiniluoto. He essentially agrees with the thrust o f this section, when 
acknowledging that: 'the choice o f the ta rg e t... is not a matter o f logic, but depends on
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our cognitive interests' [Niiniluoto 1998, p i4]. In other words, an element o f interest- 
relativity is unavoidable. (And therefore so is an element o f subjectivity, although like us 
in the next subsection, Niiniluoto is keen to emphasise that once relativised to some 
particular interest a definition o f similarity can still be objective thereafter.)
As noted, I think our treatment o f interest-relativity also does, for any one context, just 
the job that Popper originally earmarked generally for comprehensiveness. A general 
theory is useful only if  it has wide range as well as accuracy, which was o f course 
Popper's starting point. But for any specific context (which was not Popper's focus), this 
just boils down to saying that the general theory is useful if  its range happens to include 
what we are interested in here and now. As it were, general range is irrelevant, what 
matters in any particular case is only whether that range covers that case. The gain from 
incorporating Popper's notion o f content boils down to exactly the same gain we achieve 
from our incorporation o f interest-relativity -  namely, that a theory or model does indeed 
cover the particular factors o f interest to us. Throughout, our whole approach to 
approximate truth has concentrated on Popper's accuracy rather than comprehensiveness. 
In a sense, the motivation for including Popper's comprehensiveness at all has now been 
satisfied instead by our incorporation here o f interest-relativity. As it were, once -  but 
only once -  we have specified the question, we are left free to focus purely on accuracy.
Finally, is it perhaps a mistake to try to analyse at all something so seemingly vague and 
subjective as interest-relativity? Yet similar difficulties have not stopped other 
philosophers profitably analysing, for instance, subjective degrees o f  belief. A t heart, our 
scheme is conceptual, and I do not see a problem with conceiving o f some specification 
o f relevant causal strengths as being the reflection o f our subjective interest. Moreover, 
in many cases that focus o f interest may be pretty uncontroversial. (Vagueness is 
separately discussed in more detail in section 2-11.) Consequently, although I accept that 
approximate truth is indeed inextricably bound up with interest-relativity, I do not see any 
necessity to abandon ambitions for a general definition o f it just on this account -  
contrary to the pessimism o f several authors, for instance [Smith 1998] and [Psillos 
1999].
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Divergence between theory  and  consequences
One particular conundrum is highly troublesome for most o f the mainstream literature, 
and turns out to be relevant now. This is the fact that sometimes the consequences o f an 
approximately true theory may not themselves necessarily be approximately true. For 
example, the 'butterfly effect' in dynamical systems means that a very good 
approximation o f  the underlying theoretical equations may yield predictions that quickly 
become very bad approximations o f the actual outcomes, even assuming perfect 
knowledge o f the initial conditions. As Miller points out, if  it is these outcomes that we 
are interested in, then approximately true knowledge o f the theoretical generating 
equations no longer seems particularly desirable or important [Miller 1994, pp 198-202]. 
That is, there seems to be a divergence between achieving approximate truth with respect 
to one part o f the problem and achieving it with respect to another part. Should we put 
more weight on the underlying equations or the final predictions?
While any approach emphasising the approximate truth o f general theories has no real 
solution to this dilemma, I think that our treatment o f interest-relativity does provide one 
for us. The key is that we have only even defined approximate truth with respect to 
particular outcomes, not with respect to general theories. Thus in this example, we need 
feel no obligation to pronounce on the 'overall' success o f some theory that got the 
equations almost right but the outcomes wildly wrong. Rather, we would first specify 
whether we were interested primarily in the equations or in the outcomes, or -  
alternatively put -  in which particular outcomes. (See also our discussion o f  [Smith 
1998] in section 1-6, and our discussion o f time in section 2-11 below.) Thus there is no 
paradox whereby it seems that the same theory must be adjudged simultaneously both 
approximately true and not approximately true. Rather, it may be adjudged 
approximately true with respect to some focuses o f interest but not with respect to others. 
By definition, there is no general calculation to be made. (The point that a single theory 
is likely to be more accurate in some o f its descriptions than in others, recalls our original 
interest (section 1-1) in making sense o f the variable usefulness o f economic theories.)
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2-10) Subjective and objective
We have seen that, although the choice o f which causal strengths are relevant is 
inevitably subjective, once we have specified them they are then determined objectively. 
Nevertheless, this does still leave a subjective element in our definition. Should we be 
alarmed? No - 1 think that this amount o f subjectivity is unavoidable anyway, and that 
we are better o ff for analysing it explicitly.
One worry might be that this could boil down to ‘all models are OK once some 
sufficiently sympathetic specification o f relevant causal strengths has been found for 
them’. But some models may not be giving an accurate description o f any causal 
strengths. And in practice, often rival models do agree on what the target causal 
strengths are, merely disagreeing as to their evaluations o f them.
Take our Hiroshima example again, agreeing to focus now on what motivated the 
decision to use the bomb rather than more conventional military means. This is actually a 
lively historical controversy, with several competing theories as to what was the main 
cause o f the US action. Thus it is argued that America wanted to avoid the need for a 
bloody invasion o f  mainland Japan, and so dropping the bomb on balance actually saved 
lives. Or maybe merely saved American servicemen’s lives. Alternatively, perhaps 
America wanted to end the war quickly in order to pre-empt further Soviet territorial 
advance in Manchuria. Or it may have wanted to intimidate other governments in 
advance o f negotiations for a post-war settlement. Although all o f these motives might 
have been present, clearly not all could simultaneously be the main one. The key point is 
that the controversy concerns the relative strengths o f these causes; no one disputes that 
they are indeed the causes that are relevant. As it were, the controversy is over which
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model most accurately captures the relevant part o f  the causal web, not over what that 
relevant part o f the web is in the first place. But the subjective element only concerns 
this latter aspect. The former aspect -  the actual focus o f debate -  is presumably 
determined objectively by the actual state o f the world (at that point in time). 
Accordingly, in all important respects the determination o f our scores for approximate 
truth is satisfactorily objective.
Perhaps surprisingly, we can enlist Popper himself as a supporter o f  roughly this point. 
Miller reports Popper's opinion that: 'We can relativize any theory, in a perfectly 
objective manner, to its historical setting, and thus we may be able to construct an 
objective ... mode o f comparison o f two theories' [Miller 1975, p i 86]. (In this way, 
Popper speculated, we might after all be able to overcome Miller's objection, by making 
our judgments o f approximate truth relative only to the parameters o f the particular 
problem a theory was designed to solve. But as Miller quickly argues, when it comes to 
evaluating whole theories, it is unclear why we should in this way conveniently focus our 
attention exclusively on some rather than other problems. An obvious response in turn to 
Miller's point is to analyse approximate truth not at the level o f general theories, but 
rather -  like our own scheme -  at that of context-specific models.)
When scientific debate really does centre around which causal strengths we should be 
trying to capture in the first place, then it means that the subjective element has become 
important in the actual science itself. Suppose for instance that our question is: ‘was the 
aristocracy a good influence on eighteenth century English society?’ One answer might 
be ‘yes, it helped preserve social order without which society could not have functioned’. 
A second might be ‘no, it protected its own and repressed the rest’. Now here the first 
modeller understands by ‘good influence’ one particular phenomenon, namely 
preservation o f social stability. The second modeller understands by ‘good influence’ a 
quite different thing, namely ensuring social opportunity for all. Consequently it is 
possible that both modellers do indeed describe causal strengths correctly -  but different 
causal strengths. In that case, the controversy is not then about accuracy o f description 
but rather about agreeing what the problem is in the first place. In effect the two
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modellers have specified different causal strengths as being the relevant ones, and the 
disagreement now really lies in that initial choice rather than in the subsequent historical 
analysis. So this would be an instance o f the subjective element indeed causing trouble, 
but the point now is that that trouble would be stemming from the science itself rather 
than from our way o f defining approximate truth. Indeed, it is surely to the credit o f our 
scheme if  it captures this prior confusion by considering subjective aspects explicitly.
Some element o f subjectivity is unavoidable, so it is not a question o f trying misguidedly 
to squeeze all subjectivity out o f our definition o f approximate truth. Rather it is (or 
should be) a question o f trying to incorporate it in the best possible way. When the 
subjective aspect is unimportant in a controversy our ranking o f models by approximate 
truth turns only on objective factors, but when the subjective aspect is dominating the 
actual science then it also dominates our scheme in its turn. We only reflect 
proportionately the significance o f subjectivity in the underlying science itself. No extra 
subjectivity is being unduly imported -  and none unduly denied either.
2-11) Other discussions
Vagueness
In this subsection we are concerned with vagueness -  not lack -  o f reference. That is, we 
are concerned with the case where it is not clear to which ontological entity a scientist is 
referring, rather than the case where the scientist is referring to nothing at all. Thus 'the 
Establishment' might be a vague reference but does seem to exist in some way, whereas 
'phlogiston' presumably simply does not exist all and so does not have any reference.
The latter case is not considered until the following sections.
Although descriptive vagueness is common in natural-language descriptions o f the world
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and hence in large parts (perhaps most) o f science, still this need not mean that all such 
science is useless. On the contrary, the cost o f vagueness may very often (perhaps 
usually) be small enough still to permit sufficient clarity for the purpose at hand. Useful 
science is still possible despite ontologically imprecise description; as it were, even 
without his glasses a short-sighted man can still see something.
The important point is that where our terms are sufficiently precise for useful science, so 
they will be sufficiently precise to license judgments o f approximate truth. This is 
because under our scheme the latter depend only on obtaining sufficiently precise values 
for causal strengths, which in turn should in general presumably be neither more nor less 
reliable than the rest o f science. Any vague term has more than one possible reference, 
and so in the terms o f our hypothetical vector space o f causes this would presumably cash 
out as meaning we needed to consider more than one possible target point and model 
point. But if  all such target-model pairs generate high similarity scores in one real-world 
case, for instance, and only low scores in another, then despite the vagueness we would 
still be justified in claiming that a greater degree o f approximate truth had been achieved 
in that first case.
It is also evident that the impact o f a term's vagueness on our ability to furnish 
authoritative scores for approximate truth will vary by context. For example, the term 
‘red’ clearly refers at best to a range o f the colour spectrum rather than to any specific 
point on it. This vagueness will sometimes matter and sometimes not. Thus the exact 
frequency o f the red supposed to have been invoked may be significant if  discussing the 
manufacture o f a laser, but insignificant if  describing a traffic light. Similar remarks 
apply to other pernickety cases -  was the object really exactly 5cm long or in fact merely 
somewhere in the range between 4.9 and 5.1 cm? Was it really exactly circular? And so 
on. The fact that the cost o f vagueness varies by context in this way also provides 
another reason why approximate truth is best worked out context-specifically.
O f course, the issue o f  vagueness has long been addressed by logicians, for instance 
partly inspiring Zadeh's apparatus o f fuzzy logic, but unfortunately this work does not
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seem to help us here particularly. There still appears to be some variation o f opinion on 
the best way to proceed. An obvious initial possibility is simply to introduce a scheme of 
multi-valued logic, that is to say to allow new truth values in addition to True and False, 
perhaps a third one 'Indeterminate' for instance, or perhaps an infinity o f new values on 
some continuum between True and False. But none o f this is easily applied to the 
approximate truth o f theories or models in science, or to the concerns o f section 1-3 for 
instance. (It is also unclear that we should wish to rule out, like fuzzy logic does, the 
possibility o f a model's distance from the truth being exactly zero.)
A big problem for any new logics, such as fuzzy logic, incorporating such ideas is that 
standard operations will no longer preserve truth values. One response, the so-called 
'super-truth' approach, is to say that for any vague predicate there exists a number o f 
possible 'precisifications' [Fine 1975], or clarifications. Each o f these individual 
precisifications is itself true or false. Roughly speaking, we then pronounce a vague 
sentence true if  and only if  it is true for all o f these ways o f making it completely precise, 
otherwise we pronounce it false. The precisifications themselves are taken as primitives. 
But notwithstanding its logical merits, for our purposes such an approach does not help 
much (nor o f course was it particularly designed to). The concentration on whether any 
particular vague statement should be classified as true or false is too crudely put for our 
concerns -  as it were, we are more interested instead in tracing degrees o f  approximate 
truth within the 'false' category. Similar remarks apply to other work within this literature 
too.
Time
Some problems will explicitly incorporate time as an important factor. Yet our scheme 
consists essentially o f comparing two (weighted) static snapshots o f  the world for 
similarity, which would seem to make incorporation o f time difficult. The solution may 
be to treat time in the same way as we have throughout already implicitly been treating 
space. Thus, for instance, the sun's gravity has a much stronger causal influence on Earth 
than that o f another star, simply because the sun is closer. The causal strength assigned
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to the sun's gravity is therefore correspondingly more, and by this means we have 
implicitly incorporated spatial distance. If temporal separation is a causal variable, we 
can incorporate that similarly. For example, the causal strength o f a snowfall with 
respect to disrupting traffic might be very high initially, but as time passes become less 
and less as the snow melts away. Thus the value o f this causal strength in effect 
incorporates the passage o f time automatically.
It might seem that the following kind o f case would present a problem for this strategy 
though: suppose we have two dynamic theories that postulate particular trajectories 
through time for some variable. Presumably there is some true trajectory for this 
variable. How would our scheme enable us to compare for similarity the postulated 
trajectories with the true trajectory? ([Smith 1998] is motivated by exactly this kind of 
example.) The answer is that it would not, but also that it need not. Recall our 
discussion (section 2-9) o f a similar example, and in particular o f the case when a theory 
is almost correct with respect to the underlying mathematical equations but is very wrong 
with respect to the actual outcome later on. Such a theory will have many different 
values for approximate truth, depending on exactly when we measure it. To attempt 
some 'general' evaluation o f approximate truth would be to attempt the mistake o f 
evaluating general theories rather than context-specific models. Here, by 'model' we 
mean postulated values for the variables at any particular time. Thus we would not 
compare for similarity trajectories as a whole; rather, we would only compare for 
similarity the values ascribed to the variable by those trajectories at any particular 
moment. In this way, and interpreting or re-expressing the variable at hand as a causal 
strength, our definition o f approximate truth could proceed unproblematically.
O m itted causes
Frequently, it will be the case that a model ignores some o f the causes that are in fact 
pertinent, indeed we have seen this in several o f our examples already. Often, it will be 
natural in such cases to assume that the model assigns a weighting o f zero to the causes it 
ignores. For instance, our Earth-model ignored the gravity from the mountain, which
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amounts to it having assigned zero causal strength to the mountain’s gravity.
But sometimes it will be better to assume that the model is implicitly assigning a non­
zero strength to ignored causes. For example, a model o f the flow o f a glacier may 
implicitly assume some constant ‘normal’ air temperature, ignoring small variations.
This hardly assumes ‘zero’ influence from air temperature, since the influence o f the 
temperature on the mechanics o f the glacier would be very different at -273  °C than at 
5°C, or 200 °C. In general, typically any model is likely to be carrying plenty o f implicit 
background assumptions concerning ambient temperature and pressure, strength o f 
gravitational and electrical fields, and so on. All these are likely to correspond to non­
zero weightings on particular causes. More generally, any model typically assigns its 
ignored causes some implicit functional form. A famous example is the assumption by 
pre-relativistic cosmology that space-time possessed a Euclidean geometry. (The point 
resembles our need when defining a cause's strength to set a 'neutral level' not always 
equal to zero -  section 3-2.)
In practice, what matters o f course is whether the omitted cause is salient to the problem 
at hand, or -  to use our terminology -  whether the omitted cause had a high causal 
strength. Obviously, models are usually designed to capture precisely w hat seem to be 
the most salient features o f a problem. Perhaps a more common difficulty is the 
systematic blind spots, so to speak, that a general theoretical approach might suffer from. 
In particular, because the implicit functional form assigned to the omitted cause will not 
have been explicitly considered it is likely in such cases to be unresponsive to new data, 
making the cost o f the omitted cause likely to rise as the theory is applied to new areas. 
For example, Newtonian theory ignores relativistic effects. For many problems this does 
not matter significantly, and neither does the exact form o f the implied error. But it does 
carry the latent weakness that Newtonian theory itself gives us no way o f knowing in 
advance in which problems those ignored causes will become significant after all. So in 
the case of, for instance, the precession o f  the perihelion o f Mercury’s orbit, Newtonian 
theory gave us no way o f adjusting our assumptions appropriately.
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In plainer language, this is the familiar observation that models often go wrong when 
applied to new domains because in these new domains the important factors may turn out 
to be just the ones that the old model has not catered for. This point is particularly 
pertinent to some arguably overambitious applications o f economic theory, which was 
one o f my original motivations for starting this thesis (section 1-1). The important thing 
here is that our scheme for approximate truth caters for this, and via its system o f context- 
specific weighting functions does so to precisely the appropriate extent.
2-12) When ontologies differ
When does it matter?
We have emphasised how in practice most scientific disputes do not concern choice of 
ontology or vocabulary. However, occasionally they do, and in any case the issue has 
been a major focus o f past philosophical interest. So even though it may be of, as it were, 
only second-order importance methodologically, still the topic needs to be addressed. 
Note that, to my knowledge, no previous work in the literature has discussed this issue 
from the same angle as shall we. As a result, I believe the next three sections to be 
original, in that it is impossible to know just what previous opinion would have made o f 
some o f the following examples and questions.
The first thing to note is that our own definition assumes prior agreement with regard to 
both ontology and vocabulary. If  there is no such agreement, therefore, then our 
definition is not directly applicable. Moreover, it in fact seems to need to assume 
something stronger than that: not only must the ontology and vocabulary be agreed on, 
but they must pick out real causes in the world, that is they must be true. For example, 
suppose two competing models talk about the causal strengths o f phlogiston or o f 
dragons. The problem is that our definition requires us to compare those causal strengths
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with the true causal strengths but that it is hard to make sense o f the latter here. What 
could be the true causal strengths o f fictional entities like phlogiston and dragons?
The conditions for our definition to be applicable would therefore seem to be onerous 
indeed -  we need prior agreement not only on both ontology and vocabulary, but also on 
a true ontology and vocabulary. Fortunately, however, in practice these conditions can 
be considerably softened. Take vocabulary first. Clearly, to insist on prior agreement on 
literally the same vocabulary would be unreasonable. Suppose one model talks about the 
forces on the 'rock', a second the forces on the 'boulder', a third the forces on the 
'obstruction' and a fourth the forces on the 'target'. In context, it may be clear that these 
all refer to the same physical object. In the example from section 2-6, for instance, we 
talked about 'the Sundarbans' and 'the forest' similarly equivalently. All that is needed is 
sameness o f reference. Moreover, if  reference is not identical it its true we lay ourselves 
open to potential Miller-type problems, still in practice usually no such problems will 
actually arise even then. For instance, suppose one commentator speaks o f'the  allies' 
advance in Iraq' and another o f'the  Americans' advance in Iraq'. These two phrases do 
not have (exactly) the same reference. The causes they pick out will therefore likely have 
slightly different strengths. Suppose the claim was made that the allies' advance caused 
the Iraqis to flee more than did the hot weather. This claim will likely be equally as true 
(or false) as the same claim with respect to the advance o f the Americans rather than the 
allies. The causal strengths o f either will be similar here, and in particular much greater 
than the causal strength o f  the hot weather. Essentially, in practice what matters when 
assessing approximate truth is the size o f a causal strength, and if  small differences in 
reference lead only to small differences in causal strength then many qualitative 
judgments o f approximate truth will be correspondingly unaffected. And recall (section
2-7), we should not in any case over-interpret the exact quantitative scores for 
approximate truth that our definition delivers.
Remarks similar in spirit can be made regarding ontology. Suppose one model says that 
kicking a football moves it further than does throwing it, while a second model claims the 
opposite. Each model will assign some causal strength to each o f the factors, and we can
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compare them to the true causal strengths (for some particular context) to see which 
model is (more nearly) right, i.e. to see which is more approximately true. This is a 
perfectly mundane example, and exactly the kind we would want our definition o f 
approximate truth to be applicable to. But look a little more closely and we would likely 
see (very often) that our models were Newtonian and hence arguably, in the light o f 
relativity theory, in fact ontologically mistaken due to their assumptions o f constant 
masses, Euclidean absolute space and so forth. Are we therefore disallowed from 
speaking o f the 'true causal strengths' for kicking and throwing here? Strictly speaking, 
perhaps yes indeed we are. When we speak o f a kick in Newtonian terms, we may need 
to 'interpret' this as being a particular cause in the terms o f some true ontology. The point 
here is that the objective authority o f the true causal strengths we assign to the Newtonian 
causes will be entirely a function o f how much objective authority we accord to the 
'interpretation' between the true causal ontology and the erroneous Newtonian one.
In the particular case o f kicking footballs, it seems that we normally do look upon such 
interpretations favourably. It follows that, in practice, our definition does not demand 
absolutely the right ontology in order to be able to proceed. Rather, what is required is a 
sufficiently correct ontology (and vocabulary) for 'true causal strengths' to be ascribed 
with sufficient objective authority. In particular, what is required is that actual scientific 
disputes do not concern what the true causes are or whether true strengths for them exist, 
but rather agree (positively) on those things and concern instead whether or not a model 
has got an accurate estimate o f  these strengths. So long as this condition holds, then so 
long is our definition o f approximate truth applicable. Fortunately, as already argued at 
length, in practice this condition nearly always does hold. In sections 2-13 and 2-14 we 
shall discuss in more detail the tangled issue o f what might govern just when such inter- 
ontological 'translations' are or are not admissible. (From now on, we shall use the word 
'translation' even though what we have in mind is sameness o f  reference rather than the 
more usual sameness o f meaning.) In particular, the issue can appear more fraught in the 
unusual cases when two models differ in their ontological commitments.
Note that this is an issue implicitly facing all suggested definitions o f  approximate truth,
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not just our one. Measures o f logical distance such as Niiniluoto's and Oddie's, for 
instance, assume from the beginning that the truth can be represented in the particular 
language concerned, or else concede that their verisimilitude measures are relativised just 
to that language's version o f the truth. How to understand the approximate truth o f a 
theory expressed in a different language (or ontology) to the truth itself, or how to 
compare two theories o f different ontologies, are nowhere addressed satisfactorily. 
Similar remarks apply to all other previous approaches too.
The four cases
So far, we have seen that our own definition can apply smoothly when there are no 
controversies over ontology or vocabulary, but that otherwise the situation becomes more 
complicated, dependent on whether or not translation is deemed acceptable. Recall now 
our original notions o f OAT and EAT. Perhaps they can be o f help in these new 
awkward situations when ontological differences between models crop up? It is useful to 
proceed systematically through the full inventory, so to speak, o f possible cases. Along 
the way, this will also prove helpful for elucidating our approach generally.
For each case, we shall consider the task o f comparing for approximate truth two 
different models. Sometimes they will differ ontologically, or empirically, or in their 
vocabularies; sometimes they will not. Let us explore all the possible combinations, 
examining each time the prospects for our own definition and also those for OAT and 
EAT. (A note on the upcoming terminology: by 'ontologically equal' we shall mean here 
that the two competing models cite the same ontology, by 'vocabularies equal' that they 
employ the same vocabulary, and by 'empirically equal' we shall mean that they are 
empirically equivalent with respect to the explanandum variable. The opposite of 'equal' 
here will be denoted by 'separated'.)
Case 1) Ontologically equal and empirically equal.
1-a) Vocabularies equal. Suppose our two models both have the same ontology. If  that 
ontology is the true one then we are in our ideal case and our scheme works as desired. If
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that ontology is not the true one, however, then our scheme can only work if  there is an 
acceptable translation into the true one (as just discussed above). What o f OAT and 
EAT? As noted before, in these circumstances neither will be able to express a 
preference for one model over the other, therefore being forced to declare the two models 
equal. Assuming translation is possible, our scheme is therefore much the best here. As 
repeatedly argued, since such circumstances are much the most common in actual 
science, this result is the main motivation for adopting our scheme.
If  translation were not possible, then none o f OAT, EAT or our scheme could express a 
preference. Other definitions, such as the mainstream logical-similarity and structuralist 
ones, could -  but only if  they were prepared to take seriously the language o f the models. 
This would certainly be formally possible but it is hard to imagine why we should want to 
do this. Remember, two such models would be in an ontology and vocabulary not only 
wrong, but so wrong as to defy translation into anything correct. Perhaps they would be 
referring to dragons and angels to explain some physical phenomenon, one citing two 
dragons and one angel, the other three dragons and four angels. Which o f  these models is 
more approximately true? I do not see it as an important desideratum o f a definition of 
approximate truth that it be able to adjudicate cases such as these.
1-b) Vocabulary separated -  the Miller problem. I f  the two models use different 
vocabularies, then we require translatability between the two. If they each have the same 
ontology, as here, this should always be possible. However, there would still be the 
spectre o f potential Miller-reversals. For instance, in the canonical weather example one 
model might be expressed in the hot-rainy-windy language and the other in the hot- 
minnesotan-arizonan one, while each sharing the same ontology. To compare them for 
approximate truth, we would have either to convert them both into the former language or 
both into the latter one. This choice, Miller shows, can have a decisive influence on our 
approximate truth rankings. In general, therefore, our scheme will only work smoothly if 
the translation between vocabularies does not result in a Miller-reversal. But as we saw 
(chapter 1) this will likely be true in almost all actual cases, given the unintuitive nature 
o f the predicates needed for Miller-reversals. I know o f no case o f a Miller-reversal from
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actual scientific practice. Notwithstanding [Miller 1994]'s claims, in the thought- 
examples that do exhibit Miller-reversals a preference between vocabularies is always 
immediately suggested, and so there are no cases where it actually does seem the most 
appropriate option just to accept that no judgment can be made.
Case 2) Ontologically equal and empirically separated.
2-a) Vocabularies equal -  translation difficulties even for EAT. Once again, our own 
definition will work as desired here, assuming that (in the case o f the ontology being 
false) there exists an acceptable translation into the true ontology. As before, OAT would 
not be able to express a preference; however, now that the two models disagree 
empirically, EAT would.
Note though that the applicability o f EAT is also dependent on an acceptable translation 
being available. In EAT's case, there needs to be an accepted translation o f the parameter 
we wish actually to measure, else there would be no agreement on what the relevant 
empirical observable even is. ([Miller 1994] also makes this point.) It is true that this 
translation requirement is less strenuous than the one on our own scheme, since it 
requires the translatability only o f the final effect whereas in our scheme we require in 
addition the translatability o f the relevant component causes. In cases where translation 
difficulties affect only the causes and not the final effect, this difference could therefore 
become significant. For example, if  one model cites two dragons kicking a ball three 
metres with particular contributions from each, whereas the second model claimed it was 
one dragon and two unicorns kicking it four metres with particular contributions from 
each, EAT would be able to compare the two since (we take it) the distance the ball was 
kicked is a well-defined observable all can agree on. Our definition, on the other hand, 
would struggle since we cannot easily make sense o f the true values for the causal 
strengths o f the dragon and unicorn kicks. Thus, in this circumstance, EAT would be 
able to offer an opinion and our definition would not.
I do not think, though, that this represents an advantage for EAT, and not ju st because 
such cases are presumably rather rare. The deeper point is: would we necessarily even
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want our definition to deliver judgments in such cases? If no translation o f the posited 
causes is available, this means in effect that we consider the models irretrievably 
mistaken, and so any empirical success o f theirs with respect to the final effect we might 
want to put in the 'fluke' category. Accordingly, it should then be considered a weakness 
o f EAT that it rewards such fluke successes, and a virtue o f our scheme that it does not. 
Thus it is a mistake to imagine that EAT, by ignoring underlying causes and focusing 
only on measurement o f  simple observables, will therefore be applicable even in the 
difficult cases where our own scheme is not. Or rather, it could be so only by rewarding 
fluke correlations. In sum, EAT is not really compensated for its inapplicability to cases 
o f empirical equivalence by any desirably greater range elsewhere than that already 
available to our own scheme anyway.
2-b) Vocabularies separated. Again, just as in case 1-b, the extra issue raised now would 
be the possibility o f Miller-reversals, but the same analysis as before applies equally now. 
Note also that, in so far as the Miller issue affected our empirical observable, that 
analysis would apply to EAT too.
Case 3) Ontologically separated and empirically equal.
3-a) Vocabularies equal. It is not clear to me whether two models' vocabularies even can 
be thought the same if  their ontologies are different, in which case this category is empty. 
But I suppose that, literally speaking, classical and relativistic mechanics each share a 
vocabulary o f ‘mass’, ‘acceleration’, ‘angle’ and so on. In which case, refer to the 
analysis in case 3-b below, save with the amendment that we would not now need to 
worry about the Miller problem.
3-b) Vocabularies separated. Our own definition will still be applicable here if  there are 
acceptable translations for both models, both o f their ontologies and their vocabularies.
If  only one model has such acceptable translations, then that one will presumably be 
preferred, on the grounds that the very acceptability o f the translation reflects a 
preference for that model's ontology compared to its rival's -  but it is necessary to warn 
here that the question o f when a translation actually is acceptable becomes considerably
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more complicated when the competing models are ontologically separated (section 2-14), 
although we sidestep that issue for now. If neither model has an acceptable translation, 
then our definition must remain silent. (O f course, if  a model is expressed in a true 
ontology, then it would be automatically suitable and no translation would be required.) 
EAT will clearly be o f  no help in this category, given the empirical equivalence. 
However, OAT may come into its own. In particular, if  one model has the true ontology 
and the other does not, then (and only then, as we saw) OAT can express a preference 
between them. Whether or not this enables it sometimes to pronounce on cases on which 
our own definition remains silent, depends again on the details o f how we analyse 
translatability (section 2-14). On the other hand, if  both models have incorrect 
ontologies, albeit different incorrect ones, then while OAT must now remain silent, our 
own definition will still sometimes be able to express a preference -  again, subject to 
translatability. With respect to the possibility o f  Miller-reversals, similar remarks apply 
as before.
Case 4) Ontologically separated and empirically separated.
4-a) Vocabularies equal. See the comments above for case 3-a, and hence also those 
below for case 4-b.
4-b) Vocabularies separated. The situation will be similar to case 3-b with regard to our 
own definition, to OAT, and to Miller-reversals. The only difference concerns EAT, 
since with empirical separation this now becomes potentially relevant -  provided that we 
can agree on which observable to measure. In other words, EAT requires that the two 
models' final effect variables be translatable into an accepted common currency. As in 
case 2-b, this raises the possibility o f EAT being able to deliver a verdict when our own 
definition (and OAT too) is unable to, but again only in cases where it is doubtful that we 
would want to be able to. Waters are further muddied now by a potential trade-off 
between ontological success and empirical success (section 2-14). Finally, it bears 
repeating again that, as argued in section 2-6, in the great majority o f  scientific disputes 
there is in fact no ontological disagreement between the competing models anyway, so all 
the discussion o f cases 3 and 4 really concerns only rather unusual possibilities.
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In summary:
1) Ontologically equal and empirically equal.
— Our own definition works if  the competing models are in a true ontology already, or if 
there is an acceptable translation into the true ontology.
— Neither EAT nor OAT would be applicable under any circumstances.
2) Ontologically equal and empirically separated.
-- Again, our own definition works if  the competing models are in a true ontology 
already, or if  there is an acceptable translation into the true ontology.
-- Again, OAT is inapplicable.
-- EAT is now applicable, but in effect subject to the same translation constraints as our 
own definition.
3) Ontologically separated and empirically equal.
— Our own definition is again at the mercy o f translatability, although that latter issue 
may now become more complicated.
— OAT may be applicable here sometimes, although whether ever when our own 
definition is not depends on the details o f translatability.
-- EAT definitely will not be applicable.
4) Ontologically separated and empirically separated.
— Our own definition is once again at the mercy o f translatability, with the extra proviso 
that translatability may now become more complicated still.
— OAT again may be applicable here sometimes, although whether ever when our own 
definition is not again depends on the details o f translatability.
— EAT is now applicable, but in effect again subject to the same translation constraints as 
our own definition, save that it is now more complicated whether it is ever usefully 
applicable when our own definition is not.
Thus note: first, we do not often if  at all find that either OAT or EAT offers superior
139
coverage to our own definition. This is particularly noticeable in the cases 1 and 2 that in 
practice account for most real-life examples o f science and scientific dispute, and 
arguably still holds even in the arcane cases 3 and 4 as well. Second, our own scheme's 
applicability depends critically on how we handle the issue o f translation. So also does 
EAT’s, as well as the extent to which OAT and EAT could ever exhibit superior range to 
our definition. Hence we must now turn explicitly to that issue o f translation.
2-13) More on translation I: when is it acceptable?
(Note again that, throughout the next two sections, by 'translation' we shall mean 
sameness o f  reference rather than sameness o f meaning.)
Three conclusions
As noted in the previous section, the critical requirement for our own definition to work 
is that we can make sense o f there being true values for the relevant causal strengths. As 
we saw, even when two models agree on an ontology, often that ontology will 
nevertheless still be incorrect, as for instance with two competing Newtonian models. In 
such cases, it is necessary to interpret (or 'translate') the causes cited by the models into 
true causes that actually exist, in order that their strengths may be assigned true values. 
When is such translation acceptable? Or rather, as we argued, the key question is when 
the issue is sufficiently pressing that scientific argument concerns not what the values of 
the causal strengths are, but rather whether they can even be said to have objective values 
in the first place. In most everyday Newtonian cases such as kicking a ball, it seems that 
translation is indeed deemed acceptable. Accordingly, objective values for the relevant 
causal strengths are assumed to exist, and thus our definition can work smoothly.
1) Context-speciflcity
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This clarifies what translatability means here. What principles, if  any, govern when it 
obtains? To begin with, consider the simplest case, where two competing models agree 
on their ontology. Then the only question is whether that ontology is sufficiently 'correct' 
for a translation to be licensed. In the particular case o f kicking footballs, it seems that 
we normally do view such translations favourably. We typically seem to be willing, that 
is, to accept that a Newtonian force may, in this context, indeed be ascribed an 
objectively true magnitude. Or at least that the translation into a true ontology is 
sufficiently clear and precise that for practical purposes there is 'near enough' a single 
true value.
But is this always true o f Newtonian models? For consider instead if  we were comparing 
instead two different Newtonian models o f some interaction between quarks within the 
atomic nucleus. In this new context, the ontology o f quantum mechanics or quark theory 
-  assuming this to be the correct one -  is now so different from the Newtonian picture 
that it might well seem impossible to furnish any good translation between the two. Thus 
if different Newtonian models assigned different strengths to two quarks 'pushing' a third 
one, it might well seem impossible to translate this into the exotic ontology o f the 
particles’ 'charm', 'spin' and so forth we take now to be the actual ontology. In which 
case, true values for the strengths o f the quarks’ Newtonian 'pushes' might not be 
forthcoming. The first conclusion then is that the acceptability o f an ontology may vary 
by context. Thus it may be (sufficiently) possible to assign true values to Newtonian 
causal strengths in the everyday context o f kicking a ball, even though it may not be so 
possible in the different context o f quark-quark interaction.
2) Empirical not ontological
Two supplementary remarks arise. First, it might seem as if  one o f the reasons 
Newtonian models are particularly favoured, at least in macro-level contexts, is because it 
seems there already exists a ready-made translation into the true ontology. In particular, 
if we assume the true ontology to be relativistic there is a clear sense in which Newtonian 
mechanics comes out as a limiting case if  we let the speed o f light tend to infinity and so 
forth. However, I do not think that such ontological wear-compatibility, so to speak, is
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actually the driving force behind the Newtonian models' acceptability here. Consider 
fluid dynamics, for instance. Suppose water flowing down a pipe is split into two 
channels, one narrow and one wide. Now compare the causal strengths o f what the 
theory would term the 'water pressure' in each channel. It seems to be uncontroversial 
that there would be a true fact o f  the matter as to which was the stronger here. But this is 
despite the fact that models from fluid dynamics all assume that the fluid concerned, i.e. 
water, is a perfect continuum, whereas o f course real water is in fact granular and consists 
o f hard molecules. Thus classical fluid mechanics is a stubbornly false theory (to use the 
terminology o f section 1-3), is not 'near-compatible' with the true ontology (to use the 
terminology o f this paragraph), yet still suffers from no translation problems. It seems 
that this is because the empirical error or uncertainty (with respect to the variables we are 
concerned with) due to its false ontological assumptions is very small. Thus, we reach a 
second conclusion: what determines a false ontology's translatability is whether the error 
or uncertainty (with respect to the particular causal strengths o f interest) due to having 
that false ontology is small empirically. The degree of'ontological error' is irrelevant.
3) Holistic
Our second remark concerns what we might mean by terming an error to be 'small 
empirically', and highlights a holistic aspect. Loosely speaking, when translating here we 
are reconstructing what a false-ontology might 'really mean' in terms o f the true ontology. 
In order to do this, it will typically be helpful to incorporate information -  if  available -  
from contexts other than the one immediately to hand. For instance, it will likely be from 
our knowledge o f many different applications that we confidently translate particular 
Newtonian terms into relativistic equivalents, in order to assign objective causal strengths 
to them. And equating (in some contexts) 'dephlogisticated air' with oxygen will likewise 
likely be from knowledge o f many different instances o f that term's usage. Choosing to 
declare 'dragon' as having no reference in a true ontology will also likely be a similarly 
holistic decision. One might appeal vaguely to Quinean remarks in order to motivate 
doing our best to reconcile all the different theoretical ideas and empirical data when 
determining the reference o f a mistaken ontology. Any translations will emerge from 
such efforts. Can particular false-ontology terms reasonably be translated into particular
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true-ontology ones? This a posteriori judgment we take typically to be holistic in nature 
*- which is our third conclusion.
All three o f these conclusions will now be illustrated in the context o f a thought-example. 
A fourth  conclusion: partia l objectivity
Note that whereas we take the strengths o f true causes to be objective facts o f the 
universe, whether or not some false-ontology cause is translatable into a true-ontology 
one will typically be a much more arguable matter. Nevertheless, I do not think that 
translatability is thereby rendered unacceptably arbitrary. Consider the following 
example: two stereotypically medieval drunkards argue over the cause o f  a tree falling 
down. One assigns the felling primarily to the action o f a malevolent dragon, the other 
primarily to that o f a malevolent unicorn. Which model is the more approximately true? 
Suppose that the actual cause o f the tree falling was a lightning strike. We should likely 
say that neither model is translatable into the relevant true ontology o f low air pressure, 
electrical potentials and so forth, hence that no true causal weightings exist within the 
drunkards' quoted ontology, hence that our scheme cannot judge between the models, and 
hence that approximate truth cannot even be made sense o f in this case. (Neither OAT 
nor EAT could distinguish between the two models either.)
Now suppose that the drunkards found a soothsayer friend, who announced that in fact 
there was a true causal weighting for each o f the dragon and unicorn after all, because the 
gods had revealed it to him in a dream. Suppose that each drunkard was convinced by 
this and accordingly agreed that the causal weightings quoted by the soothsayer were 
indeed the true ones, and so did enable us to compute scores for the approximate truth o f 
each o f their models after all. But just because the two drunkards agree on this, it does 
not follow that we have to. Rather, we are free to find the authority o f  a soothsayer's 
dream somewhat insufficient.
Next imagine a further twist to the story. Suppose that in the mythology o f the two
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drunkards’ village, thunderstorms were attributed to angry dragons breathing down 
lightning strikes, while damage caused by unknown large animals was attributed to angry 
unicorns righting some ancient wrong. Suppose further that, notwithstanding the 
supernatural elements to these beliefs, much practical knowledge and behaviour was 
expressed in the same terms, for example that being exposed on the top o f a hill although 
normally safe was likely to provoke the breath o f a dragon when it was angry and so 
should be avoided at those times. Would it not be natural to interpret this to be advice 
that exposure on a hill during a thunderstorm leaves one vulnerable to being struck by 
lightning? And would not such advice reflect some genuine knowledge o f the world?
Suppose now that we wished, like our drunkards, to know the cause o f some tree falling 
down. If  we saw that it had been sliced down the middle this would be evidence 
favouring a struck-by-lightning hypothesis, whereas if  it had been lifted from its roots 
this would favour an uprooted-by-animal hypothesis. I f  the soothsayer reported that, 
having seen the tree sliced down the middle, he had 'heard from the gods' that the tree 
was felled by an angry dragon rather than unicom, this might be yet further supportive 
evidence for the following conclusion: that, in this particular context, it is acceptable to 
translate the first drunkard's dragon model to be that the tree was felled by lightning, and 
the second drunkard's unicom model to be that it was felled by (real) animals. 
Accordingly, assuming the lightning-animal ontology indeed to be a true one, we could 
now after all assign true weights to each o f the dragon and unicom models, and therefore 
could now after all meaningfully compare them for approximate truth.
This example illustrates several points. First, whether or not models actually are working 
with the true ontology is presumably an objective matter -  we take it that dragons and 
unicorns do not exist. Second, whether or not the researchers themselves realise that their 
models have the right or wrong ontology is irrelevant to the definition o f  those models' 
approximate truths; what matters is whether the ontology is indeed sufficiently correct to 
be translatable. Third, for this reason the researchers may not themselves know whether 
their models are or are not translatable. Fourth (and this is our fourth conclusion 
generally in this section), whether or not models are translatable is at least partly
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objective. The elements in the last part o f the story that persuaded us the models might 
after all be translatable were neither arbitrary nor purely subjective. And it is these 
elements that decide the matter. Thus, in the earlier absence o f them, even though the 
drunkards themselves were happy to accept the values for the causal strengths offered by 
the soothsayer, we felt licensed to reject translatability on objective grounds.
The example also illustrates nicely our three earlier conclusions too. First, that the 
assessment o f translatability is holistic: the ontology o f the drunkards' models seemed, in 
isolation, clearly too fantastic to permit translatability. It was only in the light o f the 
wider usages we then postulated for the terms 'dragon' and 'unicom' that their possible 
reference to a true ontology became sufficiently established. Second, context- 
dependence: although clearly a lightning strike is not the same thing as a dragon 
breathing fire, this ontological error is not important in the particular context o f deciding 
between the two possible causes o f the tree falling. For instance, if  we were designing 
protective measures for the tree, with both the dragon and lightning ontologies we would 
correctly perceive that a protective fence around the tree ('to guard against unicorns') 
would be ineffective. But in other contexts the ontological error might become more 
important. For instance, an anti-dragon amulet would be a rather less effective protective 
measure for the tree than a lightning rod, but these two new causal strengths the old 
dragon ontology would presumably get seriously wrong, meaning that the choice between 
the two ontologies would have become significant again. Third, note once more that the 
reason it would have become significant is because o f the large empirical difference 
between the relevant causal strengths o f  the amulet and lightning rod. That is, the 
ontological error now leads to a seriously incorrect empirical reading for the causal 
strength o f the amulet 'protective measure', and it is this empirical fact that leads to 
translatability being denied.
Causal invariances
Loosely speaking, we feel licensed to infer translatability ju st when there seems to be 
some implicit reference by a false ontology to entities in a true ontology, enough to
145
enable us to assign -  sufficiently non-arbitrarily -  objective causal strengths to the 
entities o f the false ontology. It seems that such inference depends on capturing a certain 
kind o f empirical regularity. For instance, in our medieval drunkard example we 
postulated that the use of'dragon' (in particular contexts) tracked the real-ontology entity 
o f lightning. Thus 'dragon' was invoked whenever there were bright flashes in the sky 
during thunderstorms, evidence o f trees split down the middle, and so on, but was not 
invoked (in these contexts) otherwise. In this sense, the term matched certain empirical 
regularities we associate with lightning, hence justifying the translation here.
It is also possible, indeed convenient, to state this point in terms o f causal invariances. 
Thus, the argument might go: all else being kept equal, the cause 'dragon' invariantly 
makes certain effects more likely, and if  those effects match (sufficiently) those that 
lightning invariantly make more likely, then we are justified (in this context) in our 
translation of'dragon' as lightning. This then is perhaps the key to defining 
translatability. Although there are pragmatic qualifiers to it ('sufficiently' and 'in this 
context'), nevertheless I do not think the criterion is hopelessly arbitrary or subjective. 
And although the adjudication o f borderline cases may o f course be left disputable, in 
practice it may often be relatively uncontroversial whether or not a particular translation 
is acceptable.
Much, perhaps most, old science worked with incorrect ontologies, for instance 
Newtonian physics and phlogiston chemistry. With our translatability criterion in mind, 
we can specify more clearly now just when disputes conducted in the terms o f these false 
ontologies can and cannot be meaningfully analysed for approximate truth. In the case o f 
our medieval drunkards, the dragon and unicom ontology seemed too fantastical to allow 
any such judgments until it turned out that (in certain contexts) they did match up 
(sufficiently) onto the invariances associated with real causal entities such as lightning 
and animals, at which point an approximate truth analysis did become possible after all. 
And we saw that Newtonian models were similarly acceptable for translation, except in 
contexts (for instance nuclear physics) where the Newtonian causal entities no longer 
matched up sufficiently well with the invariances associated with any o f  the relevant
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causal entities from the real ontology.
As a final illustration, consider a hypothetical case from phlogiston chemistry. The 
ontology involved is now known to be incorrect, o f course. Nevertheless, rather in the 
manner o f Newtonian models, sometimes it can still seem sensible to speak o f one model 
being more approximately true than another. Suppose we were concerned with 
producing water, and a first model cites a particular causal strength for a particular 
quantity of'flam m able air' (i.e. what we would now call hydrogen) in the presence o f a 
particular quantity o f 'dephlogisticated air' (i.e. oxygen). The second model cites a 
different causal strength. Say the first model implies that to synthesise water two parts 
flammable to one part dephlogisticated air is required (i.e. H2O as it were), and the 
second model implies instead a ratio o f one-to-one. Can our definition say which model 
is more approximately true? If  we can make sense o f what the true causal strength o f the 
'flammable air' is here, then yes we can. In our terms, the acceptability o f the suggested 
translations is established by holistic consideration o f which real-ontology causal 
invariances the phlogiston terms seem to track, and in particular whether (in this context) 
this match is sufficiently close. Here, even though the ontology o f  phlogiston chemistry 
is known to be wrong, still sometimes there seems to be a sufficiently clear interpretation 
o f its terms into modem vocabulary that we can legitimately prefer one phlogiston model 
to another -  in particular, prefer the two-to-one over the one-to-one model. O f course, it 
may be that in other examples the phlogiston models have no such easy interpretation. 
The acceptability o f such interpretations will vary context by context. Still, I think there 
will be some occasions where disagreements between phlogiston-era scientists are 
scientifically meaningful rather than merely ontologically confused, and this will be so 
just in those cases where the models involved are translatable.
[Aronson, Harre and Way 1994] state that a theory's ontological adequacy can be 
determined by the ability it affords us to manipulate individuals o f the kinds that it treats. 
That is, if  it posits certain entities that we can then manipulate by intervention, this is 
evidence for those entities’ existence. I take this point to be similar to our one here 
concerning causal interventions -  namely, that a causal strength is (sufficiently) well-
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established if  and only if  it licenses an associated causal intervention, and hence that a 
successful such intervention confirms the existence o f the causal strength.
Summary
We have concluded that translation is acceptable if  and only if  the causal terms o f the 
false ontology track sufficiently well invariances associated with causes from a real 
ontology. This criterion incorporates our four earlier conclusions about translatability:
1) The acceptability o f a false ontology will vary by context. Thus the terms from the 
false ontology will in general match the invariances associated with particular real- 
ontology causes only in some but not other contexts.
2) What governs a false ontology's translatability is that the error or uncertainty (with 
respect to the particular causal strengths o f  interest) due to having the wrong ontology is 
small empirically. The match with invariances is defined with respect to the quantity o f 
effect, which is an empirical entity. The intuitive closeness or otherwise o f the false 
ontology to any real one is irrelevant. For instance, dragons are presumably far removed 
ontologically from reality; nevertheless, if  they track empirical invariances associated 
with lightning, still they may be good candidates for translatability.
3) Judgments o f translatability are holistic. Thus (in practice) we cannot assess well 
whether a particular invariance has been satisfactorily captured except by examining a 
plurality o f instances. Note though that these instances must o f course be relevant, that is 
must concern the same effects in the same or (sufficiently) similar context -  this follows 
from point 1 above. So to that degree the holism is circumscribed.
4) Whether or not models are translatable is at least partly objective. Thus when we 
speak o f an invariance being captured 'sufficiently', although this is partly a pragmatic 
decision, clearly it is also informed by objective factors.
There is no denying that the whole issue o f translatability seems to be unattractively 
messy, but the discussion o f this section has aimed to show that it can nonetheless still be 
analysed with profit. More importantly, the issue is anyway unavoidable. In particular, 
even though it may seem unattractively messy, translatability is necessary for
148
underpinning clearly useful notions such as deeming one Newtonian model more 
approximately true than another. Therefore a hardline anti-translation approach would 
seem unreasonably strict. For instance, we can generate and calibrate useful Newtonian 
interventions, so to rule those out just because Newtonian ontology is incorrect seems 
unnecessarily restrictive. True, the causal strengths assigned to Newtonian causes can 
only ever be as precise as the associated translation, but as remarked repeatedly, this may 
be plenty precise enough for all practical purposes. To insist on a perfectly objective and 
perfectly precise score for approximate truth for such models, would seem just to be 
making philosophy irrelevant to scientific practice. My position is that we should, even 
at the expense o f some conceptual complexity if necessary, seek if  possible to give a 
rigorous account that is relevant to actual science, and in particular relevant to actual 
judgments o f approximate truth.
2-14) More on translation II: further discussions
When two models’ ontologies differ: degrees of translatability
The previous section was concerned exclusively with cases where the competing models, 
although framed in a false ontology, still were framed in the same false ontology. What 
now if  the two competing models are framed in differing ontologies? The issue o f 
translatability will still be relevant, since we shall be interested here in cases where at 
least one o f the models has an ontology that is false. Can we just use the same analysis of 
translatability as in the previous section? We shall indeed again make use o f  the notion 
o f a false ontology sometimes capturing invariances o f real causes, but it turns out that 
now the issue is subject to some fresh twists. In particular, the biggest flaw in our 
previous treatment o f translatability has been interpreting it as an all-or-nothing thing, 
with no concept o f  degrees o f  translatability.
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Suppose that, as in our first presentation o f it, the Ptolemaic model performs empirically 
better than the Newtonian one. If the Newtonian model is deemed translatable and the 
Ptolemaic one not, then our definition would unambiguously prefer the Newtonian 
model. If  both were deemed translatable, then it would likely prefer the Ptolemaic one. 
Problems would arise only once we started to think that the Newtonian model was to 
some degree preferable ontologically to the Ptolemaic one, perhaps as it were that the 
Ptolemaic model was only 'half-translatable' but the Newtonian one fully so. In such a 
case, we would seem to be forced to make a trade-off between the ontological and 
empirical aspects o f approximate truth -  the Newtonian model would be to some degree 
preferable ontologically, the Ptolemaic one to some degree preferable empirically.
Perhaps this point can be sharpened if  we imagine comparing a Newtonian model now 
with a relativistic one, and stipulating that the Newtonian one was empirically superior.
In other words, now we are comparing for approximate truth one model with a false 
ontology against one with a true one. If  we deem the Newtonian model fully translatable, 
then in this example our definition would prefer it. But it seems to me that this is likely 
to seem intuitively unacceptable if the empirical difference between the two models is 
very small. For instance, suppose the two differed in their prediction only in the 
eighteenth decimal place -  in that case, the relativistic model's empirical deficit, so to 
speak, would seem negligible, and certainly less than the benefit that should accrue from 
its ontological superiority. (This horn o f the dilemma might be made sharper still if  we 
substituted for the Newtonian model a Ptolemaic one that we had deemed translatable.) 
On the other hand, suppose that the Newtonian model was empirically accurate whereas 
the relativistic model was empirically hopelessly wrong -  that the Newtonian one could 
(say) successfully land a spacecraft on the moon, whereas the relativistic one could not 
even get it o ff planet Earth. In such a case, there would be a strong intuition that the 
Newtonian model had captured more o f how the universe actually is, that is was more 
approximately true, notwithstanding its ontological inferiority. In other words, neither 
'extreme' solution is satisfactory (as we noted in our original discussion o f  OAT and 
EAT) -  both the ontological and empirical aspects o f approximate truth matter, and 
neither can be ignored completely. It does not seem that either the relativistic or the
150
Newtonian model should always be preferred. Rather, it would all depend on the extent 
o f the Newtonian model’s empirical superiority, compared to the extent o f the relativistic 
model’s ontological superiority. A trade-off is unavoidable. It follows that our intuitions 
about approximate truth do implicitly support working in terms o f degrees of 
translatability, as this seems to be the only way (within our framework) o f licensing that 
trade-off between ontological and empirical success. (The ontological half o f these trade­
offs would presumably be dictated by much the same criteria as dictated our 
translatability before, save now rephrased appropriately -  thus, 'the degree to which a 
model’s ontology captures real causal invariances', and so forth.)
H ave we moved beyond sim ple EAT and intuition?
It may be worth returning to the question o f whether our own definition even actually 
adds much to a simple EAT one. Recall first our arguments from section 2-9 on this 
matter: namely that, in order to sort out correct from incorrect explanations we must 
examine the value not just o f the final explanandum variable (which is all EAT would 
consider) -  since this is bound to be the same for all explanations good and bad -  but also 
those o f the cited component causes. This method also enables us to rule out fluke 
correlations too.
Now, our discussion o f translatability here might seem to raise the following worry: 
whether or not something is translatable seems to boil down just to tracking when an 
EAT result does or does not feel intuitively satisfactory, and adds nothing to this 
intuition. Thus if  a model yields the right final answer empirically but still seems to be 
unacceptably wrong ontologically, for instance if  it is couched in terms o f  dragons, then 
that model being deemed correct by EAT seems unsatisfactory. In ju st such cases we 
would deem the model 'not translatable', but on what grounds beyond EAT's intuitive 
unsatisfactoriness? Perhaps translatability is just an ad hoc label for our intuitive 
reactions to an EAT result? Another way o f putting this point is to say that what matters 
when assessing the satisfactoriness o f an EAT result is whether or not the 'ontological 
gap', so to speak, is important. That is, when has an ontologically mistaken model
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nonetheless still captured successfully some relevant patterns in nature, and when instead 
has it achieved a high EAT score only through luck or through ex post worthless 
storytelling? When, as it were, are we dealing with Newtonian celestial mechanics, and 
when with magic dragons? These ontological considerations become still more pointed, 
as we saw, in examples where we are forced in effect to trade off ontological success 
against empirical success. So, does our notion o f translatability do anything other than 
track our extra-EAT intuitions here?
First, EAT itself cannot escape the need to consider translatability in any case (section 2- 
12). Admittedly, tackling translatability indeed turns out to be messy, but unfortunately 
just because there is no easy treatment does not make the need to attempt one therefore 
any less pressing. What we have dubbed 'translatability' is just a systematic exposition o f 
what factors are relevant to the task, such as tracking causal invariances and so on, which 
perhaps may serve at least to clarify just what our intuitions are. Such reflection may 
also clarify the motivations behind them, and perhaps thereby eventually lead intuition.
It is true that in exotic mixed-ontology examples the weaknesses o f translatability -  
namely its imprecision and its pragmatic elements -  are emphasised. But in most cases 
of actual scientific dispute there is little controversy over ontology, and in such -  more 
typical -  circumstances it is now the strengths o f our approach over EAT that are 
highlighted. Thus, I think, overall our emphasis on translatability does enable us to 
construct a much better account o f approximate truth than would have been possible 
armed solely with EAT and intuition alone.
Some o ther questions
Lexicographic OAT/EAT?
Perhaps another way to avoid the troublesome talk o f translatability would be to construct 
a simple two-part definition, utilising only the more clearly defined notions o f OAT and 
EAT. The idea would be: if  two models have the same ontological status, EAT should be 
used as the tie-breaker; otherwise, the ontologically superior model always wins. The
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advantage o f this simple system, so the argument goes, would be that we could ignore 
translatability.
Unfortunately, the weaknesses o f such a scheme are clear and indeed by now familiar. 
Thus: sometimes we might want to prefer an ontologically inferior model if  it is 
sufficiently empirically superior. Or sometimes one wrong ontology seems much 
preferable to another. Plus, in cases where the models' ontologies differ, only crude 
qualitative judgments would be available. And in cases where the models' ontologies are 
the same, the suggested definition would inherit the same weaknesses as plague EAT. 
Hence fluke correlations could not be ruled out, nor explanations that while correct 
ontologically were otherwise obviously ridiculous or mistaken. And as noted, EAT 
anyway in fact does require some consideration o f translatability in any case. Thus again, 
I do not think that there exists any satisfactory short-cut enabling us to evade a discussion 
o f translatability.
Given the inadequacy as definitions o f OAT and EAT on their own, and now o f any 
combination exclusively in terms o f them, it seems that there is little alternative left but to 
move beyond them. In particular, it seems there is little alternative but to tackle head on 
the question o f when a false ontology is or is not acceptable. This o f  course is precisely 
the focus o f our discussion o f translatability.
When do we have normative warrant?
Because our causal strengths are defined in terms o f empirical effect (chapter 3), if  a 
model gets a causal strength correct this can be verified through empirical intervention. 
That is, a particular intervention can be accurately predicted to have a particular effect if 
and only if a model has the relevant causal strength correct. In this sense, the degree to 
which a model gets the relevant causal strengths correct can be verified empirically.
Thus the normative force o f a ranking for approximate truth on our definition can be 
backed up by such empirical warrant. However, if  it is disputed not whether a model has 
gauged the true causal strengths correctly, but rather whether a model's terms have any 
objective causal strengths at all -  that is, if what is disputed is not a model's degree o f
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approximate truth but rather its translatability -  then this normative warrant no longer 
applies. The warrant comes from intervention but that requires agreement on what the 
intervention variable is, and this latter is o f course precisely what is at stake in disputes 
over translatability. For example, if  we could agree that 'phlogisticated air' indeed 
referred to nitrogen then we could check its causal weighting via an intervention with 
nitrogen, but such an intervention could not tell us whether ‘phlogisticated air’ indeed did 
refer to nitrogen in the first place. The normative warrants for our judgments o f 
approximate truth thus only kick in after decisions about translatability have already been 
made.
The inference from this is that our judgments regarding translatability are therefore rather 
less authoritative than our subsequent ones regarding degrees o f  approximate truth. I 
agree. The point is then what further inference we should draw as a result. One would be 
that, while fine in the context o f normal science, we should abandon all talk o f 
approximate truth in the more difficult cases where translatability is controversial. But 
we have seen that neither always allowing nor always disallowing translatability seems 
satisfactory, and that it is still possible to analyse the issue with some profit. Certainly, 
we still feel strong intuitions about approximate truth even in the wrong-ontology 
contexts where translatability is required, and I would claim that some philosophical 
account here is better than none.
A plurality o f accounts?
As noted (section 2-5), our scheme can be seen as a way o f combining the 'best o f both 
worlds', incorporating into one definition both the ontological and empirical aspects of 
approximate truth. We have seen that complications arise both when extending this 
scheme beyond normal science but also when, in contrast, the issue o f translatability is 
instead evaded. Perhaps then a better solution would be just to accept that the univocality 
of the notion o f approximate truth comes apart in these problematic contexts? Thus 
neither OAT nor EAT are fully satisfactory, and may yield contradictory results, but this 
should be seen merely as symptoms o f the fact that 'approximate truth' actually conflates 
two separate notions which we are erroneously used to thinking about in a unified way.
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Such an attitude might seem tempting, but I do not see that it actually confers any 
advantages. Recall that, upon closer inspection, even EAT on its own must rely on some 
notion o f translatability, so that it is not really any better o ff than our own definition in 
that respect. Moreover, OAT too must embrace translatability on pain o f disallowing all 
false-ontology models -  that is, potentially all o f science past and present -  from positive 
consideration, even though it was examples o f just such models (e.g. the presumed 
ontological superiority o f Newtonian over Ptolemaic astronomy) that provided the 
motivation for OAT in the first place. That is, even if  we accept that approximate truth 
comes apart into two separate notions, still we cannot avoid the issue o f translatability. 
This therefore removes the motivation for the pluralist approach. In trying to provide a 
univocal notion o f approximate truth -  as we have been doing -  we are no worse off 
conceptually, and better off in so far as we do at least capture the intuition o f approximate 
truth's univocality. Hence, even in awkward cases, there seems to be no philosophical 
profit here to adopting pluralism.
Conclusions about translatability
First, in practice disagreement about translatability is very rarely at the heart o f any actual 
scientific disputes. Accordingly, it is mainly for the sake o f philosophical completeness 
rather than practical applicability that we need address the issue at all.
Second, translatability is the label we have used for the issue o f ontological acceptability. 
In particular, what is the cost a model incurs by citing an incorrect ontology, and how do 
we accommodate the fact that some wrong ontologies are judged worse than others?
Third, the issue is unfortunately unavoidable. No serious definition o f approximate truth 
can evade it. Or at least, any attempt to do so turns out either to be deluded or else to 
come at the cost that we could only rarely pronounce on approximate truth at all, even in 
many o f the commonest and apparently simplest cases o f  it.
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Fourth, the issue is messy, in the sense that there seem to be no neat philosophical criteria 
that fully determine to what degree any particular translation is acceptable. Pragmatic 
influences are to a degree inescapable. Thus our criteria for translatability should perhaps 
be seen merely as a summary o f  the clearest thinking we can manage on this tricky issue.
Fifth, although messy, the issue is not so messy that we cannot still get some 
philosophical purchase on it. While pragmatic factors do inescapably enter our criteria 
for translatability, so also do perfectly objective factors too, meaning that these criteria 
are not wholly arbitrary. Thus, rather than just leave the assessment o f a model's 
ontological acceptability entirely to intuition or extra-philosophy, it is possible with profit 
to analyse it more rigorously.
Appendix -  An exact definition 
Choosing a measure of similarity
We have introduced a framework in which to assess approximate truth, but not yet given 
an exact definition o f  it. What we have are a set o f  true values for the relevant causal 
strengths, a set o f values ascribed to them by a model, and the conclusion that what 
matters is these two sets' similarity. It is useful to re-describe this situation in terms o f a 
hypothetical vector space with causal strengths along each axis. Then if  the truth o f any 
particular context is some particular set o f values for the relevant causal strengths, this 
will correspond to one particular point in this vector space ('truth-point'). And competing 
models’ own estimates o f these causal strengths will likewise correspond to their own 
particular points ('model-points'). The degree o f approximate truth o f  any given model is 
then seen as the closeness o f its point to the truth-point. But what we have so far left 
unspecified is exactly how to define this 'closeness' between two points. We turn to that 
task now.
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Smith concludes in a similar context: ’and if  problems remain here, they are problems in 
geometry, o f specifying suitable metric approximation relations, not conceptual problems' 
[Smith 1998, p253]. I think it is true that no remaining conceptual problems remain, 
which is why we tackle this issue only in an appendix. Moreover, to concentrate 
excessively on the question o f the precise measure to use would be to repeat an emphasis 
that we previously criticised much o f the existing literature for -  namely, an emphasis on 
the exact syntactic form o f the measure rather than on the philosophical interpretation of 
the distance that was being measured. In practice, it may be only rarely that the exact 
choice o f measure is really decisive in adjudging which o f two models scores best. 
Nevertheless, even this claim already assumes that obviously ridiculous measures have 
been eliminated, without explaining how. And in any case, I think it does still turn out to 
prove philosophically profitable to proffer a specific definition and then test it against 
various difficulties. We shall see that there are good reasons to prefer some measures 
over others; the issues are not mere 'problems in geometry'.
For simplicity, we shall assume our vector space to be Euclidean. Since it is only an 
abstract space, this does not commit us to any physical implications. Nevertheless, there 
is certainly a philosophical interpretation attached to this vector space and this enables us 
to reject some candidates for a measure o f similarity immediately. For example, one 
broad principle we can immediately endorse is that o f each axis being equally important. 
O f course, a foundation o f our approach is the allowance for asymmetric weightings on 
each cause, but this just reflects their different strengths in reality and is in turn already 
incorporated in our vector space by how far the truth-point lies along each axis. But to 
emphasise one axis itself more than another, beyond this allowance for causal strength, 
has no licence from objective reality. Thus a measure which emphasised the error in the 
y-coordinate (say) over the errors in other dimensions would not be acceptable, since 
such special treatment would have no justification from the underlying physical situation 
we are trying to represent and so would be unacceptably arbitrary. Otherwise, for 
instance, we might ask why we could not simply re-label the axes so that the 'y' now 
represented a different physical cause, and by this means alone change our result for
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approximate truth. The arbitrariness o f any such re-labelling reflects the underlying 
arbitrariness o f treating the axes o f our vector space in any way asymmetrically.
Another broad principle we should want to endorse is the need for absolute, and not just 
relative, weightings. For instance, suppose that there are two equally massive planets in 
space, and that we release a ball near them. (As usual in Newtonian cases, for simplicity 
take the planets and ball to be point masses.) Next assume that when we release this ball 
it is equidistant from each planet, so that the ball and two planets form the three points o f 
an isosceles triangle. Now consider a second situation exactly the same as this first one, 
but with the single exception that this time the ball is twice as far away from the planets 
as before, although still equidistant. Define two problems, one for each o f these two set­
ups, in each case asking: what is the gravitational pull on the ball from the two planets?
Suppose that at first we were still considering only relative weightings. Then we would 
be unable to distinguish between these two cases, even though they are clearly physically 
distinct. This is because a relative weighting o f the planets' gravitational pulls on the ball 
is the same in both cases -  half comes from each planet. Yet clearly the absolute pull is 
not the same in both cases, as it is much stronger in the first case when the ball is nearer 
the two planets. A concentration solely on relative weights misses this difference, and so 
fails to distinguish between two substantively different physical states o f  the world. It 
would follow that we could define two substantively different models (e.g. that the pull is 
10ms' or that it is 20ms' ), and a purely relative weighting function would be unable to 
tell them apart. This cannot be satisfactory. (A similar problem would arise if  the ball 
was each time the same distance from the planets and it was the planets' masses that were 
varied instead.) In order to get satisfactory ontological descriptions for every case, 
relative weightings alone are not reliably sufficient.
One example o f a measure that would fall foul o f this principle is the inner product. (The 
inner product o f two n-vectors X and Y is defined by: X.Y = ( £  x iy i) / ( |X | | Y | ), 
where xi and yi are X and Y ’s respective components in the direction o f the /th axis, and 
the sum is for i = 1 to n.) We can think o f the truth-point and model-point in our vector
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space as defining two vectors. One way o f measuring the two points' similarity is by 
measuring the similarity o f their directions relative to the origin, which is what the inner 
product does. But X.Y = kX.jY for any constants k and j, that is absolute weightings 
have no influence on the inner product if  applied uniformly to one o f the vectors. 
(Intuitively, if  we travel north-east we remain the same bearing relative to the centre no 
matter how far  we travel.)
It might seem that this need to incorporate absolute weightings will cause problems, since 
often the absolute units we use will be arbitrary. For instance, if  the effect term is 
distance travelled, then our causal strengths could equally well be expressed in kilometres 
or centimetres (or inches). But all that is required is that we are consistent within any one 
context. If  the true causal strength is measured in centimetres, say, then so should be the 
models’ postulated ones; if  in kilometres, then likewise the models’. The requirement for 
allowing absolute weightings only applies once this initial scale has been agreed on, so to 
speak. So if  the true distance was 3km east and 3km north, then we need to be able to 
prefer a model that postulates 4km each way over one postulating 6km each way.
O f course, there remain many possible measures satisfying both the above principles, 
namely treating each axis equally and allowing absolute weightings. How do we choose 
between these? In particular, what o f perhaps the most obvious measure o f all, namely 
Euclidean distance? (The Euclidean distance between two points (xi, X2, ... , xn) and (yi, 
y2, . . . ,  yn) is defined by: ( £  (xi - yi )2 ) 1/2, the sum being for i = 1 to n. Intuitively, it is 
just the distance o f the straight line drawn between them.) Can we not simply use this as 
our measure o f  closeness to the truth? But it turns out that philosophical consideration 
yields another desideratum, and that this one proves enough to rule out Euclidean 
distance too.
Why Euclidean distance does not work: the causal subdivision problem
Return to our original example (section 2-1) o f dropping a ball and then estimating the 
relative gravitational pulls on it o f a nearby mountain and the rest o f  the Earth. Suppose,
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in some units o f force, that the correct causal strengths are (3, 100) respectively. (For 
simplicity, ignore the fact that in reality the ratio would obviously be much greater than 
100 to 3.) So in our two-dimensional vector space, the truth-point is (3, 100). Suppose 
that our first model ignores the mountain, but slightly underestimates the strength due to 
the rest o f the Earth, putting it at 96 instead o f 100 units. Then its model-point in our 
vector space would be (0, 96). And suppose that our second, mountain-only, model is 
accurate as far as it goes, so that its model-point is (3, 0). Then the Euclidean distances 
between each model-point and the truth-point are:
1) for the Earth-model: [(3 - 0)2 + (100 - 96)2]'/! =  (25)14 = 5
2) for the mountain-model: [02 + (100 - O)2]7’ = 100
Thus the Earth-model would be judged much closer to the truth, as desired.
So far so good, but suppose now that we re-described the situation. Suppose in particular 
that we now considered the Earth as two separate halves, say the western and eastern 
hemisphere, each contributing their own gravitational pull. There would therefore now 
be three different causes at work, with strengths (3, 50, 50). Likewise, our two models' 
points would presumably now be (0 ,48 ,48 ) and (3, 0, 0) respectively. O f course, this is 
exactly the same physical situation as before; all that has changed is our description o f it, 
in particular our arbitrary division o f the Earth's gravity into two causes instead o f one.
A third desideratum for any measure now presents itself: it should be invariant with 
respect to such arbitrary re-descriptions. So long as the physical reality and our focus of 
interest are the same, so should be our judgments o f approximate truth. Such a 
desideratum recalls the Miller problem, but unlike that it is vital in practice that this one 
be satisfied. All that is varying is how we subdivide causes, and frequently there may be 
no obvious or 'natural' way to do this. For instance, it is not obvious whether we should 
or should not subdivide the Earth in this example, or even whether we should separate the 
mountain from the rest o f the Earth. In other contexts, surely judgments o f approximate 
truth should not be dependent on, for instance: whether we describe the causal strength o f 
an army as a single entity or as the sum o f the strengths o f the individual soldiers; the 
causal strength o f gas pressure as a single entity or the sum o f the strengths o f individual
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molecules; or the causal strength o f smoking as a single entity or as the sum of the 
strengths o f cigarettes smoked in the morning and those smoked in the afternoon, or as 
the sum o f all the cigarettes individually. All such choices o f description are not only 
arbitrary, but also likely to vary in practice. Hence it is a practical as well as theoretical 
necessity that our judgments o f approximate truth be invariant with respect to them.
It might be thought that our scheme o f causal strengths achieves precisely this -  after all, 
if  a cause divided in two such as the Earth in our example, now each sub-cause is 
awarded only half the strength o f the composite entity. This is true and o f course one o f 
the clinching merits o f our general approach, but it turns out we now have to be careful 
that our chosen measure o f similarity does not, as it were, squander this hard-won 
advantage. Return to our Earth example. Under the new two-hemisphere description, 
recall, the truth-point is now (3, 50, 50) and the two model-points respectively (0 ,48 ,48) 
and (3, 0, 0). This yields new Euclidean distances of:
1) for the Earth-model: (32 + 22 + 22)'/2 = (17)/2 = 4.1 (approximately)
2) for the mountain-model: (02 + 502 + 502) /2 = (5000)/2 = 70.7 (approximately) 
Previously, the results were 5 and 100 respectively, thus they have now changed. This is 
the reason why simple Euclidean distance is an unsatisfactory measure for our purposes: 
if  using it, a purely arbitrary re-division o f agreed causes leads to a change in scores for 
approximate truth.
Note that not only the gross scores have changed, but also the ratio between the two.
This hints at why the following counterargument does not work either: that although the 
scores have changed, still there is no need to worry since the ranking has not -  the Earth- 
model remains much the preferred one of the two. If  this happy outcome always 
transpired it might indeed be some comfort, especially given our earlier emphasis on 
relative rather than absolute scores (section 2-7). But unfortunately we can construct 
examples where even the qualitative ranking alters too. For instance, suppose the 
numbers in the Earth example had been: truth-point (12, 12), the first model Mi's point 
(8, 8) and the second model M2S point (9, 7). Next suppose we arbitrarily sub-divided 
the second cause into two, yielding a new truth-point o f (12, 6, 6) and new model-points
161
o f (8 ,4 , 4) for Mi and (9, 3.5, 3.5) for M2. These would yield the following Euclidean 
distances:
1) Before the subdivision. For Mi: (42 + 42)/2 = (32)/2 = 5.7 
For M2: (32 + 52)'/2 = (34)'/2 = 5.8
Thus Mi is adjudged closer to the truth.
2) After the subdivision. For Mi: (42 + 22 + 22) /2 = (24)/2 = 4.9 
For M2: (32 + 2.52 + 2.52)'/2 = (21.5)‘/2 = 4.6
Now it is M2 that is adjudged closer to the truth. Thus Euclidean distance does indeed 
yield rankings for approximate truth that are not invariant with respect to arbitrary 
subdivisions o f agreed causes. (Intuitively we might diagnose the effect as resulting from 
the Euclidean distance giving undue weight to a cause once it is subdivided into two, that 
is to a cause awarded, so to speak, two axes rather than one in our abstract vector space.)
This particular difficulty does not affect only Euclidean distance; other possible measures 
are similarly affected. For example, we might consider the errors in each model's 
ascribed causal strengths and then take the variance o f those errors, the model with the 
lowest variance scoring the best. (Thus a true model's errors would all be zero, and hence 
it would score a minimum variance also o f zero.) This would be analogous to the least- 
squares procedure common in statistics, but also falls foul o f the causal subdivision 
problem. Or take another example: it is possible to adjust our inner product measure by 
adding a normalising coefficient reflecting the relevant vectors’ absolute strengths. This 
enables it to meet the desideratum o f incorporating absolute weights, but it too would still 
fall foul o f the causal subdivision problem. Moreover, it seems to me that all previously 
suggested definitions o f approximate truth are here either potentially vulnerable because 
they are silent on their exact measure o f similarity (most previous ontological 
approaches), or else actually vulnerable because they are prone generally to the 
seriousness-of-error problem o f which this can be seen as a special case (all other 
approaches). Fortunately though, there does seem to remain one possible measure that 
can overcome it, as well as meeting the two earlier desiderata. Moreover, as we shall see, 
it can also meet various other desiderata we shall impose. Accordingly, we shall select 
this measure as this thesis's 'official' definition o f approximate truth. We outline it now.
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Our preferred measure
Instead o f  the Euclidean distance, consider instead the so-called Manhattan or 'city-block' 
distance. This is defined by travelling from one point to another only in the directions o f 
the orthogonal axes, and never taking the direct diagonal, so to speak, o f the Euclidean 
distance. ([Niiniluoto 1987, p4] notes that both the Manhattan and Euclidean distances 
are special cases o f the more general Minkowski metric. He though nowhere discusses 
the relative merits o f the two, perhaps not surprisingly given that he also nowhere 
mentions the causal subdivision problem.) Return to our original Earth example, with a 
truth-point o f (3, 100) and model-points o f (0, 96) and (3, 0). In this case, the Manhattan 
distance between (3, 100) and (0, 96) is 7: we must travel 3 units on the first axis, from 0 
to 3, and then 4 units on the second, from 96 to 100, making 7 in total. The Manhattan 
distance between (3, 100) and (3, 0) is the same as the Euclidean one, namely 100 -  this 
is because the straight line between the two points happens to be parallel to the second 
axis, thus we can go straight up an avenue, so to speak, rather than take a diagonal.
The interesting point is to see what happens when we re-express our vectors using the 
alternative subdivided description. As we saw, now the truth-point will be (3, 50, 50) and 
the two model-points (0, 48, 48) and (3, 0, 0). The Manhattan distances will now be:
1) for the Earth-model: 3 + 2 + 2 = 7, in other words exactly the same as before.
2) for the mountain-model: 50 + 50 = 100, again, as desired, exactly as before.
In general, the Manhattan distance is not subject to the causal subdivision problem, which 
represents its decisive advantage. Clearly, it also meets our two previous desiderata as 
well, namely treating all axes equally and incorporating absolute as well as relative 
weightings. We therefore select it as our preferred measure.
Our definition of approximate truth
We can now state our full definition o f approximate truth:
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1) We must specify our context o f interest. This means specifying our ontology and 
vocabulary, and also exactly which causal strengths are relevant.
2) Thereafter the definition is fully objective. It will apply only to competing context- 
specific models rather than general theories. The causal strengths specified in step 1 will 
have some particular true values, and the competing models attempt to match those 
values (assuming translatability in the case o f mistaken ontology). The degree o f 
approximate truth for each model is then just the degree o f similarity between its ascribed 
values and the true ones.
3) This degree o f similarity is defined by the Manhattan distance between the model- 
point and truth-point in the relevant abstract vector space.
More formally, for a given set o f causes with true strengths (s i, s2, ...)  and a model 
postulating strengths (mi, m2, . . . ) ,  the model’s distance from the truth is:
^  | sj -  mi | , the sum being over i.
Further technical notes
Numerical value
The numerical value o f our measure is unrestricted, in that a model-point may be an 
indefinite Manhattan distance away from a truth-point. The important thing is that for 
any given context, that is for any given truth-point, we are able to make comparative 
judgments for different model-points. As discussed earlier (section 2-7), it is 
questionable anyway how much sense can be made o f comparing approximate truth 
scores from different contexts. Nevertheless, if  this was thought desirable then our scores 
could be normalised by dividing them by the Manhattan distance o f the truth-point from 
the origin. Thus in our example above the truth-point was (3, 100) and our model-points 
(0, 96) and (3, 0). The Manhattan distance o f the truth-point from the origin is 103, so 
our previous scores for approximate truth could be normalised by dividing through by 
103, yielding scores o f 7/103 and 100/103 respectively.
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Units
If the scores were normalised in this way, then their units would be pure scalars. Un­
normalised, they come in units o f the effect term. In our system all the causal strengths 
are defined with respect to the same effect term, so within any one context all models' 
scores for approximate truth will also be in these same units. Only when comparing 
between contexts could problems over incompatible units arise, which is why we would 
then have to normalise as above in order to transform the units into pure unit-free scalars.
Negative causes
It is also straightforward under our scheme to incorporate negative causes. For instance, 
suppose a chemical reduces the probability o f getting cancer, while smoking and asbestos 
increase it. Then it would be desirable to award that chemical a negative causal strength, 
compared to the positive strengths o f the other two. This is naturally incorporable into 
our scheme simply by giving the truth-point a negative entry along the axis representing 
the chemical, after which the rest o f our procedure could run as normal. Thus hindering 
causes are treated just the same as enabling ones.
Infinity o f causes
What if  there is an infinity o f causes to be considered in a problem? To be sure, most of 
these may be o f very little relevance but it would seem cavalier to assume that they are all 
of literally zero strength. And in any case, perhaps there will be ways o f  subdividing a 
causal influence into an infinite number o f parts. Either way, it is desirable that our 
definition still be able to yield finite answers.
Happily, it turns out that this should always be possible whenever the effect term is itself 
finite. For if  the total effect is indeed finite, then by our definition o f  causal strength the 
total Manhattan distance o f the truth-point from the origin in our vector space must also 
be finite, and this will be true no matter how we subdivide the causes o f  that total effect -  
that is, no matter how many different dimensions there are in our space.
Multiplicative or additive?
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Suppose that the true value o f a causal strength is 2. On our definition, a model 
postulating a value o f 1 for it would be a distance o f 1 from the truth, whereas another 
model postulating a value o f 4 for it would be a distance o f 2. Thus the first model would 
score better for approximate truth. But, it might be argued, should this be so? Perhaps 
estimating a variable to be twice as high as the true value should be considered the same 
degree o f error as estimating it to be twice as low, in which case the two models should 
have scored equally? The issue boils down to whether we assess errors multiplicatively 
or additively. Our definition is committed to the latter.
It seems to me that the intuitions can be argued either way on this issue, and perhaps that 
neither position is obviously preferable. In any case, it also seems to me that no measure 
could simultaneously satisfy both, and so we are forced to make a choice. One pertinent 
point is that I do not know o f any multiplicative measure that does not fall foul o f our 
earlier problem o f causal subdivision. If this is true generally, and given that the 
multiplicative approach is not obviously preferable for any other reason either, it would 
be a strong argument in favour o f  our additive measure.
166
Chapter Three -  Defining causal strength
3-1) Desiderata 
3-2) A unified account
Two kinds o f causal strength? Preliminary intuitive definitions. Some technical 
wrinkles. Final definitions. PM and DM unified. Two examples. Causal 
strengths in group problems. Desiderata revisited.
3-3) Causal interaction
Introductory example. Causal composition and black boxes. The full credit 
strategy. An independence requirement. More on background conditions. 
Explanation. Causal overdetermination. Conclusion.
3-4) Commensurability





Our definition o f approximate truth requires that we also have a good definition o f causal 
strength. Which o f two causes o f an event is the more important? This question might 
appear fundamental, but is in fact relatively neglected in the philosophical literature. 
(Exceptions include [Good 1961], [Sober 1984], [Miller 1987], [Sober 1988], [Sober e ta l 
1992], [Spirtes et al 2000] and [Pearl 2000].) Whereas the general metaphysics o f 
causation has received vast coverage, this subsidiary question o f  comparing two causes' 
strengths has not. Yet answering it turns out to be a surprisingly delicate task. Except 
where mentioned in the text, the details o f the analysis o f this chapter are not prefigured 
in any o f  the literature.
From the preceding chapters we saw that, for our purposes, an account o f causal strength 
must satisfy the following desiderata:
1) The concept should be univocal, that is deliver unambiguous results. It turns out that 
there can seem to exist at least two distinct notions o f causal strength, so satisfying this 
requirement needs more work than might initially have been suspected.
2) Results should be (sufficiently) objective.
3) Ideally, results should also be quantitative.
4) The definition should be widely applicable, and in particular applicable to all 
situations where we might be judging degrees o f approximate truth. For example, the 
definition should be able to deliver results even in cases o f causal interaction.
5) Results should carry some normative force.
Note from the start three aspects o f our investigation. For our purposes we need be 
concerned only with calculating the strengths o f causes that are already given. Therefore: 
first, we say nothing about the epistemological question o f how those causes might best 
be discovered; and second, nor anything about the venerable issue o f how to define 
causation in the first place. Third, note also that by ‘causal strength’ we shall have in 
mind always the strength o f a particular (instantiation o f a) cause in a particular context 
with respect to a particular effect. For the purpose o f defining approximate truth, there is
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no need (on our context-specific account) to attempt to define general causal strengths 
independent o f specific context.
3-2) A unified scheme 
Two kinds o f causal s treng th?
It might seem that our task is a pretty straightforward one: can we not just define the 
strength o f a cause by the quantity o f effect it leads to? But consider the following story. 
Suppose that Holmes shoots Moriarty, but that if  he had not then Watson would have 
done so anyway. What strength should we then assign to Holmes's shot as a cause o f 
Moriarty's death? One analysis runs: Moriarty was killed by the bullet fired by Holmes, 
therefore his death was a direct consequence of Holmes's shot, therefore Holmes's shot 
should be assigned maximum causal strength. To use different words, Holmes's shot had 
full causal potency here. (Throughout this chapter, we shall use 'strength', 'potency', 
‘efficacy’ and 'importance' interchangeably.) Call this sense o f causal strength 'potency- 
magnitude', or PM.
But there also exists a second analysis, which runs: given that Watson would have shot 
Moriarty in any case, in fact Holmes's shot made no difference. Whether Holmes fired or 
not, Moriarty would still have died either way. Accordingly, we should not assign 
Holmes's shot any causal strength after all. Call this second sense o f causal strength 
’difference-magnitude', or DM.
Notice immediately that the PM sense o f causal strength is unable to distinguish between 
the case in which Watson is present and the case in which he is not, whereas o f course 
DM can. Hence the two senses are indeed distinct and so may diverge, as in this 
example. Accordingly, we must investigate whether causal strength really can be given a
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univocal understanding after all.
Preliminary intuitive definitions
Begin by stating more formally what we understand by DM and PM, starting with DM. 
What difference does a cause make? The definition o f a DM must include some 
specification o f  what the world would have been like if  the cause in question had not 
operated. For instance, if  Holmes had not fired, then Watson would have done anyway. 
Label the cause at issue 'C', so in this example C = Holmes's shot. Label the relevant 
effect 'E', so here E = Moriarty's death. We want some specification o f the 'alternative' 
counterfactual cause, i.e. o f what would have happened had Holmes not fired. Label that 
'D’, so here D = Watson's shot. Lastly, we shall need some term to represent all the 
implicit background conditions, such as that Holmes and Watson knew how to fire their 
guns, that Moriarty did not have on a bullet-proof vest, and so on. Label these 
assumptions 'W', for the state o f the whole world just excluding our specific causes o f 
interest C and D. Let E(x) be the value o f the effect E as a function o f  the state o f the 
world x. Then we can think o f the DM as follows:
DM o f C relative to the counterfactual D = E(C & W) -  E(D & W)
In words, the DM o f C relative to D is the effect given C minus what the effect would 
have been given D instead. Note that any assignation o f DM is therefore only ever 
relative to some choice o f  counterfactual D. There is no such thing as some 'absolute' 
DM defined independently o f counterfactual context (or rather to the extent that there is, 
this is what we call PM -  more on which presently). This is desirable, since the idea o f a 
cause 'making a difference' surely presupposes some context o f  comparison -  made a 
difference relative to whatl
In our Holmes-Moriarty example, if  Watson would have shot Moriarty anyway then 
Moriarty dies whether or not Holmes fires. So, taking M oriarty4 s death to be E = 1 and 
his survival to be E = 0, the DM of Holmes's shot is given by the formula as: E(C & W) -
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E(D & W ) = 1 - 1 = 0 .  That is, Holmes's shot indeed made no difference.
The formula is clearly readily extendable to cases where there is more than one 
counterfactual. For example, suppose that if Holmes had not shot then either Watson 
would have shot or else Inspector Lestrade would have entered and shot instead (cause 
'L'). Each o f  these possibilities could be given some weighting in the formula and the 
DM then calculated. For instance, if  we used weightings o f ki and k.2 for Watson and 
Lestrade respectively, corresponding, say, to the probabilities o f them being the ones to 
fire the alternative shot, and if  Watson would have hit and killed Moriarty whereas 
Lestrade would have missed him, then the DM o f Holmes's shot would now be: E(C&W) 
-  ki.[E(D&W)] -  k2.[E(L&W)] = 1 -  ki. (ki and k2 in this formula are constants, and 
serve as multiplying coefficients o f the effect functions E.) Thus because o f the 
possibility o f Moriarty otherwise surviving, Holmes's shot now did make some difference 
after all, in proportion to the chances o f his back-up shot being fired by the errant 
Lestrade rather than the reliable Watson.
Move on next to our other kind o f causal strength, PM. We have just seen how the values 
our formula yields for DM depend in part on our choice o f counterfactual. By contrast, 
the concept o f causal potency, i.e. PM, intuitively seems to be intrinsic and local. 
Nevertheless, I propose that for our purposes PM is also adequately definable by using 
this same counterfactual technique. In particular, the potency o f a causal input can be 
defined by reference to the specific counterfactual o f that input being totally absent, with 
no other input taking its place. (What exactly could be meant by ‘absent’ we discuss 
shortly.) So the 'choice' o f counterfactual here is no real choice at all - it is always the 
possible world exactly the same as the actual one in all respects except that the particular 
cause in question is absent. For E = effect, C = cause, ~C = absence o f  that cause, and W 
= the rest o f the world in addition to C, preliminarily define the causal potency o f  C as 
follows:
PM o f C = E(C & W) -  E(~C & W).
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This is really quite intuitive when applied to everyday examples. For example, to 
determine the PM o f throwing a brick at a window, we would compare the window with 
the brick thrown at it ('E(C & W)') with the window with no brick thrown at it ('E(~C & 
W)'). In words, a cause's PM is just the quantity o f its impact on the effect, compared to 
its absence, and holding all other causes constant. (For the purposes o f this thesis, we 
shall ignore the issue o f other possible formulations like using the quotient o f the effect 
terms instead o f their difference.)
Some technical wrinkles
What exactly do we mean when citing the 'absence' o f a cause C in the right-hand side o f 
our PM formula? It is true that in many cases the interpretation o f such an absence will 
be natural and unproblematic. For instance, if  C is throwing a brick at a window then the 
absence o f  C would presumably be simply keeping the brick in hand. However, just like 
effects, causes too may be either an event or a variable, and in the latter case problems 
arise. For example, suppose the cause o f interest is a hot air temperature, say 35 degrees 
Celsius. What would be the 'absence' o f such a cause? We could hardly speak o f the 
absence o f any air temperature, but at the same time there is no immediately obvious 
fallback point to adopt as our baseline reference temperature. Choosing freezing point, 
for instance, may sometimes seem odd -  if  our question was 'how much did the hot day 
cause me to sweat?', this would seem if  anything to imply a contrast with average rather 
than freezing ambient temperature. Yet on other occasions, such as the query 'how strong 
an effect does air temperature have on the speed o f evaporation o f a puddle?', the 
reference temperature might be freezing point after all. There seems to be no obvious 
general answer.
In this thesis I propose to follow [Humphreys 1990] on the issue, and to appeal in general 
to what he terms the neutral level o f causal input. This he defines (p38), in the case o f a 
variable, as 'the level o f the variable at which the property corresponding to that variable 
is completely absent.' For instance, a neutral level o f temperature in our example above 
would be any temperature at which there was no sweating. A key point is that this
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neutral level is likely to depend on the exact effect o f interest and on the exact context.
For example, it may be that our focus o f interest is the change in the level o f our variable, 
in which case the neutral level would o f course just be the original level before the 
change. Or suppose C is ambient air pressure at sea level and we were interested in its 
effect on the optimal volume o f  a lung. We might interpret the 'absence' o f  this C to be a 
vacuum, but o f course a vacuum would definitely not be neutral with respect to this 
particular effect, since presumably a vacuum would leave no role for a lung at all. 
Depending on our interest, we might instead want to use for comparison the air pressure 
at higher or lower altitudes, or perhaps the rate o f change at sea level o f air pressure with 
respect to altitude. Again, the point is that it is not enough simply to cite in the formula 
the 'absence' o f the cause C, since the interpretation o f this alone will be unclear.
Another example o f a neutral level that can be awkward for simplistic accounts is when it 
is suggested that we define the absence o f C to be the level o f cause that leads to zero 
effect. But sometimes even in the absence o f C the level o f effect is non-zero, and it is 
this latter level that we should use as our baseline. For example, the probability of 
getting lung cancer for non-smokers is greater than zero, so when calculating the causal 
strength o f smoking we should take as a baseline this non-zero level.
A key point which Humphreys stresses is that this neutral level is objective. By this he 
means that, once given the specification o f our cause, effect and context o f interest, the 
neutral level is then defined objectively. The pragmatics only enter, as it were, in setting 
the background parameters; after that, the definition o f the neutral level follows 
automatically and unambiguously. In this respect, our definition o f causal strength -  
which will include reference to the neutral level -  is objective in exactly the same way as 
was our definition o f approximate truth in chapter 2. So to speak, there is no extra loss of 
objectivity here.
Finally, turn to two other issues. First, in general the effect term may be an event or a 
variable. So far, we have been assuming the latter and hence expressing E as a
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continuous function. This is fine if, for example, E is air temperature. But suppose that 
the effect is more naturally thought o f as an event that dichotomously either does or does 
not happen -  for instance, if  E is getting cancer. In that case, we might want instead to 
speak in terms o f probabilities and adjust our notation accordingly. For example, the PM 
of some carcinogen C with respect to the effect E o f getting cancer could be written: 
p(E|C&W) -  p(E|W)
where p denotes a probability function, the probabilities concerned being conditional 
ones. The formula for DM would be adjusted similarly. An alternative is to keep the 
same notation as before but to interpret now the effect to be expected effect. For 
notational convenience, we shall adopt this latter policy. Either way, such cases will 
require the assumption that we are able to make sense o f single-case probabilities.
Second, we should be aware o f the danger o f phenomena such as Simpson's paradox. In 
particular, if  we do not hold fixed all other causal parents o f an effect while varying our 
cause o f interest, any results obtained for causal strength may be misleading. This is 
really just the logic o f controlled experiment. (Note though that the introduction o f the 
cause o f interest may itself alter the levels o f other causes -  see the discussion o f 
background conditions W below.) For us, it boils down to a reminder that our definition 
of causal strength can only be as good as the prior specification o f  causes on which it is 
applied. For example, if  C is smoking and E is lung cancer, it may still be that C's causal 
strength is different with respect to one person than with respect to another, perhaps 
because the two individuals differ in their genetic predispositions or diets. Thus smoking 
per se will have a great many different causal strengths with respect to lung cancer 
depending on the exact state o f all other causally relevant factors, and it is important that 
these different strengths are not conflated. (Again, note that the analysis o f such cases 
requires that we be able to make sense o f single-case probabilities.) It follows that a 
causal strength must always be relativised to background conditions, and in particular to 
the levels o f other causes.
Final definitions
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Putting together the resolutions o f all these wrinkles, we can give final versions o f our 
two definitions o f causal strength. Start with PM. Let C be the cause, E be the effect, 
and for our context o f interest let Co be the neutral level o f C. Let Wi be the background 
conditions given Ci, and Wo be the background conditions given Co- Wi includes the 
levels o f all other causes o f E. Note that Wi differs from Wo since changing from Co to C 
may impact on other aspects o f the world apart from E. Given that our definition o f PM 
is comparing the cases o f C and Co, it follows that it must be relativised to the levels o f 
background causes in each case, i.e. to Wi and Wo. However, we can simplify a little. 
Recall that -  once given a specification o f our context o f interest -  the choice o f  neutral 
levels is objective and automatic, so there is no need explicitly to relativise PM to Co. 
Furthermore Wo may be defined in terms o f Wi, in particular as just being Wi save 
substituting Co for C together with all the consequences o f that. Therefore, given C, our 
PM need only be relativised to Wi -  the other necessary relativisations are implicit in 
these ones. In conclusion, for the case where C is an event and E is a variable, then:
The PM of C with respect to Wi = E(C & W,) - E(C0 & W0)
Turn next to DM. For this purpose, we define a second cause D, with neutral level Do. 
Let Wi be the background conditions given C and Do, and W2 be the background 
conditions given Co and D. W2 may be defined in terms o f Wi, C, D, Co and Do. Then 
by similar reasoning as with PM above, we arrive at:
The DM of C relative to a second cause D, with respect to Wi
= E(C & Do & Wi) -  E(D & Co & W2)
Analogous definitions hold as we vary between events and variables. For instance, if  E is 
still a variable and now so is C, then we should re-label so that Ci is the actual level of 
causal variable and Co the neutral level. Re-label D as Di likewise, and redefine Wi and 
W2 appropriately, i.e. substituting in their definitions Ci for C and Di for D. Finally, let
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W3 be the background conditions given a second non-neutral level C2. Then we arrive at 
the following useful definitions:
1) the PM o f  Ci with respect to Wi = E(Ci & Wi) -  E(Co & Wo)
2a) the DM o f Ci relative to a different level C2 o f C, with respect to Wi 
= E(Ci& W i)-E (C 2& W3)
2b) the DM o f Ci relative to a level Di o f a second cause D, with respect to Wi 
= E(Ci & D0 & Wi) -  E(Di & Co & W2)
If  E is an event, we can reinterpret these formulas as expected values o f effect in the way 
described earlier. Other variations, such as DM defined relative to weighted averages 
over a range o f  counterfactuals, or cases where some o f the causes are events and some 
variables in different combinations, can be handled in a similar way.
It follows from our definitions above that causal strengths are, so to speak, highly 
sensitive. They will vary with choice o f cause C, o f course. They will also vary with 
choice o f effect term E - the same thing may be a strong cause o f one effect but a weak 
one o f another. Again, this is obvious. In addition, they will also vary with the values of 
other causes. For instance, striking a match will cause light if  the atmosphere contains 
sufficient oxygen, but not otherwise. And as mentioned, the PM o f C is also relative to 
the neutral level o f  both C and the other causes, which themselves may vary with our 
context o f interest. Finally, in the case o f DMs, causal strength will o f course be relative 
to our choice o f  counterfactual, the latter presumably being interest-relative.
Obviously, such a definition o f causal potency is hardly particularly original. As [Sober 
et al 1992] points out, complications arise once we try to use it to compare causal 
potencies. However, I do not think that these complications turn out to be at all 
disturbing [Northcott 2003a], although I shall not discuss that further here.
Clearly, our definitions can yield negative as well as positive values for the causal 
strengths, but I do not see this as being particularly problematic. In a similar way, there
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is no objection to allowing 'negative causation' generally, that is - in [Humphreys 1990]'s 
terminology - to acknowledging counteracting as well as contributing causes.
The precise choice o f unit o f effect will typically not be crucial here, since our aim is to 
compare the impacts o f different causes on a common effect E. So long as our units are 
the same for each calculation, these comparisons o f impact will typically be independent 
of the precise choice o f unit. For example, the mass displaced by one cause would still 
be twice as much (say) as that displaced by another, regardless o f whether that mass were 
measured in ounces, grams or tons. We can therefore happily define our causal strengths 
in whatever units scientists themselves naturally use for E anyway.
Strictly speaking, however, this unit-independence will not quite hold always. In 
particular, if  one choice o f unit is non-linear with respect to the other, problems can arise. 
For example, suppose our competing units o f mass were grams and logarithm-of-grams. 
Then if  one cause was assessed to be twice as potent as another using grams displaced, it 
would in general not be assessed twice as potent using logarithm-of-grams displaced. It 
may well be that in practice such cases are rare, that is to say that controversies about 
assignments o f relative causal strength only rarely if  ever hinge on choice o f unit in this 
way. Nevertheless, there seems no way to rule out the possibility in principle and 
accordingly if  such a case did arise we would indeed be forced to concede that the 
comparison o f causal strengths was choice-of-unit-dependent. Recall though our earlier 
remarks on interpreting scores for approximate truth absolutely versus relatively (section 
2-7). This issue would become rather more serious if  choice o f unit determined also the 
qualitative ranking o f causal strengths. This recalls the classic Miller problem 
concerning the language-dependence o f approximate truth. But as with that before, so 
long as no units actually in scientific use generate such ranking reversals then so long can 
the issue legitimately be disregarded (section 1-4).
PM and DM unified
Recall again our two definitions (for when all causes are events and the effect is a
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variable):
1) the PM o f C with respect to Wi = E(C & W }) -  E(C0 & W0)
2) The DM o f C relative to a second cause D, with respect to Wi 
= E(C & D0& Wi) -  E(D & C0 & W2)
Notice that, although there is in it no ambiguity or choice about which counterfactual to 
consider, nevertheless the definition o f PM is still in form similar to that o f  DM -  how 
much difference does the cause make compared to its not being there at all? (Strictly 
speaking, the only difference between the two is that with PM we set the choice o f 
counterfactual TV to be Do.) This enables us to see now how our two senses o f causal 
strength can be unified. In particular, the key insight will be to see a DM as always just 
the difference between two PMs. Alternatively put, if  we take PM to be our core 
definition o f causal strength, then a DM can always be seen as a relative causal strength. 
It would follow that the two senses are analytically unified. Analogously, the existence 
o f both relative and absolute speed does not imply that there are really two distinct senses 
o f ’speed'. In the same way as we need only one definition o f speed so, I shall argue, we 
need only one o f  causal strength.
The key fact is that, formally, the DM of C with respect to D is always just the PM of C 
minus the PM o f  D:
DM o f C relative to D 
= E(C & D0& Wi) - E(D & C0& W2)
= [E(C & D0 & Wi) -  E(C0 & D0 & W0)] -  [E(D & C0 & W2) -  E(C0 & D0 & W0)] 
= [PM o f C] -  [PM o f D]
(Note that these PMs and DM are each defined with respect to \Vj (or W2 in the case o f 
the PM of D), and moreover that our derivation assumes that the appropriate choices o f 
the neutral levels Co and Do do not vary. Given that all the causal strengths are taken to 
refer to the same context here, this latter assumption is justified.)
Thus any DM can always be re-expressed in terms o f two PMs. For example, the DM of
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Holmes's shot relative to Watson's is equal just to the PM o f Holmes's shot minus the PM 
o f Watson's. Notice that, as also in our original definition o f DM earlier, the two PMs are 
each defined with respect to the absence o f the other cause o f interest. This is because 
the alternative DM -  o f Holmes's shot given that Watson had fired relative to Watson's 
shot given that Holmes had fired -  would be trivially zero since we would ju st be 
comparing E(C & D & W4) with itself (for W4 = background conditions given C and D). 
Hence the only DM we would be interested in here is that o f Holmes's shot given that 
Watson had not fired relative to Watson's given that Holmes had not fired. That means 
that when defining the DM o f C relative to D, we want to compare the case o f C without 
D with that o f D without C, which implies the particular comparison o f PMs as per our 
calculation above.
Note that our formula specifically picks out C and D. Why pick out them rather than any 
of the other causes o f  E? Purely pragmatic reasons suffice - we happen to be interested in 
the PMs o f  C and D, and in particular in the DM o f C with respect to D. The latter 
implies that we are interested in certain counterfactuals defined in terms o f C and D and 
not any other causes. That is, our choice of DM o f interest automatically picks out 
particular counterfactuals and the interesting thing is that these counterfactuals also 
happen to be the ones involved when defining particular PMs o f those causes.
It is also worth noting that, formally, a PM can in turn itself always be understood as a 
limiting case o f DM:
PM o f C
= E(C & Do & Wi) -  E(C0 & D0 & W0)
= [E(C & Do & W ,) -  E(C0 & D0 & W0)] -  [E(C0 & D0 & W0) -  E(C0 & D0
& W0)]
= [PM o f C] -  [PM o f no cause]
= DM o f C relative to no cause, by our previous result
(‘No cause’ here is shorthand for ‘no cause beyond the neutral level’. Again, these causal 
strengths are all relativised to Wi, and we assume unvarying neutral levels Co and Do.)
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Thus the PM o f some C can be described as the PM o f C minus the PM  o f no cause at all, 
in other words described as a DM. This immediately suggests that perhaps, instead of 
speaking o f DM being cashed out in terms o f PM, we could equally well think o f things 
the other way round -  namely, o f it always being possible to cash out PM in terms o f 
DM. Why should it be PM that is taken to be the more fundamental? For many purposes 
it will not matter whether we talk in terms o f PM or o f DM. The important point is that, 
expressed whichever way, there is only one independent notion in play here. Despite 
initial appearances to the contrary in the Holmes-Moriarty example, there do not exist 
two kinds o f causal strength; rather, there is really only the one.
Two examples
Imagine a Newtonian particle with a gravitational force on it. In this context, the 
DM/PM distinction can sometimes seem to collapse; let us see why. What is the potency 
o f gravity here? Let C be gravity, Co be the neutral (in this case zero) level o f gravity,
Wi be the background conditions given C, and Wo the background conditions given Co. 
Then:
the PM o f  C with respect to Wi 
= E(C& W i)-E (C 0& W0)
= (the particle’s motion with gravity) -  (the particle’s motion with no gravity) 
Next, suppose we ask how much difference does gravity make? It is often natural to 
interpret this as being relative to no gravity at all, in which case the DM o f gravity would 
be:
DM of C relative to the counterfactual Co, with respect to Wi 
= E(C & Wi) -  E(C0 & W0)
= (the particle’s motion with gravity) -  (the particle’s motion with no gravity)
In other words, here DM and PM are exactly the same.
The two could have diverged if  in the DM calculation we had adopted a different choice 
o f counterfactual. Suppose we were comparing the strength o f gravity on Earth with that
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on the moon. Let the Earth’s gravity be Ci and the moon's gravity C2, so that the 
counterfactual C2 was now some lesser but non-zero alternative level o f gravity, 
corresponding to its strength on the moon. Redefine Wi now substituting Ci for C, and 
let W2 be the background conditions given C2. Now the calculation would run:
DM o f Earth's gravity Ci relative to the moon's gravity C2, with respect to Wi 
= E(Ci& W i)-E (C 2& W 2)
= (the particle’s motion with Earth gravity) -  (the particle’s motion with moon 
gravity)
= [E(Ci & W,) -  E(C0 & Wo)] -  [E(C2 & W2) -  E(C0 & W0)]
= [PM o f  Earth’s gravity] -  [PM of moon’s gravity]
(Again, these PMs would be relativised appropriately, namely to Wi, and we would be 
assuming unvarying Co -  in this case zero gravity in all cases.) There are two different 
questions here: ‘how much difference does the Earth’s gravity make compared to some 
other level o f gravity?’, and ‘how much difference does the Earth’s gravity make 
compared to no gravity at all?’ The difference between the questions is entirely down to 
choice o f counterfactual - either moon or zero. Often, as in the way we originally set the 
example up, the implicit choice o f counterfactual will be zero anyway, in which case DM 
and PM will coincide and there will not be even the appearance o f ambiguity. Perhaps 
this is why the issue o f causal strength seems so unproblematic in the Newtonian particle 
case, and indeed in many everyday cases too.
Turn now to a second example (like the first one, adapted from [Sober 1988]) -  do genes 
or environment have the most causal impact on the height o f an individual com plant?
On one view, the situation is more problematic here because both genes and environment 
are necessary inputs for a plant to achieve any height at all, which makes it seem 
impossible to assign either factor a greater importance than the other. But there is a 
second way o f looking at it too. Suppose that we have a traditional genetic input and the 
option o f a new one (a new plant breed, say), and similarly a traditional and new 
environmental input too (a new fertiliser, say). Suppose further that switching to the new 
plant breed increases average plant height by 2cm, but that switching to the new fertiliser
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increases it by 5cm. There is now a clear sense in which, with respect to these particular 
options, switching the environmental input has more causal impact than does switching 
the genetic one. So overall we have something o f a paradox: on the one hand, the causal 
strengths o f genes and environment seem inextricably intertwined and therefore 
necessarily equal; on the other, it seems that one o f them can be seen as more important 
than the other after all.
First, our DM can capture this second sense. How much difference does the new 
fertiliser make relative to the old one? This is given by the subtraction E(new fertiliser) -  
E(old fertiliser), which is just a DM. Likewise, we can also calculate a DM for the new 
plant breed, and then compare the two DMs to see which is bigger and hence which 
factor more important.
What o f the first sense o f causal strength here, according to which genes and environment 
must be adjudged equal? I claim that this sense is the one captured by our other notion, 
PM. Now biologists standardly say that to speak o f causal potencies here is meaningless, 
and [Sober 1988] agrees with them. But let us work through our definition. Let C = 
genes and D = environment, with neutral levels Co and Do. Let Wi be the background 
conditions given C and Do, W2 the background conditions given Co and D, and W3 the 
background conditions given C and D. Then:
PM o f C with respect to W3 = E(C & W3) -  E(C0 & W2)
= (com plant’s height with both environment and genes) -  (com plant’s height 
with environment but no genetic input)
= (com plant’s actual height) -  0 
= com plant’s actual height 
And for environment, we get an exactly analogous calculation:
PM o f D with respect to W3 = E(D & W3) -  E(Do & Wi)
= (com plant’s height with both genes and environment) -  (com plant's height 
with genes but no environmental input)
= (com plant’s actual height) -  0 
= com plant’s actual height
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(We assume in the calculation that each PM is calculated with respect to the presence o f 
the other input. Thus with the PM o f C, for instance, the background level is D rather 
than Do. If the other input was instead absent, then each o f genes and environment would 
have been awarded zero potency. But either way, our basic point here would still hold.) 
So our definition implies that: first, genes and environment each has maximum causal 
potency here -  the plant's height goes from zero to full with their (individual) presence 
compared to their absence. Second, therefore each has the same degree o f PM, as 
desired.
Intuitively, the second conclusion seems fine. I would also defend the first conclusion -  
intuitions that each o f genes and environment could only have perhaps a causal potency 
o f 'a  half reflect, I suspect, an intuition that the total potencies o f two inputs should not 
add up to more than the total effect. But such an intuition would be misplaced here. 
These potencies are being calculated individually, i.e. for each input while assuming the 
other input is already in place. Were we to calculate the 'joint potency', i.e. where C = 
(genes & environment) in our PM formula, then the joint potency would again just be the 
plant's actual height, and no more than that. So under no circumstances is any PM ever 
calculated to be more than the total effect. If  there are many jointly necessary causes, 
then it is surely no weakness o f our scheme if  any one o f those causes when taken 
individually is found to have maximal potency -  given that all the other causes are 
already present. (See also section 3-3 for discussion o f this point.)
So the question o f how much contribution each o f genes and environment made, is now 
well defined. And although the answer we get may be trivial it seems to me that, 
contrary to biological orthodoxy, it is nevertheless certainly not meaningless. The 
simplicity o f the issue in the Newtonian particle case compared with the apparent 
dichotomy o f senses o f causal strength in the biological one, leads [Sober 1988] to 
conclude that 'there is no such thing as the way science apportions causal responsibility; 
rather, we must see how different sciences understand this problem differently, and why 
they do so' (p304). But I think that both cases can be analysed using our same DM/PM
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framework. Therefore, given that DM and PM in fact boil down just to the single 
underlying notion, our suggestion is that a unified understanding across science o f the 
notion o f causal strength is possible after all.
Part o f the confusion here stems from the fact that the second sense o f  causal strength in 
the biology example is usually analysed using the statistical technique o f ANOVA rather 
than using our DM formulation. My own view is that the use o f ANOVA to calculate 
causal strengths in this way, here and elsewhere, is both unnecessary and mistaken -  
although it would take us too far afield to discuss this, see [Northcott 2003b]. The 
important point for our purposes is merely that the DM/PM formulation can indeed be 
applied successfully to these apparently difficult cases.
Causal strengths in group problems
So far, we have defined causal strength only for singleton cases, as it were 'individual- 
PM' and 'individual-DM' for individual plants and individual Newtonian particles. But 
suppose, for example, we were interested not in whether an individual plant's height was 
due more to genes than to environment, i.e. not in the singleton PM and DM. Rather, 
suppose we wanted to know instead which o f genes and environment was the more 
important cause o f height across a whole population o f plants - wanted to know, as it 
were, the 'group-PM' and 'group-DM'? Consider a new example, concerning smoking. 
We could ask either how important a carcinogen this is with respect to a particular 
individual person, or ask instead how important it is across a society as a whole. Can we 
unproblematically scale up our singleton definitions for use in these group cases?
Start with the case o f  one smoker, who smokes at a certain level, say 10 cigarettes per 
day for 30 years. Label this level o f  causal input Ci, the neutral (here zero) level of 
smoking Co, and the effect o f cancer E. As before, let the levels o f other causes o f cancer 
be represented be incorporated in the background conditions, with Wo being the 
background conditions given Co, and Wi the background conditions given Ci. Then, as 
usual, the PM o f C with respect to Wi = E(Ci & Wi) -  E(Co & Wo).
184
Now imagine a group o f two smokers, each member o f which smokes at this same level 
Ci. What will be the total PM o f smoking for this group? Clearly, the total expected 
number o f  extra cancers in the group is given by the PM for the first smoker plus the PM 
for the second. But, despite initial intuitions perhaps, this will not necessarily come out 
to be just twice the first individual potency calculated above. For example, it may be that 
the second smoker has a much better diet than the first one and hence a lower PM of 
smoking. In that case, the group-PM would be less than twice the first smoker’s 
individual-PM. In terms o f our formula, although Ci might be the same for the second 
smoker, Wi would not be. What if, on the other hand, the level o f all other 
carcinogenically relevant factors was the same for the two smokers after all? In that case, 
the two would indeed have identical individual-PMs, and the group-PM would indeed 
just be twice that individual one. Label here such a convenient group ‘causally 
homogeneous’. For our purposes we can, so to speak, treat such groups in the same way 
as individuals. They thus simplify our calculation, since for any causally homogeneous 
group we can obtain the group-PM simply by multiplying the individual-PM by the 
number o f  group members. On the other hand, if a group is not causally homogeneous -  
as with the first case o f different diets -  then the group-PM can after all only be 
calculated by laboriously adding up all the individual-PMs one by one.
In any real population, o f course, we are likely to see many different levels o f smoking.
If two smokers smoke at different levels, it automatically follows that they cannot be part 
o f the same homogeneous group. In practice, therefore, we are likely more to be 
interested in the number o f causally homogeneous groups within a population. For 
each such subgroup, we can calculate an individual-PM. In order to calculate the group- 
PM, we would then multiply each such individual-PM by the number o f  members o f the 
subgroup to reach a ‘subgroup-PM’, and then sum over all the subgroup-PMs in the total 
population. Thus the score for each subgroup would be appropriately weighted for its 
relative preponderance in the population as a whole. If  no causally homogeneous 
subgroup had more than one member, then the calculation would just collapse back to 
summing over all the individual-PMs one by one again.
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Either way, we would reach the same final figure for the group-PM. It represents the 
total effect across a group o f a cause C, compared to the neutral level o f that cause Co. In 
our example, it would correspond to the total number o f  cancers in the population caused 
by smoking, that is to the total number given the actual distribution o f smoking minus the 
total number there would have been given zero smoking. ([Sober et al 1992] calls this 
group-PM 'distribution-dependent' causation and contrasts it with 'potency', by which it 
means what we have been calling individual-PM.)
In formal terms, suppose that for each individual j  within a group we have: an effect E, a 
level o f cause Cij with neutral level Co, background conditions Wij given Cij, and 
background conditions Wo given Co. Then, for C = this particular distribution o f the 
cause in the population (i.e. this particular set o f Cij’s):
The group-PM of C with respect to all the Wij 
= SUM OVER J  OF: [E(Cij & Wij) -  E(C0 & W0)]
And equivalently, for each causally homogeneous subgroups j, each representing a 
proportion Kj o f the total population, then with our notation suitably adjusted to refer to 
the subgroups rather than individuals, we would have:
The group-PM o f C with respect to all the Wij 
= SUM OVER J OF: Kj[E(Cij & Wij) -  E(C0 & W0)]
Note that an exactly analogous analysis applies also to DM, not surprisingly given that as 
we saw earlier it is just relative PM. Thus suppose that for each individual j within a 
group we have: an effect E, a level Cij o f the first cause with neutral level Co, and a level 
Dij o f a second cause with neutral level Do. Let Wij be the background conditions given 
Cij and Do, and let W2j be the background conditions given Co and Dij. Then we arrive 
at:
The group-DM of Ci relative to a second cause Di, with respect to all the Wij 
= SUM OVER J  OF: [E(Cij & D0 & Wij) -  E(Dij & C0 & W2j)]
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(A definition o f group-DM in terms o f causally homogeneous subgroups could be 
formulated in a similar way to before.) For example, if  we took Ci to be the actual 
distribution o f (all kinds of) smoking in a population, and Di to be the distribution if  all 
cigarette smokers smoked pipes instead, then this DM would yield the total number of 
extra cancers in the population that occur due to the smoking o f cigarettes instead o f 
pipes. In other words, it would tell us the potential ‘benefit’ to society o f a mass 
switching from cigarettes to pipes.
In one sense, the group definition is the true general definition o f causal strength. We can 
think now o f our individual-PMs before as being merely special cases o f  group-PM 
where the total number o f individuals (or number o f homogeneous subgroups) is equal to 
one, enabling us exceptionally to calculate a PM in a single go, so to speak. In this way, 
our approach again yields us a unified analysis -  this time o f singleton and group cases.
Desiderata revisited
1) Univocal. This was the whole thrust o f our demonstration that DM and PM boil down 
to one and the same underlying notion.
2) Objective. As stated earlier, once given a specification o f our focus o f interest, to whit 
a specification o f our cause, effect and background conditions, our definition o f causal 
strength proceeds objectively.
3) Quantitative. Our definition is quantitative.
4) Applicable. For causal interaction, see section 3-3 in a moment. Already we have 
shown that the same approach can be applied to singleton and group cases, and also to 
cases from biology often claimed to be awkward. We show later (section 3-4) that using 
it we can compare non-trivially the strengths o f two causes o f any given effect, no matter 
how apparently incommensurable those causes be.
5) Normative. Since we define causal strength to be the quantity o f  effect caused, it 
follows that our scores for causal strength have instrumental normative force. For 
example, to say that (in a particular circumstance) a fertiliser has a causal strength o f 5cm
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with respect to the height o f a plant, implies that the addition o f the fertiliser actually 
would increase that plant's height by 5cm.
Our definition o f causal strength therefore promises indeed to complete satisfactorily our 
overall definition o f approximate truth. In the rest o f this chapter we address the 
remainder o f desideratum 4, plus review briefly how our account o f causal strength 
relates to causation generally, and to work on Bayes nets.
3-3) Causal interaction
Introductory example
Imagine that adding one bag o f Green fertiliser increases a plant’s height by 2 inches, that 
adding instead a bag o f Blue fertiliser increases it by 4 inches, but that adding both the 
fertilisers together does not increase the plant’s height by 6 inches, as we might expect, 
but rather by 14 inches. That is, there is a positive interactive effect between the two o f 
an extra 8 inches. In such a case, what is the causal strength of, say, one bag o f the Green 
fertiliser? Intuitively, the issue seems confusing because it is not clear how -  or whether 
-  to include the big interactive effect with Blue. Is Green’s causal strength 2, or 10, or 
half o f 14, or 2 plus some share o f an interaction o f 8, or perhaps exactly half as much as 
Blue’s, or maybe the question is just meaningless or under-specified?
We may represent the fertiliser puzzle in the form o f a table:









Application o f our formula yields the following immediate solution: Green has two causal 
magnitudes, depending on whether Blue is also present. In particular, Green has a 
magnitude o f 10 units when Blue is present and o f 2 units when it is not. There is no 
need to declare the issue intractably confused.
There is also no need to be embarrassed by Green possessing more than one causal 
strength. We defined causal strength to be a particular and so naturally two different 
contexts means two different strengths. In a similar way, striking a match leads to light 
given sufficient atmospheric oxygen but not otherwise. In this example, the notion that 
there is a single potency for Green is therefore in effect a misplaced attempt to define a 
single potency across several relevantly different circumstances. I am sceptical whether 
we can even make sense o f a cause having an unchanging ‘general’ strength or power 
across contexts (on which see [Northcott 2003a]). But in any case the issue is irrelevant 
to the points o f this section, which all concern causal influence in singleton instances.
Suppose we had had a population o f ten plants, five treated with Blue fertiliser and five 
not. In half the cases therefore, Green would have been awarded a potency o f 12, and in 
the other half only 4. The total potency across this population would have been ( 5 x 1 2 )
+ (5 x 4) = 80, or an average o f 8. As we saw in section 3-2, it makes perfect sense to 
define a group-potency like this for a given population. O f course, if  we altered the 
population so that now more than half the plants were treated with Blue, then we would 
reach some new average potency figure for Green. Hence the result for the group- 
potency is specific to choice o f  population, exactly analogously to how individual 
potency was specific to choice o f Blue or non-Blue background conditions. We may 
define Green’s causal strength with respect to a population o f plants treated with Blue, 
with respect to one o f plants not treated with Blue, or with respect to a specified mixture 
of the two. What we cannot meaningfully do is define it independent o f  any specification
189
o f context at all. For this reason, our table o f results above cannot be captured fully by 
just a single causal strength for each o f Green and Blue.
C ausal com position and  black boxes
A recurrent challenge when working with causes is to find out their laws o f composition. 
In order to be useful for prediction, knowledge o f the various causes at play is not enough 
on its own; we also need to know how they interact, or compose, with each other. We 
cannot simply assume additive composition, as J.S. Mill does. When defining the 
strength o f interacting causes, the same issue crops up. As we have just seen, knowing 
the potencies o f  the Green and Blue fertilisers acting on their own was not sufficient for 
us to know their potency once they were interacting with each other. On their own,
Green had a potency o f 4 and Blue o f 2, but acting together they had a joint potency o f 
14.
Our emphasis on context-specificity now delivers another advantage -  we no longer need 
to know any general laws o f causal composition. Instead, we need know only how 
causes actually composed in the particular context we are concerned with. For example, 
suppose the Green and Blue fertilisers combine to give a score o f 14 only when it is 
normal weather. When the weather is hot they combine for a score o f  18, except if the 
weather is also unusually wet in which case they compose additively and yield a score of 
only 6 . Any ambition to define the causal strengths o f the two fertilisers in some kind of 
general, context-independent way would among other things require us to be aware o f 
this full pattern o f causal composition. By contrast, defining it only case by case as we 
have done means that there is no such necessity for all these details. All we needed to 
know in our example was how Green and Blue actually composed in the specific case we 
were interested in. Here (let us assume) there was normal weather and so they composed 
to produce a joint effect o f 14. This is all the information we need. The way the two 
causes might compose in counterfactual hot or wet conditions is irrelevant to defining 
their causal strengths in normal conditions. In this sense, it is therefore much easier to 
define causal strengths only context-specifically, since much less information is required.
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Once given the background conditions, for any given cause C all we need to know is the 
value o f the effect E in its presence compared with the value o f E when it is absent.
There is a further sense in which our definition o f causal strength makes life easier -  all 
we need consider is the final value o f the effect term. We have taken no notice o f the 
underlying causal mechanism that is producing this effect, for instance whatever may be 
happening at the molecular level as Green and Blue both impact on the plant at the same 
time. We leave the causal mechanism a black box, as it were, and take note only o f the 
final result. This may indeed make life easier, but does it come at an unacceptable cost? 
Consider now an example that might be taken to suggest that it does, in order to see why 
in fact it does not.
Suppose that in place o f fertilisers and plants, we talk instead o f workers, managers and 
production o f widgets. Imagine that the worker on his (or her) own can only achieve an 
output o f 2 widgets, as without the manager to provide the necessary final authorisation 
most o f the worker’s widget-building labour is left unexploited or incomplete. Imagine 
next that the manager on his (or her) own achieves an output o f 4, since now the 
necessary authorisations can be made and even without the worker the manager is able to 
do a little labour himself. Imagine finally that both the worker and manager are present: 
now the total output will be 14 widgets, since the worker can produce much more labour 
than the manager was able to, and the manager can dispense all the necessary 
authorisations so that none o f the worker’s efforts go to waste. There is thus a positive 
interactive effect.
The payoff structure here is o f course deliberately identical to that o f the fertilisers: 
namely, 2, 4 and 14. It follows that, by our definition, so are the potencies identical too. 
Thus, the manager has a potency o f 4 on his own, but 12 if  the worker is there too; 
similarly, the worker, like the Blue fertiliser earlier, is awarded potencies o f  2 and 10.
But, the objection runs, are these values really intuitively satisfactory? Reasons why they 
might not be can, I think, be crystallised into two slightly different objections. First, it 
might be argued that, as it were, it is the worker who is really doing most o f  the work and
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our potency scores do not reflect this. Second, our formula incorporates the full 
interactive effects into the potency scores for individual inputs -  is this acceptable?
Begin with the first point. Our worker is doing all the hard labour while the manager is 
merely signing some forms; surely it would be more just, therefore, if  the worker 
received the lion’s share o f credit for the final output? This objection is only made 
possible by our knowledge o f the details o f the causal mechanism underlying the final 
results. If  the objection held up, therefore, it would also be a strong argument against our 
strategy above o f leaving -  for the purposes o f defining causal strength -  these causal 
mechanisms as black boxes.
But I think the issue in fact boils down merely to confusion about the explanandum (a 
danger also emphasised in [Sober et al 1992]). Our effect E here was the final output of 
widgets. For that effect, the worker on his own was indeed unable to produce many 
widgets, whereas -  once the worker was in place -  the introduction o f the form-signing 
manager did indeed have a dramatic impact on final widget output. Accordingly, it is 
desirable that our formula captures this dramatic impact. I suspect the objection here is 
really more a moral one, and is motivated by the sense that the worker is putting in a lot 
more labour and physical effort than is the manager, and that this should be recognised. 
Maybe so, but in that case we should re-specify our effect E to be something like hours o f 
effort or litres o f sweat, rather than final output o f widgets. Or maybe instead widgets 
that are built but unauthorised should be awarded a score o f 0.8 o f  a unit or some such.
All these modifications o f  E would indeed tend to yield higher potency scores for the 
worker and lower ones for the manager. The point here is that our controversy turns out 
only to lie in the specification o f E, and none o f the foregoing constitutes a criticism of 
our definition o f causal strength itself. (Perhaps our contrast here between the different 
specifications o f E is an example o f the classic one in economics between the labour and 
exchange theories o f value, or more generally is an example o f  the divergence between 
moral and economic accounting.)
O f course, none o f this is meant to deny that knowledge o f underlying causal mechanisms
192
may often be extremely useful, perhaps essential, methodologically, for instance for 
working out the likely impact o f a cause in different circumstances. Moreover, a 
necessary condition for applying our definition o f causal strength in the first place was 
that we agree on the causal ontology, and presumably knowledge o f causal mechanisms 
is likely to be more than useful for achieving that. So we are not making any claims here 
about instrumentalism in general. Rather, our claim is much narrower -  merely that, 
once we are agreed on our ontology, then for the specific purpose o f defining causal 
strength we need not worry about the underlying mechanism.
The full credit strategy
Turn now to the second objection. A more contentious aspect o f the solution is what we 
might call the decision to award each cause full credit. When Blue is already present, the 
addition o f Green indeed yields an extra 10 inches, but intuitively it seems we can 
decompose this into the 2-inch ‘pure’ effect o f Green acting alone, plus a further 8 inches 
due to the interaction between Green and Blue. Why, it might be objected, should Green 
receive full credit for all o f these extra 8 inches, rather than ‘share’ that extra credit with 
Blue? Similarly Blue is awarded a causal strength o f 12 inches in the presence o f Green, 
likewise receiving full credit for the positive interactive effect. The unease is heightened 
by the following consequence: when acting on the plant together, Blue and Green are 
now awarded strengths o f  12 and 10 respectively -  even though this adds up to more than 
the total effect o f 14. How can this be right? How can two components each have a 
strength o f more than half the total?
But I suspect that our intuitions here are, so to speak, informed by a naive additive 
sensibility. For why take it as a priori that component causal strengths should always 
add up to the total? This will be correct o f any additive system, true enough, but our 
starting point was precisely that real-world systems are often not additive but instead 
interactive. In such cases, by definition, the component strengths will therefore not add 
up to the joint strength.
193
The fact that many laws o f  physics, such as conservation o f energy, are additive has no 
bearing on the matter. Energy, for instance, is typically dissipated from a given system, 
in which case with respect to any particular effect it may not be conserved. For example, 
friction implies that the energy o f a moving rock will after a time be less than the energy 
given it initially by my push. Remember that our formula encompasses the possibility o f 
the change from Co to C leading also to a change in background conditions W. In 
particular, the latter may include any changes resulting from the energy dissipated. Thus 
conservation o f energy is preserved globally even though not in our system o f interest. 
Similarly, no contradiction o f the laws o f  physics was implied by the positive interaction 
o f our fertilisers.
In essence, the point ought to be no more controversial than the following: if  we have a 
box but no match, then the addition o f a match means we shall have a light where before 
there was none. Equally, if  we have a match but no box, then this time the addition o f the 
box leads to a light where before there was none. Therefore, given the presence o f the 
other, the box and the match each individually leads to a light where before there was 
none. But presumably no one would take this therefore to be paradoxical, on the ground 
that now the addition o f the match and box together must somehow be assumed to lead to 
two lights.
In any case, raw intuition is a fickle master. It might be argued intuitively that since 
Green is necessary for the interactive effect to occur at all, so it should receive full credit 
for it. Then again, since Green on its own is insufficient for that effect, maybe it actually 
deserves no credit. All in all, I think the moral is that arguing purely at the intuitive level 
does not get us very far here. We must appeal instead to the wider logic o f  the issue.
To that end, note immediately two preliminary points in defence o f  our full credit 
strategy. First, the joint causal strength o f Green and Blue is just equal to the effect with 
both present compared to that with both absent, in other words is equal to the total effect 
o f 14. Thus no causal strength is ever calculated to be more than the total effect. Second, 
our definition o f causal strength in section 3-2 automatically yields the full credit
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strategy, so to the extent that the ideas behind that definition are persuasive so this lends 
us support here.
But we need to make a more detailed case. For this purpose, I shall take the only feasible 
alternatives to the full credit strategy to be:
1) The ‘pure’ strategy. None o f an interactive surplus should be added to a 
cause’s individual strength. In our example, this would mean that Green 
scores 2 .
2) The ‘sharing’ strategy. On this view, a cause should be credited with only a 
partial share o f  the interactive surplus. In our example, this would lead to 
Green receiving (in the interactive case) a score somewhere in between 2 and 
10. One advantage o f this manoeuvre, and perhaps the motivation for it in the 
first place, is that -  given an appropriate split -  now Green’s and Blue’s 
individual causal strengths could add up to their joint strength o f 14 after all.
I shall argue that neither o f these other strategies is defensible, and that for this and other 
reasons the full credit solution is correct. Green’s causal strength in the interactive case 
is indeed 10.
An independence requirement
Following [Davidson 1980] and many others, in this thesis take causal relations to hold 
between two events and in particular therefore to be a feature o f the world rather than of 
our descriptions o f it. That is, a causal strength is fixed by physical reality. Accordingly, 
once we are agreed on which two events are cause and effect, I claim that the following 
Independence Requirement must hold:
Causal strengths are independent o f arbitrary re-descriptions o f physically
identical situations
The idea here is straightforward. For example, the event o f my kicking the ball has a 
certain causal strength, given by the ball’s subsequent acceleration. This strength will
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remain the same whether we choose then to describe the weather as ‘cloudy’ or as 
‘gloomy’, or to describe the kick itself as ‘strong’ or as ‘spirited’. Likewise, it will stay 
the same regardless o f  pragmatic or external considerations like whether my kick was 
stronger than my sister’s or than my brother’s. It may or may not have been stronger than 
either o f  these other kicks, but o f course that has no bearing on the causal strength o f my 
kick.
Turn now to the issue o f  foreground versus background causes. So far we have been 
considering only the Green and Blue fertilisers, but o f course there are many other causes 
o f the plant’s growth too: sunlight, warmth, nutritious soil, water, and so on. When 
considering the causal strength o f Green, say, we have up to now been concerned only 
with whether it is interacting with Blue and implicitly ignoring the issue o f  whether it is 
also interacting with these other causes. That is, Blue has been foregrounded for special 
attention and these other causes left in the background. Much has been written on the 
distinction between foreground and background causes. But I think it is uncontroversial 
that from the point o f view o f physical reality there is nothing special about the Blue 
fertiliser over these other causes that mandates us to privilege it in this way. So for our 
purposes grant all the causes equal status, as it were. The only one that is privileged in 
our example is Green itself, since by definition when assessing Green’s causal strength 
we are comparing the plant’s height with it to that without it. But beyond Green, all the 
other causes are on a par.
Accordingly, I interpret the Independence Requirement to imply in our fertiliser example 
that the causal strength o f Green is independent o f how we arbitrarily demarcate those 
other causes -  that is, independent o f which o f the background causes we choose to 
highlight for special attention. We shall compare the case where Blue is foregrounded, as 
it has been up to now, with the case where by contrast Blue is consigned merely to be one 
o f  the background causes and it is the plant’s need for nutritious soil that is foregrounded 
instead. The actual physical reality is identical either way; all that is changing is our 
labelling. But we shall see that only on the full credit account is causal strength invariant 
with respect to such arbitrary foreground/background designations. Following either o f
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the pure or sharing strategies, by contrast, renders Green’s causal strength unacceptably 
mutable.
To demonstrate the point clearly, we shall in our formula have to be precise about the 
definition o f the background conditions W. To begin with, suppose that we are 
concerned with the causal strength o f Green in the presence o f Blue. Let Wi be the 
background conditions just excluding Blue so as to foreground it, just as we have always 
been doing up to now. Let Wo be the background conditions just excluding Blue, only 
now given the absence o f Green. For notational ease, label the addition o f one bag of 
Green fertiliser to be cause G, and o f one bag o f Blue to be B. Then the causal strength 
o f Green according to our formula is (assuming the neutral level o f  Green to be just the 
simple case o f its absence):
E(Green & Blue & background conditions) -  E(not-Green & Blue & background 
conditions)
= E(G & B & W i)  -  E(~G & B & W o)
Next turn to the case where instead o f Blue, the foregrounded cause is now the soil 
nutrients. Label those nutrients N. Assume that they actually are present, and so were 
part o f Wi above. We now define W2 to be the background conditions just excluding 
these nutrients, and instead including Blue. For simplicity, label still by W o the 
corresponding background conditions given the absence o f  Green, even though strictly 
speaking these will not be the same as for the Wo above. (Assume for simplicity also that 
the levels o f B and N  are independent o f whether G is present or not.) Then the causal 
strength o f  Green according to our formula will then be:
E(Green & nutrients & background conditions) -  E(not-Green & nutrients & 
background conditions)
= E(G & N  & W 2) -  E(~G & N & W o)
The important point is that these two expressions for Green’s causal strength are the 
same. They both compare the effect with and without Green, given that all the other 
causes are in place. Thus (for our chosen figures) they give the same numerical answer
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of 10. If  we defined W3 to be the background conditions just excluding Blue and the 
nutrients (and again disregard irrelevant technical niceties in our specification o f Wo), 
then both formulas alike could be re-written:
E(G & B & N  & W3) -  E(~G & B & N  & Wo)
= E(Green & Blue & nutrients & background conditions) -  E(not-Green & Blue 
& nutrients & background conditions)
Therefore, as desired, causal strength as given by the full credit strategy does not vary 
depending simply on which o f  the background causes we arbitrarily promote to the 
foreground. But if, by contrast, we exclude interactive effects in the manner o f the pure 
strategy, we shall see now that we no longer get this desirable constancy result. The pure 
strategy, recall, says that Green’s causal strength is 2, in other words that it should not 
include any o f the interactive surplus with Blue. Formally, we may write this:
E(Green & not-Blue & background conditions) -  E(not-Green & not-Blue & 
background conditions)
= E(G & ~B & Wi) -  E(~G & ~B & Wo)
= only 2 , not 10, on our figures 
(Again we shall gloss over non-germane technicalities, thus enabling us to keep the same 
notation as before for the different background conditions.)
But now turn to the case where it is the soil nutrients, not Blue, that are foregrounded.
By exactly parallel reasoning to above, we shall want to exclude from Green’s causal 
strength any interactive effects with the soil nutrients. This will yield:
E(Green & not-nutrients & background conditions) -  E(not-Green & not-nutrients 
& background conditions)
= E(G & ~N & W2) -  E(~G & ~N & Wo)
The sting in the tail is that this expression for Green’s causal strength will in general be 
different to the one o f the previous paragraph. With Blue foregrounded, we were 
considering the impact o f adding Green given that Blue was not present but that soil 
nutrients (as part o f the extant background Wi) were. Now with the nutrients 
foregrounded, we are considering the impact o f adding Green given that Blue is present
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(as part o f the extant background W2) but that soil nutrients are not. The difference is 
illustrated by the fact that, assuming plausibly that soil nutrients are necessary conditions 
for any plant growth at all, the latter value for Green’s causal strength is 0, not 2.
This difference comes out clearly in the formulas if, as before, we let W3 be the 
background conditions excluding both Blue and soil nutrients. Under the pure strategy, 
with Blue foregrounded the causal strength o f Green was in effect deemed to be:
E(G & ~B & N & W3) -  E(~G & ~B & N & Wo)
= E(Green & not-Blue & nutrients & background conditions) -  E(not-Green & 
not-Blue & nutrients & background conditions)
But with soil nutrients foregrounded, the causal strength o f Green was instead calculated 
as:
E(G & B & ~N & W3) -  E(~G & B & ~N & Wo)
= E(Green & Blue & not-nutrients & background conditions) -  E(not-Green & 
Blue & not-nutrients & background conditions)
Where in the first formula we have ~B&N, in the second we have instead B & -N . I 
conclude that the pure strategy does not satisfy the Independence Requirement.
The root o f the problem is that the pure strategy disallows the interactive effect with one 
background cause (i.e. the foregrounded one) while implicitly letting through those with 
all the others. This suggests that there might be a remedy for such arbitrariness, namely 
just to disallow interactive effects with all background causes equally. Thus, the 
argument would run, the pure strategy should stipulate that all causes other than Green be 
set to their ‘normal’ non-interacting levels. Here, for instance, this would presumably 
mean to assume in all calculations that the Blue fertiliser was not present. That way, the 
Independence Requirement would indeed be satisfied. But we would also be left with a 
problem, namely the obligation to set all causes o f E to their ‘normal’ levels. In our 
example for instance, we would need to identify the ‘normal’ levels o f  soil nutrients, o f 
water, o f the farmer’s psychology, o f planetary distance from the sun ... and so on. Such 
a task would seem daunting indeed, a nightmare o f arbitrariness, yet our value for 
Green’s causal strength would be critically dependent upon getting it right.
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Does the sharing strategy fare any better? Recall, this stipulated that Green’s causal 
strength incorporate some but not all o f its interactive surplus with Blue. But why pick 
out just Blue here? If  the rule is that Green should share only with whatever background 
cause we choose to put in the foreground, then once again Green’s causal strength will be 
inconstant with respect to that arbitrary choice and so the Independence Requirement be 
breached again. For instance, if  we had foregrounded the soil nutrients instead o f Blue, 
Green would now have been sharing an interactive surplus o f 10 rather than 8 units and 
so in general would have had a different value. (Assume plausibly that soil nutrients are 
necessary for any plant growth at all. Then, given the presence o f Blue in the 
background, Green without nutrients yields a height o f 0 inches, nutrients without Green 
one o f 4 inches, and the two together one o f  14 inches. Therefore Green and the nutrients 
generate an interactive surplus o f 14 -  (4 + 0) = 10.) If alternatively the rule is 
specifically that Green’s causal strength should include a share o f its interaction with 
Blue but no other cause, then we must justify such an odd stipulation on objective 
context-independent grounds. I can think o f no such justification. The only remaining 
solution would be, as with the pure strategy in the previous paragraph, to identify 
‘normal’ levels for all the background causes and then presumably to share out their joint 
interactive surplus universally. But this would again provoke the nightmare o f 
arbitrariness (as well as several other undesirable consequences that we turn to in a 
moment). The obvious alternative, o f course, is simply to set each background cause 
instead to the level that actually obtains in reality. But to do this while simultaneously 
avoiding the problem o f undesirable inconstancies, any definition o f causal strength must 
include interactive effects fully.
M ore on background conditions
In many treatments o f causation, there is a tendency to neglect background conditions. 
But here I think that would be a costly mistake -  because background conditions are 
often causes that turn out themselves to be relevant non-additively. For instance, any 
necessary but insufficient cause o f  the plant’s eventual height implies a small or zero
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height given its or Green’s absence and full height only if  both are present. In other 
words, as we saw above in the case o f soil nutrients, it implies such a background cause’s 
own positive interactive effect with Green. The other background causes we mentioned 
earlier, namely sunlight, warmth and water, are also each plausibly necessary but 
insufficient conditions and thus, strictly speaking, themselves compose interactively with 
Green (with respect to the particular effect o f the plant’s height). (More generally, the 
same will be true even in the realm of apparently additive analyses such as those of 
elementary mechanics, since shielding conditions are implicitly always present in the 
background even then and are in turn themselves presumably necessary but insufficient 
for the particular mechanical effects under study. Thus there is a sense in which 
interactive effects are in fact ubiquitous even in contexts usually thought safe for additive 
composition.)
These thoughts lend further, somewhat more informal, support to the full credit approach. 
Return to the sharing strategy. We see now that many background conditions also 
compose interactively with Green and so presumably should be equally as entitled as 
Blue to a share o f the interactive surplus. Indeed, strictly speaking, the entire total effect 
o f the plant’s height is an interactive surplus -  between the two fertilisers and all these 
background conditions. This raises several new difficulties for the sharing strategy.
First, we become vulnerable to intractable counting controversies. Is there really a 
canonical categorization o f every single background cause? For example, are soil 
nutrients to count only as one cause, entitled presumably only to one unit-share o f the 
interactive surplus? Or ought they to be disaggregated into nitrogen, phosphorus, lack o f 
salinity, air circulation, and so on, all o f these disaggregated factors being entitled to unit- 
shares o f the surplus in their own right? The sharing strategy requires that such questions 
always admit o f non-arbitrary answers.
Second, even if  some canonical list o f causes were available, it is not clear that each o f 
those causes should receive an equal share o f the surplus. For example, while the 
interactive surplus between Green and Blue is 8, that between Green and the soil
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nutrients is 10 (see above). Should not this objective asymmetry between Blue and the 
nutrients be reflected in their shares o f the overall surplus? One can imagine further 
complications in a similar vein. For instance, suppose (varying the story) that Blue and 
warmth were enough to yield some plant height even without the nutrients, whereas 
nutrients and warmth without Blue yielded only a smaller height. This would now argue, 
contrary to the lesson above from their interactions with Green, in favour o f the greater 
importance o f Blue over the nutrients. It is not clear that there could exist any single 
scheme for sharing the overall surplus that satisfactorily resolved all such complexities.
Third, the sharing strategy also leads to unsatisfactory results in everyday examples. For 
instance, the causal strength o f my kick on a ball would not be just the ball’s resultant 
acceleration. Rather, it would only be some (arguably ill-defined -  see above) share o f 
that acceleration, the rest o f the credit being distributed around the many various 
interacting background causes like ambient air pressure and temperature, the rules o f 
football, the fact that I was free to play that day, and so on. In other words, we would 
lose our basic notion o f  the strength o f a cause being the size o f effect it leads to. (This 
last difficulty applies also to the pure strategy.)
Explanation
If  called on to apportion explanatory responsibility between Green and Blue in the case o f 
the 14-inch plant, we would proceed in a similar way to how we have been defining their 
causal strengths -  how much difference, for instance, did it make that Green was present 
rather than absent? It is not clear what alternative way o f thinking about explanatory 
credit would be plausible, at least with regard to causal explanations. Therefore this 
section’s arguments have force not just with respect to causal influence but also with 
respect to our explanatory talk, so that on our account we should adopt a full credit 
strategy for the latter too.
A further strike against the pure strategy as applied to explanations, is that it seems to 
leave large numbers o f events simply unexplained at all. For instance, i f -  following the
202
pure strategy in our fertiliser example -  we award Green 2 units o f explanatory credit and 
Blue 4, it is hard to see how any plant height above 6 inches, let alone one o f 14, has been 
thereby accounted for. This problem becomes still more acute given the ubiquity o f 
background causes that are necessary but not sufficient for the final effect. Strictly 
speaking, remember, such background factors are themselves composing interactively 
with the fertilisers. In these cases therefore, the entire final effect would be the result of 
interactive effects and so the pure strategy would be forced to conclude that none o f the 
causes receive any explanatory credit at all. In our example Green, Blue, soil nutrients, 
water and so on would all be assigned exactly zero explanatory force with respect to the 
plant’s height. This seems like a reductio ad absurdum for any account o f apportioning 
explanatory responsibility. Moreover if  it is shown that such background causes can be 
disaggregated into infinitely many sub-causes, and if  shown further that there is no non- 
arbitrary way o f disallowing this, then the sharing strategy would suffer the same fate.
Really, underlying this is a central truth -  that at least in matters o f explanation we in fact 
all the time naturally follow a full credit strategy already. For example, suppose that I 
work a pump hard while you work it only softly, and that between us we create the effect 
o f a certain degree o f air pressure inside the pump. It seems clear then that my hard 
pumping explains more o f  that air pressure than do your softer efforts. Suppose further 
that my and your pressings on the pump do not interact, i.e. that they compose additively. 
Nevertheless even here we have seen there would be one further way in which we were 
still incorporating interaction, since my work on the pump only produced greater air 
pressure because o f interaction in its turn with background causes such as the rigidity and 
airtightness o f the pump's lining, the ambient atmospheric temperature being what it was, 
and so on. The latter causes on their own do not create any air pressure in the pump 
beyond the baseline background level, but then neither on its own does my pumping; it is 
only the joint action o f all three that yields the effect o f increased air pressure inside the 
pump. This is therefore an interactive effect for which my pumping was all along being 
given full credit when, a few lines ago, we agreed that it explained more o f the pressure 
increase than did your softer pumping. That is, even in cases o f apparently additive
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composition like the pump, our explanations have implicitly always been committed to 
the full credit strategy already.
To see this point in a different way, consider that perhaps we could have taken your 
working on the pump for granted, put it among our background causes and concentrated 
instead on the relative impacts of my work and o f the ambient air temperature, 
contrasting the case o f a summer's and winter's day. Which explains more o f the 
increased air pressure inside the pump -  my pumping, or that it was summer rather than 
winter? Again, when before we accepted that my hard pumping was more explanatorily 
important than your softer efforts, implicitly we were also accepting the inclusion o f the 
interaction effect with the background air temperature. There is no reason this latter 
decision should suddenly become unacceptable now just because we have arbitrarily 
designated air temperature rather than your pumping to be the other cause to foreground.
C ausal overdeterm ination
Just as necessary but insufficient background conditions are examples o f  positive causal 
interaction, so also are cases the ‘other way round’ -  when causes are sufficient but 
unnecessary -  examples o f negative interaction. In particular, this is true o f when we 
have multiple sufficient causes o f an effect, in other words true o f cases o f  (symmetric) 
causal overdetermination. That is, technically speaking, causal overdetermination is 
merely an example o f interactive effects at work. To see this more clearly, construct a 
table for the standard story o f  how the multiple shots o f a firing squad overdetermine a 
prisoner’s death. (For simplicity, assume a squad o f only two soldiers.)
Table -  Prisoner and the firing squad
1st soldier shoots 1st soldier does not shoot 
2nd soldier shoots 1 1
n  J
2 soldier does not shoot 1 0
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Take the shot o f each soldier to be a cause, and the state o f the prisoner to be the effect.
In particular, label the prisoner’s death to be an effect o f 1 and his survival to be one o f 0. 
Then it is clear that the effect when both causes are present (i.e. 1) is less than the sum o f 
the causes’ individual effects (1 + 1), in other words that this is an example o f  negative 
interaction. None o f the central arguments in this section has turned on the distinction 
between the interaction being positive or negative, so the full credit strategy is equally 
mandated for the latter case. Thus the causal strengths here incorporate the interactive 
effect fully.
I therefore conclude: each soldier’s shot has a strength o f 0 when the other shoots too and 
o f 1 when the other does not shoot, while the two soldiers’ shots together have a joint 
strength o f  1. In particular, in the normal firing squad situation where both soldiers do 
indeed shoot, the causal strengths o f their individual shots are 0 -  and not either 1 or any 
fractional share o f  1. If  (plausibly) we identify a zero strength with not being a cause at 
all, then this is equivalent to saying that in the case o f the firing squad neither soldier’s 
shot is a cause o f the prisoners’ death individually even though the two shots together are. 
Put differently, each shot kills the prisoner if  fired alone but not if  fired in tandem with 
the other.
Overdetermination has long been an embarrassment for counterfactual theories of 
causation, since the above result has been deemed unavoidable and yet simultaneously 
absurd. Hence the many attempts to evade it, such as the hope that micro-examination 
might show that ‘really’ one o f the bullets hit the prisoner before the other, thus turning 
the problem into (the admittedly scarcely more tractable) one o f pre-emption. But even 
perhaps the most sophisticated attempt, this time applying the exciting apparatus o f 
structural equations and causal graphs, yields the same stubbornly absurd result 
[Hitchcock 2001, p289]. (Admittedly, Hitchcock (following Pearl) does go on to suggest 
a definition by which the shots would after all be causes individually. But this relies on 
the somewhat gerrymandered notion o f ‘weakly active’ causal routes, about which even
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he himself comments (p290): ‘I fully grant that [they are] less intuitive and less well- 
motivated’ than the main concept o f ‘active’ routes that he uses elsewhere.) Thus our 
result is in itself hardly novel; rather, the novelty lies in the attitude it is recommended we 
adopt towards it. In particular I do not see it as absurd, nor therefore as an 
embarrassment to counterfactual theories. It follows that attempts by theorists to evade it 
are not just unsuccessful but also unnecessary.
The prisoner’s death does not go unexplained, since it is agreed by all that the two shots 
together do cause it. Therefore any sense o f absurdity we diagnose to be the symptom 
merely o f an unwarranted attachment to thinking additively. In particular, we have no 
good reason to demand that a cause’s strength in cases o f interaction be the same as it is 
otherwise, and plenty o f  reason to demand the opposite. In a world o f  interactive effects 
we must learn to adjust our thinking about the relation between individual and joint 
causation. Once we do, it becomes apparent that the paradox o f overdetermination is 
really no paradox at all.
Conclusion
I do not think it is immediately clear intuitively how to trace causal influence in cases of 
interaction, as our initial fertiliser example was designed to illustrate. But I conclude that 
the correct analysis actually turns out to be straightforward: a factor takes full causal 
credit for any interactive effects in which it participates. New light is thereby cast on the 
familiar puzzle o f  causal overdetermination. Following any alternative strategy to ours 
leaves causal influence unacceptably inconstant with respect to arbitrary re-descriptions 
of physically identical situations, as well as raising the prospect both o f intractable 
counting controversies and o f unsatisfactory results in everyday examples. Standard 
explanatory practice also turns out implicitly to have endorsed the full credit strategy all 
along. Moreover, furnishing explanations any other way would frequently imply an 
inability to grant positive explanatory credit to any factor at all.
Therefore there is a clear answer as to how a definition o f  causal strength should handle
206
interactive effects, and happily all the desiderata our account satisfied earlier remain 
satisfied now. It follows that our account o f approximate truth is safely applicable even 
to cases o f interaction.
3-4) Commensurability
In troduction
Is it possible to compare the strengths o f two causes that work in apparently 
incommensurable ways? To get a sense o f this issue, consider the question of which is 
the stronger cause o f cancer, smoking or plutonium [Sober et al 1992]? To be sure, 
smoking is responsible for more cancers in our society than is plutonium, but on the other 
hand it is also much more widespread. And whereas just one grain o f plutonium lodged 
in a lung makes cancer virtually certain, even years o f heavy smoking makes cancer 
merely more likely. So there seems to remain a sense in which, although fortunately rare, 
still plutonium is a stronger (or more ‘potent’) cause o f cancer than is smoking. Is this 
intuition well founded?
One problem seems to be that it is very hard to get any ‘absolute’ means o f  comparison. 
Although one grain o f plutonium seems like a small chunk o f cause next to years of 
heavy smoking, there is no common natural unit by which each can be measured. Is lg  
o f plutonium equivalent to 1 cigarette, 1 pack o f cigarettes, or 20,000 packs? By 
contrast, if  comparing the causal strengths, say, o f gravity and electromagnetism, this 
problem seems to go away since the strength o f each can be compared readily using the 
common notion o f ‘force’. Likewise, if  comparing the strength o f my push on a rock 
with yours, again there seems to be a common natural unit for comparing our two efforts. 
This suggests that the key to being able to compare the strengths o f two causes is that 
they be commensurable. But, we shall argue, this analysis is mistaken since
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commensurability turns out to be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for such 
comparisons.
Note from the start that since this essay’s sense o f commensurability is at issue even in 
cases where the causes themselves are already agreed on, it has nothing to do with the 
ontological sense o f commensurability discussed by Kuhn and others. (Note also that, in 
my view, the true diagnosis o f the problem in the smoking-plutonium case actually lies in 
a mistaken implicit appeal to the notion o f a general causal strength independent o f 
context [Northcott 2003a].)
To get a further sense o f the issue, turn now to an example from earlier -  which o f genes 
or environment was more responsible for the height o f an individual plant? As noted, 
biologists have been taught to regard this type o f  question as meaningless since both 
genes and environment are necessary inputs for a plant to achieve any quantity o f height 
at all, which makes it seem impossible to assign either factor a greater importance than 
the other. Perhaps it would be better to describe any such comparisons as trivial rather 
than meaningless -  once given the presence o f the other, the addition o f either genes or 
environment will each score ‘full’ causal strength in the sense o f  leading to a full plant 
rather than none at all. But still, even on this reasoning, neither factor could ever be 
assigned a greater strength than the other. [Sober 1988] attributes the root o f  the problem 
to the incommensurability o f  genes and environment. For instance, does switching from 
one plant breed to another represent a greater or lesser change than switching from one 
fertiliser to another? There is no general answer because, unlike in the case o f  the 
Newtonian particle, there is no common natural unit we can use to equate one chunk o f 
genetic cause with one chunk o f environmental cause.
The same issue crops up in many places. For example, a long-running debate in the 
philosophy o f biology concerns the relative importance in evolution o f various factors -  
selection, genetic drift, migration, rate o f mutation, and so on. But are these different 
factors even commensurable? If  not, their relative importance (it is claimed) would not 
be well defined. [Matthen and Ariew 2002, p68], for instance, complain that ‘there is no
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common currency in which to compare the contributions o f [these] different evolutionary 
“forces”.’
[Lewontin 1974, p402] illustrates the general point vividly:
If two men lay bricks to build a wall, we may quite fairly measure their contributions by 
counting the number laid by each; but if one mixes the mortar and the other lays the 
bricks, it would be absurd to measure their relative quantitative contributions by 
measuring the volumes of bricks and of mortar.
Accordingly [Sober 1988, p312], speaking for many, offers the following conjecture:
For it to make sense to ask what (or how much) a cause contributes to an effect, the 
various causes must be commensurable in the way they produce their effects.
But despite its apparent reasonableness this conjecture is wrong.
C om m ensurability  versus separability
All causes are ‘commensurable’ in that they impact on the same effect. But the claim at 
issue here is that they need also to be commensurable in the way they produce their 
effects. Thus although the bricklayer and mortar-mixer each contribute to the same final 
effect (i.e. the wall), the reason the strengths o f their contributions are not comparable is 
seen to be because they contribute in, as it were, incommensurable currencies. There are 
many causes in the world that are incommensurable in this second sense, so if  the 
conjecture really were true it would represent a serious limitation on, for instance, our 
ability to compare the impacts o f different causal interventions. That is, many choices o f 
intervention are between incommensurable instruments; must we declare all such 
instruments’ efficacies incomparable?
True enough, there does seem to be something distinguishing cases like genes- 
environment with trivial causal strengths from those like gravity-electricity with
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interesting ones. I believe the important factor though is not commensurability; rather, it 
is marked by what I shall label separability. By this term I do not mean merely that two 
causes are distinguishable (although that too is necessary); rather I mean that their effects 
are (potentially) distinguishable. The key structural feature is really whether at least one 
of the causes is individually sufficient to produce any quantity o f the effect o f interest.
For example, genes and environment are easily individuated but neither without the other 
could have produced any quantity o f the final effect at all, and this property is symmetric. 
In our terminology the two are not separable, and it makes no sense awarding them 
different causal strengths. If, on the other hand -  as with gravity, electricity and the 
Newtonian particle -  each cause is individually sufficient to produce some effect, i.e. we 
do have separability, then (and only then) may each be deemed individually responsible 
for different particular quantities o f that effect and hence their strengths indeed be 
deemed to differ.
[Sober 1988] gives a thought-example o f genes and environment each contributing 
‘height particles’ to a plant, and claims that this would enable non-trivial comparisons of 
causal strength by creating commensurability o f genetic and environmental effects. But 
my view is that these height particles could only achieve that goal in so far as they led to 
separable impacts on the plant’s final height. Their commensurability is irrelevant.
Note that often this whole issue applies, as it were, only to absolute, not to relative, causal 
strengths. For example, which is more important for producing speech, my brain for 
thinking o f  the words or my vocal chords for generating the physical sound? Clearly, 
both are necessary for producing any speech at all and so in our sense are inseparable. 
Accordingly, each must be awarded the same absolute causal strength. But comparing 
my vocal chords when healthy to when they are hoarse, it may well be that my power o f 
speech is a little bit greater -  thereby yielding a positive but small strength for healthy 
relative to hoarse vocal chords. Comparing my powers o f speech before and after a 
major stroke, on the other hand, it may be that the difference is now enormous, indicating 
a much larger strength for the healthy brain relative to the stroke-damaged one. Thus 
sometimes relative strengths may be interestingly comparable even when the absolute
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ones are not.
To summarise so far: our interest lies in what determines whether, in our terminology, a 
comparison o f  causal strengths is trivial. Now, in the Newtonian particle example we 
have both commensurability and separability, and we get non-trivial comparisons. In the 
genes-environment example, by contrast, we have neither commensurability nor 
separability and the comparisons are trivial. So neither o f these cases is really decisive, 
since o f course they are both consistent with either o f commensurability or separability 
being the key factor. To illustrate that it is indeed separability that matters we shall 
present two further examples, this time with the two factors diverging.
Two further examples
Our first new example will be a case where the causes are commensurable but 
inseparable. Imagine a primordial soup in the early history o f  the Earth, in which there 
are two chemicals that can react to synthesise some complex organic combination but 
that will only do so given a certain activation energy. Imagine further that there are two 
thunderclouds passing overhead, a large one and a small one. Suppose that a lightning 
bolt from the large cloud is more energetic than one from the small one, but still not 
energetic enough to trigger the reaction in the primordial soup on its own. Therefore o f 
course neither is a bolt from the small cloud. However, if  the two lightning bolts strike 
simultaneously then (let us suppose) the combined energy o f the two together does go 
past the activation threshold and the chemical reaction will be triggered. In other words, 
for this effect the two bolts are individually insufficient but jointly sufficient. Assume 
finally that the two bolts then do indeed strike simultaneously and that the chemical 
reaction is indeed triggered; what is each bolt’s causal strength?
The two lightning bolts are surely commensurable if  anything is -  they are, after all, two 
examples o f exactly the same phenomenon. But their impacts, with respect to this effect, 
are nevertheless inseparable. Individually, neither triggers the chemical reaction; jointly 
they do. Therefore, defining their causal strengths in the usual way by how much they
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produce o f the effect we are interested in, we have to conclude that individually each has 
zero strength while together they have full strength. This o f course is exactly the same 
situation as in our genes-environment example: on their own, neither genes nor 
environment can produce any plant while together they produce a full plant. The 
important point is that commensurability plus inseparability has yielded a case o f trivial 
causal strengths. All the strengths here will be either zero or maximal, and there is no 
way of saying that the causal strength o f one bolt is any different from that o f the other.
Note particularly that this analysis holds even though we have specified that one bolt is 
bigger than the other. Intuitively o f course one might assume that the bigger bolt should, 
as it were, be assigned more o f the credit. It is this intuition, perhaps, that motivates an 
emphasis on commensurability in the first place -  since the energies o f the two lightning 
bolts can be directly compared (i.e. are commensurable), therefore differential causal 
strengths can be assigned. But I believe such reasoning is incorrect. Remember, the 
specific effect we are concerned with here is the chemical reaction, and this is 
dichotomous -  it either occurs or it does not. To be sure, when considering how 
efficacious they are at producing other effects, for instance inducing voltage in a wire, 
then o f course the two lightning bolts may well have different causal strengths. But when 
considering our particular effect o f triggering the chemical reaction, because o f  the 
activation energy threshold I do not see how assigning different strengths could be 
justified. In our particular example, that is, the comparison o f causal strengths must 
surely be trivial, even though our two causes are commensurable, and even though their 
comparison is not trivial in other examples. (Observe that the two bolts’ separability, our 
marker for non-trivial comparability, itself varies correspondingly with choice o f effect.)
Turn now to the last category o f example, this time the other way round from before: 
namely, with separability but not commensurability. This last example will demonstrate 
that commensurability, as well as being insufficient for non-trivial comparability, is also 
unnecessary. Suppose I am taking my dog for a walk on a windy heath and he gets 
interested in a ball lying in the grass a long way from me. I want him to come back to 
me, so call out to him. Assume that hearing or seeing my call induces him indeed to
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move back to me. Now suppose that at exactly the same moment an especially huge gust 
o f wind blows up. Suppose further that, being only a small dog, this huge gust physically 
blows him back towards me, independently o f any voluntary motion o f his. So we now 
have two independent causes -  namely the dog’s reaction to my call and the physical gust 
of wind -  each producing the same effect, namely the dog’s movement closer to me. 
Which cause is stronger?
I think we can answer that straightforwardly. The definition o f the wind’s strength is 
how much the dog moves given the gust o f wind compared to if  there had been none.
And similarly, the strength o f my call is given by how much the dog moves compared to 
if I had not called. This straightforwardness is a direct result o f  the easy separability o f 
the two causes' effects. The two strengths could perfectly conceivably differ from each 
other and in that respect the case is clearly analogous to our Newtonian particle example. 
But unlike electricity and gravitation in the Newtonian case, the two causes here do not 
seem to be commensurable. My call presumably stimulates some reaction in the dog’s 
brain, and thence voluntary movement. The gust o f wind, in contrast, bypasses such 
mechanisms completely and simply physically pushes the dog’s body. How could we 
define one unit o f wind gust and equate it to one unit o f call? The two are like 
Lewontin’s bricks and mortar, and there is no analogue to the common role o f force in 
the Newtonian particle case. But despite this lack o f commensurability, non-trivial 
comparisons o f causal strength are clearly still possible.
Conclusion
It is perhaps easy to think -  and as we have seen often has been thought -  that the key to 
comparability o f  causal strengths lies in those causes being commensurable. But I 
conclude that this is a mistake, and that the critical factor is actually not 
commensurability at all but rather that the impacts o f the causes be separable. In any 
case, even if  some causal strengths are trivial -  as with the PMs in the genes-environment 
case -  still they are anyway definable. Thus our account o f approximate truth is safely 
applicable also to cases o f incommensurability.
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In passing, we might ask just what significance then should we ever attach to 
commensurability? It seems to me that people already unproblematically compare the 
strengths o f incommensurable causes all the time in everyday life. For example, which is 
the quickest route home -  left to avoid the multiple traffic lights, or right to avoid the 
roadworks? Outside o f physics, similar remarks surely apply to much o f science too. For 
example, which is the most effective way to speed up a particular chemical reaction -  
further heating the reagents, or adding a catalyst? Perhaps therefore (my own view) 
commensurability merely makes comparison o f causal strengths particularly obvious and 
easy sometimes, but is otherwise something o f a red herring. Moreover, upon closer 
inspection some claimed instances o f it seem to be more mirage than reality. Electricity 
and gravity were supposedly commensurable via the common unit o f force, for example, 
but could that force in turn ever be measured except via a common effect such as the 
Newtonian particle’s acceleration? If  not, such cases collapse to the trivial 
‘commensurability’ common to all two causes o f the same effect, and the second sense o f 
commensurability -  referring instead to the way two causes bring about their effects -  
seems to melt away.
3-5) Bayes nets
Much sophisticated recent work has analysed causation in terms o f directed acyclic 
graphs, and developed new formal definitions -  as it were a new calculus -  for it [Pearl 
2000] [Spirtes et al 2000]. A characteristic feature is to incorporate from the start 
probabilistic causation, and once given a causal graph and the probabilities o f some nodes 
on that graph develop techniques for inferring the probabilities o f remaining nodes. The 
central role o f conditional probabilities and Bayesian updating in this process has 
generated the moniker ‘Bayes nets’ for such graphs. A particular area o f application is in
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the analysis o f raw statistical data from which, given certain assumptions, can be inferred 
quantitatively the generating causal structure. It is claimed that these methods are 
superior to many traditional statistical techniques for doing the same thing such as 
regression analysis. Contained in this program is clearly some treatment o f causal 
strength. How does it relate to ours?
We need to distinguish between two issues: defining causal strength/causal weightings, 
and defining approximate truth. Start with the former. The conditional probabilities in 
Bayes nets give the chance o f a particular effect occurring given that the related cause 
does, usually implicitly compared to that cause's absence. In other words, the basic 
conception o f causal strength is the same as in our scheme. The rules for working out the 
quantitative details -  i.e. the probability calculus, essentially -  are also in effect the same 
as ours, notwithstanding the greater complexity o f  some o f their examples. A lot o f the 
effort with Bayes nets is directed instead towards the epistemological issue o f inferring 
what (quantitative) causal relations are present in the first place. This o f course is not 
quite the same as our issue, which is rather the conceptual question o f defining what 
causal strength -  i.e. those quantitative causal relations -  amounts to in the first place. 
With regard to the latter task, the Bayes net approach is in fact rather more simplistic than 
ours since it needs to make several restrictive assumptions in order to derive its 
impressive epistemological theorems. Most notably, it needs to assume the so-called 
causal Markov and faithfulness conditions. It also has no explicit treatment o f choice of 
counterfactual (Co in our formula), or o f many o f the other issues covered in this section. 
In this way, with regard to causal strength it is actually our treatment that is the more 
general.
Move on now to approximate truth itself. Bayes nets do not yield a natural analysis o f 
this (of course they are not particularly designed to). True enough, if  some bit o f a 
network is missing or a particular conditional probability wrongly specified, Bayes nets 
do provide an apparatus for calculating the impact on subsequent probabilities. But this 
in itself would not be sufficient forjudging the impact o f  such events on a model's 
approximate truth, for two main reasons -  neither o f  which Bayes nets analyse explicitly.
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First, the impact o f a missing segment would vary depending on which final effect we are 
interested in. This is just the sensitivity o f any causal strength (and hence approximate 
truth on our account) to specification o f effect. It might be argued back in return that part 
of the specification o f a Bayes net is precisely what final effect we are concerned with, in 
which case we are just reminded to choose the right Bayes net in the first place. If  in 
addition that Bayes net was equipped with an appropriate rule for converting a set of 
causal weights into a final score for approximate truth, then we could say that Bayes nets 
have our notion o f approximate truth built in already. But note that working out such a 
rule was not trivial (see the appendix to chapter 2), and required careful consideration of 
factors nowhere explicitly discussed by Bayes nets.
In any case, there is also still a second point to be taken into account. As argued in 
section 2-9 (about interest-relativity), in order to calculate a model's accuracy we also 
need always to specify exactly which causal strengths we are concerned with in the first 
place. For example in the Hiroshima case, the Los Alamos project, the course o f the 
American advance on Japan, and the weather that day could all be seen as being part o f 
the same Bayes net leading to the explosion. But different explananda will demand 
focusing on different areas within this net. Again, it is true that we could just focus on 
that subsection o f the network that contained our causes o f interest, and then call only this 
subsection our 'Bayes net'. But given that the choice o f  net in the first place is so critical 
yet is left unmodelled by Bayes net theory itself, and given that Bayes nets offer no 
definition o f causal strength superior to ours anyway, it seems to me that the real 
philosophical work is being done here by our theory. For our specific purpose o f 
defining approximate truth, that is, Bayes nets do not offer us anything substantively new.
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